

WITTGENSTEIN'S THEORY OF MEANING

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USHA RANI KAPOOR

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It has been said that Wittgenstein inspired two important movements in philosophy. The first is the so called logical positivism and the second is the linguistic movement. He is thus, one of the most powerful and influential philosophers of the twentieth century. There is no doubt that new questions were born in his mind and he himself rediscovered them. His ideas would be valuable. He uses many technical terms, e.g. Sachverhalt, Tatsche, Sinn and so on, which illuminate each other's meaning.

It is true that Wittgenstein's philosophy has been of great importance to both these trends in contemporary thoughts. First, his early work *Tractatus-logicophilosophicus* and discussions with some members of Vienna circle, and second, his lectures at Cambridge and also glimpses of the works which he did not publish in his life time, inspired and influenced many young philosophers.

The two stages in the development of Wittgenstein's philosophy exhibit two different views of language. The two conceptions of language contain two different theories of meaning. My aim in the dissertation is to explain these theories and to examine them critically.

philosophy, at both the stages, is determined by his conception of language. It is, therefore, absolutely necessary to explain his theories of meaning.

In the Tractatus his ideas have a peculiar charm, its style is different from other philosophical work. In understanding the Tractatus the difficulty lies deeper than merely its style of presentation. During his service he was jotting down his ideas in his Notebooks. It has been said that for him all philosophical pronouncements have equal justifications. In the Tractatus every thought is connected with each other through the numbering system. According to him the Tractatus is essentially a philosophical discussion of the formal prerequisites of all valid thoughts. It shows how traditional philosophy and traditional solutions arise out of ignorance of the principles of symbolism and out of misuse of language. There are many problems as regards language. He responded to the new mathematical logic produced by Frege, Russell and Whitehead which promises to change the world with the new cybernetic devices of computers. His opinion is that simple objects and their configurations must be the ultimate consti-

seals, of which the significance is only to be revealed to the most esoteric devotees, and which, as it seems to us, embodies a very peculiar combination of rigorous mathematical and logical thought and obscure mysticism". And Brand Blanshard maintains that "... Wittgenstein ... has the strange distinction of having produced a work on logic besides which the logic of Hegel is Luminously intelligible". Wittgenstein is mainly concerned with this question: what relation one must fact have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that other. The whole conclusion of the Tractatus is mentioned in this line: "What can be said at all can be said clearly; and whereof one cannot speak there of one must be silent". A similar view is given by Plato in Theaetetus, "if Theaetetus, you should ever conceive afresh, you will be all the better for the present investigation and if not, you will be soberer and humbler, and gentler to other men; and will be too modest to fancy that you know what you do not know. These are the limits of my art. I cannot further go ...". According to the Tractatus language shows what is essential to any symbolism in order that it be significant. The Tractatus has

more elastic and comprehensive. He remained a positivist in so far as he avoids the errors of metaphysics and confines his attention to what is given in language and thought. In the Investigations he writes he travels over a wide field of thought, criss-cross in every direction, and the book is really only an album consisting of a number of sketches of landscapes.<sup>1</sup> When any idea comes in his mind he expresses it at once. I have however, chosen what seems to me to be the most important problems of the book, namely, linguistic considerations.

The main theme of his book is the question of meaning, what is the meaning of a word and on what is it based? These are the philosophical questions. For earlier Wittgenstein, each meaningful expression is something to which it corresponds and to which it points. Later on he rejects the view that a meaningful word is a kind of name because he finds that its meaning is bound up with certain rules for the use of the word.

What is aimed at, in my essay is the main features of his philosophy and I have tried to make an attempt to discuss the fundamental ideas in both the Tractatus and the Investigations. The earlier, Wittgenstein differs with the later one, but the main problem in both the books is the problem of meaning.

it. In this place he discusses meaning in terms of use. But we shall see that there are some points of resemblances. In both essays his problems are linguistic.

However, my exposition is not historical. I have divided my essay into seven chapters. The first chapter is mainly concerned with the historical background of the picture theory of meaning. Here I have also pointed out some differences between the Tractatus and the Notebooks and given some account of the nature of the picture theory according to the Notebooks.

In the Second and Third chapters I have discussed mainly the general ideas of the picture theory of meaning and its criticism. My primary concern is with his conception of meaning and language. I have refuted the view that Wittgenstein's aim in the Tractatus is to construct an ideal language for philosophy which would replace ordinary language. According to my interpretation Wittgenstein's aim is to understand the meaning of ordinary language, not to provide a substitute for it. He was, of course, mistaken, in his view that the logic of ordinary language could be elicited by constructing an ideal language. Philosophical Investigations gives a much better

how certain propositions are linked with reality and truth-function theory of complex propositions shows how all other propositions are linked with the world. Wittgenstein says that if language is linked with reality then some propositions are connected with the world and do not derive their meaning from other propositions. These he called elementary propositions. In the second place, non-elementary propositions are understood via elementary ones. Therefore, he mentions two points, first, how elementary propositions are linked with the world and second, how complex propositions are related to elementary ones? So elementary propositions are unit statements and all other propositions are truth-functions of elementary ones.

In the fourth Chapter I have tried to discuss the rejection of the main doctrines of the Tractatus. It would be quite absurd to deny that Philosophical Investigations is in obvious and fundamental conflict with the theories of the Tractatus. The earlier sections of the Investigations are an explicit criticism of his earlier work. But we shall see that there are some points of resemblances between both views.

In the Fifth chapter I have mainly discussed the use theory of meaning and its relation with the notion of language-game. It seems to me that a word cannot have the role of referring to a fixed object without having a fixed use. Wittgenstein says that every word has a meaning and the meaning of a word is its use in the language. Therefore, the meaning of a name is explained by pointing to its bearer.

Here he speaks of family resemblances and gives some account of language-games. For him games have nothing in common, they have only resemblances.

In the Sixth chapter my aim is to discuss his conception of pain and private language. He denies the view that 'Pain' is the name of an object. He gives the examples of private languages in the context of his discussions of pain and other sensations. He maintains that language must play a role in life. So the concept of a private language is a chimera. Sensation-words are as much dependent on rules of use as other words.

In the last chapter I have discussed some other theories of meaning. My discussion of these theories is very brief, but I have tried to show that these theories do not fully explain the nature of natural languages. A language is a common concern of its speakers and is thus possible because of certain rules and uses. Meaning is, thus, necessarily connected with the use of words and sentences. I have tried to show that Wittgenstein has shown a much better insight than other theorists of language.

It is my duty to thank all those who have kindly assisted me in doing my research. I am deeply indebted to Dr. D.N. Dwivedi, my guide, without whose help I could never complete the work. Thanks are also due to Mr. G.R. Maini for expert and prompt typing.

Usha Rani Kapoor  
(Usha Rani Kapoor)

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A\_b\_b\_r\_e\_v\_i\_a\_t\_i\_o\_n

A : Analysis  
AF : Archivio di Filosofia.  
APQ : American Philosophical Quarterly.  
I : Inquiry  
JP : Journal of Philosophy.  
M : Mind  
P : Philosophy.  
PAS : Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society.  
PASS : Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society  
Supplement.  
PPR : Philosophy and Phenomenological Research  
PQ : Philosophical Quarterly.  
PR : The Philosophical Review.  
PSc : The Philosophy of Science.  
RM : The Review of Metaphysics.

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C H A P T E R - I  
BACKGROUND OF THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING

C\_H\_A\_P\_T\_E\_R - I

Twentieth century philosophy has insisted on a sharp and deep connection between philosophical problems and language. In England the most powerful and influential of contemporary philosophers is Ludwig Wittgenstein. Without understanding philosophy and language we could not understand Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein's importance lies not only in the making of new points, in the creation of new points but in the creation of new and often exhilarating thoughts. Wittgenstein inspired two important movements in contemporary philosophy. The one is logical positivism and the other is analytic or linguistic movement. He has been largely responsible for both these trends in contemporary philosophy.

Wittgenstein was born in Vienna in 1889. He was the youngest of five brothers and three sisters. His family was of Jewish descent. His father was a man of forcible character who was generally both much intelligent and feared. His father had started the modern iron and steel industry in Austria. The whole family was something of a cultural and particularly a musical centre of Viennese life, his father was much interested in music, but he did not consider the arts much more because he was civil engineer. All the children had considerable musical talent. Malcolm reports that Wittgenstein discussed aesthetics and that, "the depth and richness of Wittgenstein's thinking

about art were very exciting".<sup>1</sup> He was educated at home up to the age of fourteen. He had developed a childhood interest in machinery, and decided to study engineering. According to Von Wright, "Even in his last years he could spend a whole day with his beloved anecdotes of his serving as a mechanic when some machinery got out of order."<sup>2</sup> After studying two years at the school of engineering in Berlin he went to Manchester at the age of about nineteen. At that time he studied engineering, but his interest soon passed to mathematics and then to the principles of mathematics. So he left Manchester and went to Cambridge to study under Russell. G.H. Von Wright states in his "Biographical Sketch" that, "it is probably true that he lived on the border of mental illness. A fear of being driven across it, followed him throughout his life".<sup>3</sup> He remained in Cambridge from 1911 to 1913. When he was sixteen years old he had read Schopenhauer's theory of the "world as ideas" and had been much impressed by him. The first major influence upon his philosophical thought came from the writings of Bertrand Russell and Frege. He writes in the Tractatus, "I owe a great part of the stimulation of my thoughts to the great works of Frege and to the writings of my friend Mr. Bertrand Russell".<sup>4</sup> When he was associated with Russell

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1. Norman Malcolm, Ludwig Wittgenstein : A Memoir, p.53.

2. Von Wright, G.H. Ludwig Wittgenstein, a Biographical Sketch, p.8.

3. Ibid.

4. Anscombe, G.E.M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p.12.

he wrote "Tractatus" and it was his first published work. It was written in German. In 1929 he received Ph.D. degree on "Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus". At one time he took up the charge of school-master in Austria but in 1929 some Cambridge philosophers persuaded him to return to that University. After returning there he was made a fellow of Trinity College. On the retirement of Moore he was elected to the chair of the professor of philosophy. After some time he resigned his chair. At this time he wrote an article on "Some remarks on Logical form" and dictated notes which are called Blue and Brown Books, published posthumously in 1958. In these notes, a radical change arises in Wittgenstein's mind. He rejects some fundamental ideas of the Tractatus. He abandoned the Picture theory of language. It is very difficult to understand his later new philosophy. The early Wittgenstein took the inspiration from Frege and Russell, but the later Wittgenstein did not receive any inspiration from anywhere.

By mentioning the theories of Frege-Russell and others, I will show the nature of the problems which he took from them. But he accepted neither the problems nor their solutions without his own contribution to them. Though he has many points of agreement with Frege and Russell. The earliest philosophical investigations of Wittgenstein were in the realms of the problems with which Frege and Russell had dealt. Concepts such as 'Propositional Functions', 'Variables', 'Generality' and 'Identity' occupied his thoughts. He made an interesting discovery - a new symbolism for so-called 'truth-functions' that led to the explanation of logical truths as 'tautology'.

Wittgenstein's Tractatus has captured the interest and excited the admiration of many, yet almost all that has been published about it has been wildly irrelevant. If this has had any one cause that cause has been the neglect of Frege and of the new direction that he gave to philosophy.<sup>5</sup> Anscombe tells us further that Wittgenstein's Tractatus presupposes knowledge of Frege without which it is sure to be misunderstood. "In the Tractatus Wittgenstein assumes, and does not try to stimulate an interest in the kind of questions that Frege wrote about, he also takes it for granted that his readers will have read Frege."<sup>6</sup>

Justifiably Frege may be described as the father of logic. The stimulation came from Peano. He failed to derive arithmetic from logic. Frege was to define 'Zero', 'number' and 'successor of' in logical terms. In various articles, he discussed the philosophical problems, such as 'On Function' and 'Concept', 'On Sense and reference' and 'On Concept and object', etc.

Frege makes the distinction between sense and reference of words. This was used by him in connection with truth and falsehood. Frege's inquiries were in no way psychological nor had he any interest in private mental contents. Many questions of Frege and Russell's are the same, but Russell differs from him by introducing the notion of immediate experience into his

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5. Anscombe, G.E.M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 12.

6. ibid.

explanation of meaning and his theory of judgment. We owe to Frege the notion of a truth-value. The truth-value of a proposition is its truth or falsehood as the case may be. He gave the modern view of quantification which is used in logic. This conception of modern logic is an instrument for the clarification of thoughts. Without this development of modern logic Wittgenstein could not have written the Tractatus. Russell rejected the distinction between the sense and reference of phrases and he used the new way of representing "all" and "some" in analysing sentences containing definite descriptions without reference are neither true nor false. Frege's 'sense' corresponds to the English word "Meaning" and his 'reference' corresponds to the word "Meant". Wittgenstein's and Frege's conception of sense are the same. He held that names have no sense but only reference and propositions have no reference but only sense, and a proposition cannot have any sense without being true or falsehood. Russell uses only one notion "meaning" and holds that meanings of words must always be objects.

Wittgenstein's "Picture-theory" of proposition is much influenced by Russell's Theory of Descriptions. According to that theory definite descriptions such as, "the author of waverley", and "the present King of France", and again indefinite descriptions like 'a man' as this phrase occurs in, 'I met a man', nor 'A man has been here', are not the designating expressions.<sup>7</sup> At first sight people may assume that

the meaning of any word is the object it names. For example, the word 'Socrates' names a certain man and thus that he is the meaning of the word 'Socrates'. Similarly we may suppose that the colour red is the meaning of the word 'red'. "As to what one means by 'meaning', I will give a few illustrations. For instance, the word 'Socrates', you will say, means a certain man; the word 'mortal' means a certain quality; ...."<sup>8</sup> This is obvious for definite descriptions that every word or phrase does name something. Russell realizes that this is unwarranted for example, the phrase 'the golden mountain', and words like 'or', 'if' and 'all', do not name anything. But Russell agrees to this view that if a word or phrase does name something - if it is a true proper name, a "logically proper name" - then the meaning of that word or phrase is whatever it names. According to Russell, if a noun does in fact name a certain object, then that object is its meaning, and it has that meaning in all contexts. According to him definite descriptions are quite unlike proper names; they do not name any object, and thus they have no meaning in isolation. If we think that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes then here Russell's position is not implausible. For, if we insist that all definite descriptions name objects and that the object is their meaning what are we to say about definite descriptions like, 'the present king of France'? So there are no actual objects. So that they may have a meaning. Russell thought that no definite descriptive

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<sup>8</sup> Russell, B., "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", p.186.

phrase, can be a true proper name. For example, we give the following propositions:

"Scott is the author of Waverley" ... This proposition expresses an identity; thus if "the author of Waverley" could be taken as a proper name, and supposed to stand for some object C, the proposition would be "Scott is C". But if C is any one except Scott, the proposition is "Scott is Scott", which is trivial, and plainly different from "Scott is the author of Waverley".<sup>9</sup> Russell maintains that "... the Author of Waverley"<sup>10</sup> does not stand simply for Scott, nor for anything else".

Russell says that if we contemplate the proposition expressed by such e.g., "The Author of Waverley was Scotch", we can see that it is a complex one. First of all, it states that some one wrote Waverley; if no one had written Waverley, the sentence would express a false proposition. Secondly, it states that only one person wrote Waverley; if two or more persons had written it, the sentence "the author of Waverley was Scotch" would express a false proposition. Thirdly, it states that whoever Waverley was Scotch. Thus Russell says that proposition expressed by the sentence, "The Author of Waverley was Scotch" has for its meaning the three propositions expressed by these three sentences:

- (1) At least one person wrote Waverley;
- (2) At most one person wrote Waverley;

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9. Russell and Whitehead, *Principia Mathematica*, I, Second edition, p. 67.

10. Russell, *The Philosophy of Logical Atomism*, March Vol., p. 202.

(3) Whoever wrote Waverley was Scotch.<sup>11</sup>

Since the analysis specifies what the proposition really says, "the author of Waverley" is not a constituent of the proposition at all. There is no constituent really there corresponding to the descriptive phrase.<sup>12</sup> So there is two point which we mention against Russell. First, the theory claims that certain phrases viz., definite descriptions in fact do not do so. Second that a proposition expressed by a certain sort of sentence can be analyzed into other. Thus all complex propositions might be analyzable into simpler propositions. Although Russell's Theory of Descriptions makes the contrast between definite descriptions and proper names. According to Russell definite descriptions has no meaning by itself, but the whole sentence in which it occurs has a meaning, and that a definite description does not function like a name. Russell's Theory of Descriptions represents an escape from this position, he adopted Frege's way of handling 'Some' and 'all' indefinite descriptions and phrases like 'Any number'.<sup>13</sup>

Frege's inquiries had given the notion of proper names. But in Russell's theory it retains that importance and comprises only logically simple signs. Russell explains e.g., 'The Author of Waverley drank Port' as; 'For some x, x wrote Waverley' and 'for all y, y wrote Waverley only if y = x, and x drank port; such an analysis containing definite descriptions and other

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11. Russell, B. Introduction to Mathematical Philosophy, p. 177.

12. I.M.A., "The Philosophy of Logical Atomism", March Vol., p. 222.

See, Chapt. II, cf. Also Philosophical Writings of Gottlob. Frege, pp. 12, 14, 16-20, 36-38, 93.

denoting phrases excludes the forms of signs that contribute  
the meaning of sentences.<sup>14</sup> According to Russell's terminology  
a simple signs include not only proper names of "individuals",  
but also signs for "Universals", and perhaps signs for logical  
forms as well. An important doctrine of Russell is his rejec-  
tion of the distinction between sense and reference of Frege.  
Frege says that all symbols have 'sense', that some 'Proper  
names' have reference. This problem does not arise on Russell's  
doctrine. But there are many difficulties in the theory of  
Russell. According to Russell Judgment and supposing are rela-  
tions in which the mind stands to a set of objects including a  
relation R; if R relates the objects other than R, the judgment  
is true, and if not it is false. This theory does not make it  
impossible to judge a nonsense. So Wittgenstein avoids these  
difficulties that the meaning of a Simple Sign is its bearer -  
by giving a different account of judgments, propositions and  
logical constants. Wittgenstein accepts Russell's theory of  
Descriptions in its purely logical aspect. Wittgenstein says  
that the meaning of a simple signs is its bearer. He accepts  
Russell's Theory of Descriptions in its purely logical form.  
Wittgenstein agrees the view of Russell that the meaning of a  
name is its bearer, but in him is not based on the British  
Empiricist epistemology that influenced Russell. Frege says  
that if a sentence is a fiction, it has not got a truth-value.

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14. Ancombe, G. E. M., An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 64.

It can have a good sense but not have a truth-value. According to Wittgenstein 'having a sense' was one and same thing with being true or false. This is saying the proposition is already something true or false, he calls it something "without sense". Frege always accepts that every sentence must have a sense but Wittgenstein would agree that what already has a sense must be true or false. Frege says that a sentence is only well formed if the concepts are sharply definite and if it is determined for even an object whether it falls under that concept or not. In the second place he says that the truth.- Conditions determined the sense of a proposition. We see at 5.4733 where Wittgenstein says: Frege says, "every proposition must have a sense; and I say, Every possible proposition is well-formed, and if it does not make sense, this can only come of our not having supplied any reference for some of its component parts". At 3.13 Wittgenstein says that, 'a proposition has in it everything that a projection has; but it has not got the projected thing in it.'

It is clear that the main-theme of the Tractatus is the connection between language and reality. The main thesis is this that sentences are pictures of facts. As Wittgenstein wrote to Russell a fact is what corresponds to a proposition if it is true. It is clear that the logical product of two elementary propositions can be neither a tautology nor a contradiction. Whatever elementary propositions may be, they are not simple observation statements. Wittgenstein evidently did not think that epistemology had any bearing on his subject-matter.

We find epistemology put in its place at 4.1121; 'Psychology is no nearer related to philosophy, than is any other natural science. The theory of knowledge is the philosophy of psychology. Russell had asked ... But a 'Gedanke' (thought) is a 'Tatsache' (fact), what are its constituents and components and what is their relation to those of the Picture Tatsache ? Wittgenstein replies, "I do not know what the constituents of the thoughts are but I know that it must have constituents which correspond to the words of language". It would be a matter of psychology to find out. The elementary propositions have not the role of simple observation statements. The character of reference and of meaning itself demands that there should be elementary proposition names and simple objects. Wittgenstein says at 3.23, "The demand for the possibility of the simple signs is the demand for definiteness of sense. The simple objects are presented as something demanded by the nature of language. (2.021, 2.0211). It also seems certain that we do not infer the existence of simple objects from the existence of particular simple objects, but rather know them, by description, as it were as the end product of analysis by means of a process leading to them.<sup>15</sup> Wittgenstein's Picture Theory and the theory of truth-functions are one and the same thing. Russell says that Wittgenstein was concerned with the condition for a logically perfect language that the whole function of language is to have a meaning. This statement of Russell's was plainly

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15. Anscombe, G. E. M., An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 39.

contrary to the intentions of the Tractatus. At 5.563 Wittgenstein says, "All the sentences of our everyday language, just as they are logically in perfect order". Frege says, "Language has means of presenting now one, now another part of the sentence as the object; one of the most familiar is the distinction of active and passive forms .... It need not surprise us that the same sentence may be conceived as an assertion about an object. Only we must observe that what is asserted is different".<sup>16</sup> Wittgenstein would not accept Frege's way of distinguishing between object and concept. This conception is the same as the Picture theory.

Wittgenstein's doctrine is not at all easy to understand. On the one side he says that elementary proposition is a concatenation of names, as consisting of names in immediate combination, and on the other side he says at 5.47, "where there is complexity, there is argument and function." So the elementary proposition too consists of argument and function. But this remark makes a problem; if elementary proposition consist of names in immediate connection, then it is not reproduced. But we do not know the composition of elementary proposition. The idea of conceiving a proposition as a function of the expression contained in it, Frege explains it in his essay function and concept.

For Frege, even the best symbolism cannot informatively state what a function is. Unless one already grasps it, one

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16. Geach and Black, Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege, p. 49.

cannot see how the symbolism works." These considerations of Frege's were what led Wittgenstein in the Tractatus to treat the concept function as a formal concept expressible not by a proper predicate but only by a manner of symbolizing; it is only thus, in fact, that this concept is in Frege's symbolism. And this in turn has an obvious connection with Wittgenstein's doctrine that what 'shows' or comes out, in language, cannot be stated in language.<sup>17</sup>

In the first place we introduce the notion of a numerical function. The function could be fittingly expressed by a formulation with an empty place in it. By an "argument" we mean what is signified by the sign we put into the empty place. Frege says, "how closely what is called a concept in logic is connected with what we call a function. Wittgenstein agrees with Frege and says at 3.318, "I conceive the proposition like Frege and Russell as a function of the expressions it contains". On the next step Frege says, "An object is anything that is not a function. So that the expression for it does not contain an empty place", Wittgenstein says at 4.431, "The proposition is the expression of its truth-conditions". Wittgenstein says that, "the explanation of the concept of truth is wrong; if "the true" and "the false" were really objects, and were the arguments in  $\neg P$  etc., then according to Frege's own specifications the sense of  $\neg P$  would by no means be specified.<sup>18</sup> Frege has specified the truth-values of his propositions by specifying

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17. Anscombe and Geach, *Three Philosophers*, p. 147.

18. Anscombe, G.E.M., *Op.cit.*, p.107.

the truth-conditions because his propositions are logical-truths. If Frege has a negative proposition, ' $\sim P$ ', its sense must also be the sense of the fulfilment of its truth-conditions. Against Frege the point may be given as, "If truth-values are the references of propositions, then you do not specify a sense by specifying a truth-value."<sup>19</sup> So it should be said that Wittgenstein's views are Fregean. Ramsey says that "Wittgenstein made the gulf between concepts and objects much greater than Frege ever made it. But in respect of having argument places, concepts go over entirely into logical forms." In the "completely analysed proposition" which is a logical network sprinkled with names", (I take this expression from a late note-book of Wittgenstein's in which he makes some comments on the theories of Tractatus). In his pre-Tractatus notebooks Wittgenstein says, "Properties and relations are objects too" (16.6.15). The concept of Frege has become simply the logical form. The fully analysed proposition of Wittgenstein, we have nothing but a set of argument places filled with names of objects; there remains no kind of expression that could be regarded as standing for a concept.<sup>20</sup>

Wittgenstein rejects the assertion sign of Frege and Russell. This sign is useful in symbolic logic, but its meaning is not the same as Russell and Frege took it to be. Frege's assertion sign shows the difference between the thought and

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Opposite., p.107.

1Mid., p.110.

judgment. Thus Frege has two arguments, the weak and the strong. Wittgenstein says at 4.442 that Frege's assertion sign " $\sim$ " is logically quite meaningless; in Frege (and in Russell) it only indicates that these authors hold the propositions so marked to be true". Russell and Frege both accept this point that a truth-function is the same kind of thing as a function with an empty place for a name; but there is a difference between them. According to Frege, the empty place is a place for a name, he takes propositions as names of truth-values, but according to Russell propositions are the range of significant substitutions for the variable in this kind of function, and he would not call a proposition a name.<sup>21</sup> Now Frege and Russell both stated this point that the truth-functional connectives themselves express functions. Wittgenstein did not accept this. At 5.25 and 5.251 he says, "Operation and function must not be confused. A function cannot be its own argument, but the result of an operation can be the base of that very operation".

Now Frege and Russell both say that number was not a formal concept, but a genuine concept. Russell and Whitehead have given the quantifier signs as ' $(X)$ ' and ' $(\exists x)$ ' from something is ' $\phi$ ', but its real inventor was Frege. Frege does not employ an existential quantifier like ' $(\exists x)$ ' in constructing the symbol for judgments of the form some. He simply uses

negation together with his universal quantifier. Russell's view is not different from Frege. At 4.12721 Wittgenstein tells, "the formal concept is already given with an object that falls under it". The most important thesis of the Tractatus is that "metaphysical" statements are non-sensical, and that the only sayable things are propositions of natural science. (1.6.53).

It is Wittgenstein's habit to note down his thoughts in his diary which is called his Notebooks. He had written his Notebooks in 1914-16. There is much difference between his Notebooks and the Tractatus. In his Notebooks his thoughts are given according to date and paragraphs. In the entry for 3.9.14 he writes that Frege says: Every well-formed sentence must make sense; and I say: Every possible sentence is well-formed, and if it does not make sense that can only come of our having given any meaning to certain of its parts. Even when we believe we have done so (cf. 5.4733). He says, "A proposition can express its sense only by being the logical portrayal of it. In the proposition a world is as it were put together experimentally (as when in the law-court in Paris a motor-car accident is represented by means of dolls, etc.)<sup>22</sup> (cf. 4.031). It has a sense independent of its truth or falsehood. It must be possible to demonstrate everything

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22. This remark refers to an accident about which Wittgenstein later told several of his friends (cf. G. H. Von Wright, Ludwig Wittgenstein, a Biographical Sketch in the Philosophical Review, 1955, pp. 502-3). To judge from the date of the present MS, however, this incident cannot very well have taken place in the French on the East Front.

essential by considering this case.

A picture can present relations that do not exist. Only in this way can the proposition be true or false. It can only agree or disagree with reality by being a picture of a situation. (See 4.06).

3.10.14.

Tautologies say nothing, they are not pictures of situations; they are themselves logically completely neutral (The logical product of a tautology and a proposition says neither more nor less than the latter by itself) (see 4.462 and 4.465).

4.10.14.

We can say straight away: Instead of this proposition has such and such a sense; this proposition represents such and such a situation. (See 4.031).

Only in this way can the proposition be true or false; It can only agree or disagree with reality by being a picture of a situation (See 4.06). The proposition is a picture of a situation only in so far as it is logically articulated (A simple non-articulated-sign can be neither true nor false) (cf.4.032).

The name is not a picture of the thing named. The proposition only says something in so far as it is a picture (See 4.03).

Every connexion of signs which appears to say something about its own sense is a pseudo-proposition (like all propositions of logic). Thus it is possible to devise a picture of the world without saying what is a representation of what. Roughly speaking, before any proposition can make sense at all the

logical constants must have reference.<sup>23</sup> The form of a picture might be called that in which the picture must agree with reality (in order to be capable of portraying it at all) (Cf. 2.17 & 2.18).

The sense of the proposition is what it images (cf. 2.221).

27.10.14.

The proposition is a model of reality as we imagine it.  
(Sec. 4.01).

28.10.14.

Even in a picture we could represent a negative fact by representing what is not the case. There are different ways of giving a representation, even by means of a picture, and what represents is not merely the sign or picture but also the method of representation. What is common to all representation is that they can be right or wrong, true or false. Then picture and way of representing are completely outside what is represented. The two together are true or false, namely the picture in a particular way (of course this holds for the elementary proposition too). The way of representation determines how the reality has to be compared with the picture. The picture has whatever relation to reality it does have. And the point is how it is supposed to represent. The same picture will agree or fail to agree with reality according to how it is supposed to represent.

A situation is thinkable (imaginable) means we can make ourselves a picture of it (3.001).

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23. I render 'Bedeutung' here and elsewhere, by 'reference' in order to bring it especially to the reader's attention, (a) that Wittgenstein was under the influence of Frege in his use of 'Sinn' (sense) and 'Bedeutung' (reference) or meaning in the sense 'what a word or sentence stands for' and (b) that there is a great contrast between his ideas at this stage of the Notebooks and the Tractatus, where he denies that logical constants or sentences have 'Bedeutung'.

If a picture presents what is not the case in the forementioned way, this only happens through its presenting that which is not the case. For the picture says, as it were; 'This is how it is not', and to the question, "how it is not"? Just as the positive proposition is the answer. In order to designate a logical place with the picture we must attach a way of symbolizing to it (the positive, the negative etc.).

The picture must now in its turn cast its shadow on the world. Puzzle pictures and the seeing of situations.

(Cf. 5.5423).

"Not P" and "P" contradict one another; both cannot be true; but I can surely express both; both pictures exist. They are to be found side by side; or rather "P" and " $\sim P$ " are like a picture and the infinite plane outside this picture (logical plane). Although all logical constants must already occur in the simple proposition, its own particular proto-picture must surely also occur in it whole and undivided. Then this proto-picture is not actually a proposition (though it has the aspect of a proposition) and it might correspond to Frege's "Assumption" By my correlating the components of the picture with objects, it comes to represent a situation and to be right or wrong (e.g., a picture represents the inside of a room etc.) 27.11.14.

The Picture can replace a description. 29.3.15.

The proposition is the picture of the fact. I can devise different pictures of a fact (the logical operations serve this purpose). But what is characteristic of the fact will be the same in all of these pictures and will not depend

on me. The possibility of all similes, of the whole pictorial character of our language is founded in the logic of portrayal. (4.015).

So a proposition may indeed be an incomplete picture of a certain fact, but it is always a complete picture. (cf. 5.156).

In short, if we were to apply the proto-pictures only in connexion with names, there would be the possibility that we should know the existence of the proto-pictures from the existence of their special cases. But as it is we use variables, that is to say we talk, so to speak of the proto-pictures by themselves, quite apart from any individual cases.

Tractatus-logico-Philosophicus of Wittgenstein considered an important event in the philosophical world, starting from the principles of symbolism and the relations which are necessary between words and things in any language. To understand Wittgenstein's book it is necessary to realize that what is his problems with which he is concerned. First problem is, language and meaning; second problem is that what is the relation subsisting between thoughts, words, sentences etc. This problem is concerned with epistemology. Third is that using sentences so as to convey truth rather than falsehood this is concerned with some special sciences. Fourth is that what relation must a sentence hold to another? This question is logical. Wittgenstein is concerned with the logically perfect language that the whole function of language is to have meaning. The essential business of language is to assert or deny facts.

Now, we will see that there are some differences between his Notebooks and Tractatus. During his service he was jotting down his thoughts in his Notebooks. So it is like a diary, in which the entries are dated, for example, at one place he writes:

A characteristic example for my theory of the significance of descriptions in physics: The two theories of heat; heat conceived at one time as a stuff, at another time as a movement.

25.12.14.

So in the Notebooks, there are paragraphs. It naturally shows development; thus when it appears to present views different from those of the tractatus, there is no need to reconcile the two. It will serve to cut short some argument where wholly irrelevant contexts are supposed by an interpretation. The content of an earlier Notebook are often worked over again in a later one. Therefore, it deals mainly with the ego, the freedom of the will, the meaning of life and, death. These are explained in the following paragraphs. For example, he writes:

What do I know about God and the purpose of life?

I know that this world exists. That I am placed in it like my eye in its visual field.

That something about it is problematic, which we call its meaning.

That this meaning does not lie in it but outside it (cf. 6.41).

That life is the world (cf. 6.21).

That my will penetrates the world.

That my will is good or evil. Therefore that good and evil are somehow connected with the meaning of the world.

The meaning of life, i.e., the meaning of the world, we can call God.

And connect with this the comparison of God to a father.

To pray is to think about the meaning of life.

I cannot bend the happenings of the world to my will: I am completely powerless.

I can only make myself independent of the world - and 'so in a certain sense master it - by renouncing any influence happenings.

5.7.16.

Thus the somewhat aphoristic remarks on these topics in the Tractatus are shifted from a quantity of material. In Tractatus there is numbering system, e.g., he writes that:

Things are independent in so far as they can occur in all possible situations, but this form of independence is a form of connexion with states of affairs, a form of dependence. (It is impossible for words to appear in two different roles; by themselves and in prepositions).

T.2.0122

In the Notebooks some paragraphs are there where Tractatus number is written. The language of the Notebooks can be understood easily but it is very difficult to understand the

Tractatus because its language is very difficult. In the Tractatus every sentence is connected with another sentence e.g., he writes:

A sign is what can be perceived of a symbol. T.3.32.

So one and the same sign (written or spoken etc.) can be common to two different symbols - in which case they will signify in different ways. T.3.321.

Therefore, Tractatus is like a poetry. In both the books there are significant differences in choice of words. In logical formulae, the use of symbols which he explains is often experimental. In the Tractatus his ideas have a peculiar charm and its style is different from others. To understand the Tractatus the difficulty lies deeper than merely its style of presentation. We can say that the Tractatus is a web, and it is a philosophical discussions of the formal prerequisites of all valid thoughts. It shows that how traditional philosophy and traditional solutions arise out of ignorance of the principles of symbolism and out of misuse of language. So there are some differences and some similarities involved between both the books.

**C H A P T E R - II**  
**THE PICTURE THEORY OF MEANING**

## C\_H\_A\_P\_T\_E\_R - II

In the preceding chapter I have discussed Wittgenstein's "Picture Theory of Meaning". In this section the main points are: how is a proposition linked with the world ? How is language linked with reality ? How are we to make sense of the proposition ? We understand a proposition before we know its truth-value. So the proposition is connected with the world. In short Wittgenstein's answer is: we make to ourselves pictures of facts (T.2.1). The picture is a model of reality (T.2.12) and is a fact (T.2.141).

A picture is not an assertion that something like it is to be found somewhere in the world. When a picture stands in a relation to something which is not a thing we no longer speak of it as picturing that thing. According to him the picture is the thought. Now we may explain Wittgenstein's picture theory as follows:

The picture is a fact (T.2.141). The Gramophone record and musical scores are pictures too (T.4.014). Phonetic spelling is a picture of spoken language (T.4.011). Thoughts are pictures too (T.3). According to Wittgenstein a picture may be called either true or false. The picture agrees with reality or not, it is right or wrong, true or false (T.2.21). In the agreement or disagreement of its sense with reality the truth or falsity consists (T.2.222). A picture is not a jumble of variegated point patches. The elements of a picture

represents elements in the pictured. The picture can represent every reality whose form it has (T.2.171). A proposition is a picture of reality for if I understand a proposition (T.4.021) And I understand a proposition without having had its sense explained to me (T.4.0312). Every picture is also a logical picture (T.2.182). The picturing relation consists of the co-ordinations of the elements of the picture and of the things (T.2.1514).

Now I am concerned here with linguistic pictures or propositional signs and words. Generally, I have mentioned that Wittgenstein solved all the fundamental questions concerning the symbolic representation of the world. Before we can discuss the relation of language with the world, it is necessary to understand the nature of these considerations.

Here we shall begin with what is an elementary proposition? Wittgenstein has used three words in this connection. The first is the 'Satzzeichen' (in both the Ogden and the Pears and McGuinness translations 'propositional sign'). Thus by Satzzeichen Wittgenstein means any particular sign or a group of signs that may be used to express a proposition. Secondly, we have the Sinnvoller Satz (in ogden: significant proposition, in Pears and McGuinness: Proposition with a sense). We can say that Satzzeichen are signs and Sinnvolle Sätze are Satzzeichen plus-sense. Thirdly, we have the 'Sätze' (both in ogden and Pears and McGuinness 'Proposition'). In the view of Pears it may be described as 'Sentence type'). Stenius says it as 'Satzmees'. Griffin's view is that a Satz is more

than signs but less than symbols. It is "the satzzeichen plus its projective relation to the world."<sup>1</sup> "It is a combination of words along with their syntactical application".<sup>2</sup> Wittgenstein does not always distinguish between the 'satz' and the 'Sinnvoller satz'.

Then let us discuss here the meaning and nature of elementary propositions. An elementary proposition is a series of names. It <sup>not</sup> can be analysed into any further more basic propositions. It is <sup>not</sup> absolutely simple. It is complex and has components. Wittgenstein says: "An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation of names". (T. 4.22). It is obvious that in the analysis of proposition we must come to elementary propositions, which consists of names in immediate combination (T.4.221).

Then we will explain what is a name? Wittgenstein is using name in a technical sense not in any ordinary sense. We use 'name' to things and persons. According to Wittgenstein a name means a term that is essentially to be contrasted with one that can be verbally defined; it is one that cannot be analysed or defined. "The name cannot be analysed further by any definition. It is a primitive sign", (T.3.26). It explains why ordinary names cannot count as names in Wittgenstein's sense. They are not names because their meanings can be explained by giving some essential characteristics about thing they name. In Russell's sense they are really abbreviated definite descriptions. In the language of Russell 'this' is a proper

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<sup>1</sup>. Griffin, J. Wittgenstein's Logical Atomism, p. 129.

name and is free from descriptions. If objects are not observables, then Wittgenstein would reject this ostensive definition. Names cannot be defined ostensively.

It follows from this that a name must denote something simple — something, that is, without parts or components of any kind. If a name denoted something complex, it would be a fact and not an object. All names are names of objects and predicates. Nothing can correspond to a name but an object. An object is the meaning of a name. Names are the simple symbols. I indicate them by single letters as, 'X', 'Y', 'Z'. I write elementary propositions as functions of names. Therefore, names represent and function assert. Wittgenstein tells us the configuration of names in a proposition says that the objects in reality are configured in a certain way. A name will appear in a proposition only {when all the rest of the signs in it are names too. If ' $\phi$ ' is not a name the proposition ' $\phi^a$ ' contains only one name and its fact one object. The relation between names and their denotata is purely conventional.

Frege made a distinction between Bedeutung (meaning) and Sinn (sense). He applied both sinn and Bedeutung to sentences. But Wittgenstein says that propositions have only sense. Facts can be only described. "States of affairs can be described but not named" (T.2.144). As names stand for something, it would have to stand for something. So there is no possibility of false proposition. There were no differences between a proposition and a name.

Thus Wittgenstein advocates a bearer theory of meaning for name. In Wittgenstein's special sense, a name can only denote an object. "A name means an object". (T.3.203). "Objects are simple" (T.2.02). "In the proposition the name represents the object" (T.3.22). But why did Wittgenstein think that there are any such propositions? The following passage shows us that:

It is obvious that the analysis of propositions must bring us to elementary propositions which consists of names in immediate combination. I.4.22(1).

Hence, if there were no such objects, the elementary proposition would consist of terms that had no meaning. The meaning of all proposition depends on elementary proposition. So, there is another important point that propositions are combinations of names, applies only to elementary propositions.

Now we are in a position to discuss why there must be names. According to Wittgenstein an indefinite sense is no sense at all. The meaning of the terms of a proposition depends on those of the simpler propositions. As propositions do have sense, then there must be elementary proposition consisting of only names. Names and elementary propositions are demands of analysis and definite sense.

Many ordinary personal names — names per excellence are correctly used to refer to numbers of people.<sup>3</sup> Our choice

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3. Strawson, P. "On Referring", M. 1950, p. 340.

of names is partly arbitrary, partly dependent on legal and social observances.<sup>4</sup> Miss Anscombe writes that "Wittgenstein pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the foundations of logic and the theory of meaning, with which he was concerned, the passage about the "elucidations" of names, where he says that one must be "acquainted" with their objects, gives them the lie."<sup>5</sup>

Thus, Wittgenstein's picture theory of proposition is much influenced from Russell's theory of descriptions. According to this theory, definite descriptions such as, 'the author of Waverley', and 'the present King of France', 'The tallest building in New York', and so on, phrases which might purport to name one definite object and no other. If the sentences in which descriptions are true, each description stands for an object. The way in which description stands for objects must be different from the way in which proper names stand for objects. A proper name will stand for its object because that object is called by that name. If a proper name has in fact, no bearer in the use then nothing has been ascribed to any object by sentences and so nothing has been said truly or falsely. According to Frege definite descriptions are proper names. 'Names and predicates can be said to have the role of referring when they occur in preposition'.<sup>6</sup>

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4. op.cit., p.341.

5. Anscombe, G. E. M., *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, p. 122.

6. Wright, P., *Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p. 224.

So Russell's theory of descriptions makes the contrast between definite descriptions and ordinary proper names. Hence a genuine proper name must have a bearer. According to Russell's terminology a definite descriptions have no meaning by itself, but the whole sentence has a meaning. He says that a definite description does not function like a name. Russell's theory of descriptions represents an escape from this position; "he adopted Frege's way of handling 'some' and 'all' indefinite descriptions and phrases like 'Any number', and further applied it, as Frege never did, to definite descriptions as well." Frege uses the term "proper name" in a much wider sense; which cannot be accepted to Wittgenstein.

Wittgenstein accepts Frege's distinction between sense (Sinn) and reference (Bedeutung), but he rejects his views that a sentence can be a proper name, and that an expression can have both sense and reference. But according to Wittgenstein's terminology a sentence is not a proper name, a proposition has only reference, while a sentence can have only sense.

In Russell's own view, a simple sign's having a meaning consists in its standing for something. Its meaning is the thing for which it stands. The simple signs will include signs for "Universals". Russell also rejects Fregean distinction between sense and reference. Wittgenstein says that the meaning of a simple sign is its bearer. He accepts Russell's theory

of descriptions in its purely logical aspect. There must be names of simples which can only be named and not defined by a description. "The demand for the possibility of the simple signs is the demand that sense shall be determinate" (T.3.23).

According to the theory of descriptions the simple signs are not the simple symbols in its purely logical aspect. Wittgenstein accepts the views of Russell that the meaning of a name is its bearer, this is not noticeably based on the British empiricist epistemology that influences Russell. We may say that Russell recognises only two ways. The first is that their grammatical form should be misleading as to their logical form and that they should be analysable like 's' as a special kind of existential sentence. And the second is that their grammatical subject should be a logically proper name, of which the meaning is the individual thing it designates.

The above discussion may give the impression that names are the primary units of language. "Only the proposition has sense, only in the context of a proposition has a name meaning" (T.3.3). It is of the essence of a name to be governed by the syntactical rules of the language. A given name is subject to rules of combination through which the form of the name is manifested. In T.3.263 he says that the meanings of names can be explained in elucidations but elucidations can only be understood when the meanings of names are already known. His thesis that names have meaning only in the propositions is definitely true.

Now, we have seen that according to Wittgenstein the primary units of language are elementary propositions. The most important thing about a proposition is its sense. We can understand what a proposition means even if we have never come across it before. If we understand the meaning of a new proposition we can easily follow its sense. According to Wittgenstein this feature of language is of great importance. "It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us". (T.4.027). It clearly points to the fact that the sense of a proposition is independent of its truth value.

Let us discuss, then, the important features of elementary propositions. The meaning of a proposition is independent of its truth or falsity. Wittgenstein says that: "To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true" (T.4.024). This shows the difference between the meaning of a name and the meaning of a proposition, we can say a proposition is a logical picture and "what a picture represents is its sense" (T.2.221). So the sense of a proposition is the situation it represents. "One can say, instead of this proposition has such and such a sense. We can simply say, 'This proposition represents such and such a situation'." (T.4.031(2)). "A proposition is the description of a fact" (T.4.023(5)). This nature of a proposition forces upon us certain important conclusions. First, the significant propositions are limited to possible facts. Second, it leads to the view that the same reality corresponds to a proposition and to its negation.

Here, we will explain that if the sense of a proposition is the situation it depicts, then what about the false proposition? If this situation represents then either all false propositions have no sense or there must be non-existent situations which they describe. So another alternative is this, that there must be non-existent situations which the false propositions depict. Wittgenstein uses the term 'situation' ('Sachlage') and 'state of affairs' ('Sachverhalt') in such a way that we can speak of them either actual or possible. He speaks the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. "The existence and non-existence of states of affairs is reality". (we also call the existence of states of affairs a positive, and their non-existence a negative fact.) (T.2.06). Wittgenstein says, "A state of affairs (a state of things) is a combination of objects (things)." (T.2.01). So a state of affairs, is a "combination of objects". Some combination of objects exist and some combination of objects do not exist. The former may be called positive facts and the latter may be called negative facts. (T.2.06 (2)).

At first we will consider the positive fact. How is it associated with states of affairs? Wittgenstein gives the answer that "The totality of existing states of affairs is the world." (T.2.06). "The world is the totality of facts, not of things." (T.1.1). What is a negative fact? The answer is that a negative fact is an existent combination of objects with the object "not". But Wittgenstein does not accept it. He says in T.4.062(1): "... Nothing in reality corresponds to

the sign ' $\sim$ '". And negative facts are combinations of non-existent objects. But this is absurd. Then what is a negative fact? Russell says that like the positive fact there are also negative facts which correspond to the negative propositions. But Wittgenstein rejects this. Negative facts do not form a shadowy kind of being. Both existent and non-existent states of affairs are combinations of existent objects.

"A state of affairs is composed of objects" (T.2.01). "An existent state of affairs is an actual arrangement of existent objects, a non-existent state of affairs is a non-actual arrangement of existent objects". So he maintains that corresponding to both 'P' and ' $\sim P$ ', there is the same state of affairs. 'P' says that a state of affairs exist and ' $\sim P$ ' says that it does not exist. It means that there can be no negative states of affairs. All elementary propositions are positive. Negative propositions are only truth functions of positive elementary propositions. Further, we can say that the sense is logically independent of the existence of the fact it is about. "The picture represents what it represents independently of its truth or falsehood". (T.2.22). There is no contradiction in saying that a proposition has a sense and it represents a fact. That the sense of an elementary proposition must be fixed and definite. If its sense is not definite, then, we have no definite proposition at all. So the sense of a fully analysed elementary proposition is fixed and exact.

Another important feature of elementary proposition is their independence. According to Wittgenstein, atomic facts are independent of one another. An atomic fact has no connections of any kind with others. Thus for elementary propositions, Wittgenstein says:

One elementary proposition cannot be deduced from another. T.5.134.

It is a sign of an elementary proposition, that no elementary proposition can contradict it. T.4.211.

That elementary propositions are independent of one another in the absolute sense. In the latter Wittgenstein abandoned, the view that no elementary propositions can be contraries. He maintained that they cannot be contradictories.

Now we are in a position to discuss: how an elementary proposition say anything? A proposition is said to be a combination of names. Another point is that, how we can express and understand new propositions. We understand new propositions which use the familiar terms. (T.4.02).

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In the Tractatus, Wittgenstein uses the expression 'sense of a proposition' in another way. For example, the elementary proposition " $aRb$ " and its negation " $\sim (aRb)$ ". Wittgenstein says that these two propositions have opposite sense. In Notes on Logic, he says: "Every proposition is essentially true,- false. Thus a proposition has two poles (corresponding to case of its truth and case of its falsity). We call

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this the sense of a proposition". Further he writes, "A proposition is a standard with reference to which facts behave, but with names it is otherwise. Just as one arrow behaves to another arrow by being in the same sense or the opposite, so a fact behaves to a proposition; it is thus bi-polarity and 10 sense come in".

Thus, the proposition " $aRb$ " asserts that a bears R to b. But the proposition " $\sim (aRb)$ " asserts that a does not bear R to b. If the state of affairs  $aRb$  exists then  $aRb$  is true and " $\sim (aRb)$ " is false. "Names are like points-proposition like arrows - they have sense (T.3.144 [2]). "The proposition 'p' and ' $\sim p$ ' have opposite sense, but there corresponds to them one and the same reality". (T.4.0621 [3]).

Now we will say that according to Wittgenstein, in analysing the meaning of any proposition one must ultimately arrive at nothing but elementary propositions. The sense of any proposition can be stated by means of elementary propositions and propositional connectives. And non-elementary propositions are just combination of elementary propositions. "Suppose that I am given all elementary proposition: then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all propositions, and that fixes their limits." (T.4.51).

Here a problem arises: what kind of structures do elementary propositions have? Wittgenstein says that they are combined by truth-functional connectives. Thus all molecular

propositions are truth-functional compounds of elementary propositions. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein writes: "A proposition is a truth-function of elementary propositions". (T.5(1)).

But what are truth-functional connectives and truth-functions? When the truth or falsity of any proposition can be determined solely from the truth and falsity of its constituent elementary propositions, it is called a truth-function of its constituent propositions. So the sense of any proposition can be stated completely by means of elementary propositions alone.

Now in what ways are elementary propositions combined in order to yield molecular ones? In this connection Wittgenstein says that they are combined by truth-functional connectives alone. A connective is a truth-functional one. The truth value of a proposition  $P$  determines the truth-value of its negation  $\sim P$ . If  $P$  is true,  $\sim P$  is false; if  $P$  is false,  $\sim P$  is true. Thus,  $\sim P$  is a truth-function of  $P$ .

Wittgenstein thinks that particular propositions about complex individuals are really truth-functions of elementary propositions. And general propositions are really truth-functions of particular propositions about objects. There are two basic kinds of general propositions. First, Universal, that is, "Everybody in this room has a hat", and second, general, such as, "Some body in this room has a hat". It can be seen that "Universal propositions are not equivalent to a mere conjunction of propositions about complex individuals".<sup>11</sup> Wittgenstein writes

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11. Pitcher, G., The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 60.

that "the positive proposition necessarily presupposes the existence of the negative propositions and vice-versa". (T.5. 5151(3)). In the Notebooks he puts this point in his way: "In order for a proposition to be capable of being true it must also be capable of being false".<sup>12</sup>

Thus, Wittgenstein's opinion is that Universal proposition "All objects have property F" is really a conjunction of propositions about the individual objects. In analysing existential and Universal general propositions, Wittgenstein does not use disjunction (either/or) and conjunction ('and'), but a single truth-functional connective in terms of which 'either/or' and 'and' can be defined. This single connective is A.M. Sheffer's 'neither/nor' symbolized by a stroke " $\downarrow$ ", the expression ' $P \downarrow q$ ' is to be read "neither P nor q" or " $\sim P$  and  $\sim q$ ".<sup>13</sup> (see line 12 of the chart in T.5.101). So both ' $P \downarrow q$ ' and ' $P \vee q$ ' can be defined in terms of Sheffer's stroke function.

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12. NB, 5.6.15.

13. Sheffer's work appeared in his "A set of fix Independent postulates for Boolean Algebras", Translations from the American Mathematical Society, Vol. 14(1913). In point of historical fact, Sheffer symbolized 'neither P nor q' as ' $P \downarrow Q$ '; ' $\downarrow$ ' is sometimes referred to as the dagger function- Sheffer also employed the symbol 'I' & the stroke function - but he used it to signify not joint denial but rather alternative denial, so that for him ' $P \downarrow q$ ' denies one or both of P and q (see line 12 of the chart in T.5.101). In the Tractatus however Wittgenstein chooses to symbolize joint denial by 'I' rather than by ' $\downarrow$ ' and I shall follow him in this. Accordingly, what I shall call Sheffer's stroke function is that of joint denial, even though this is not historically accurate.

The conception of Wittgenstein's relation of general propositions to elementary propositions is hard to grasp. Wittgenstein says a finite conjunction of elementary propositions, such as ' $P, Q, R$ ', determines its conjuncts by enumeration, a general proposition, such as ' $(X). fx$ ', selects the elementary propositions to be jointly asserted by using a propositional function. According to this view ' $(X). fx$ ' is assimilated to ' $f_a, f_b, f_c \dots$ ' and so on i.e. to an indefinitely continued conjunction of all propositions having the form ' $f_x$ '.<sup>14</sup> "If the difference between giving a set of elementary propositions by enumeration and giving them as the values of a propositional function is regarded as unimportant, it becomes possible to represent both general and molecular propositions".<sup>15</sup> Wittgenstein's view is that the truth of such a proposition as ' $(X) fx$ ' is the truth of the logical product. Frege uses negation together with his universal quantifier such as we can define: ' $(Ex) fx$ ' as ' $\sim(x) \sim fx$ ', but the same point would hold for the explanation of particular judgments. According to Wittgenstein it is difficult to understand " $(X) fx$ " and " $(Ex) fx$ ", and this pictorial character consists in their being truth-functions of a set of propositions. As Ramsey points out, "Wittgenstein's view "explains how " $f_a$ " can be inferred from 'For all  $x, fx$ ', and "There is an  $x$  such that  $fx$ " from " $f_a$ ". The alternative theory that "There is an  $x$  such that  $fx$ " should be regarded as an atomic proposition of the form " $P(f)$ " (" $f$  has application") leaves this entirely obscure;

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14. T. G. SE.

15. Black, M. A companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 261.

it gives no intelligible connection between a being red and red having application, but abandoning any hope of explaining this relation is content merely to label it necessary". As Moore also explains that, "Wittgenstein told that there was a temptation, to which he had yielded in the Tractatus, to say that  $(X).fx$  is identical with the logical product "fa.fb.fc. ...", and  $(\exists x)$ ,  $fx$  identical with the logical sum "fa V fb V fc ...", but that this was in both cases a mistake".<sup>16</sup> Again, he wrote that, "Wittgenstein said that, when he wrote the Tractatus, he had supposed that all such general propositions were "truth-functions", but he said now that in supposing this he was committing a fallacy".<sup>17</sup>

Thus, Wittgenstein's view is that all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions and H.M. Sheffer proved that all the truth-functional connective can be defined in terms of one primitive truth-functional connective. So there are many kinds of propositions which contradict Wittgenstein's thesis. For example, Anscombe<sup>18</sup> gives a list of such propositions.

Laws of inference, and generally, logical truth,  
Statements that one proposition implies another,  
Generality — i.e. propositions containing "all" and "some"

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16. Ramsey, F. The Foundations of Mathematics, pp. 153-54.

17. Moore, G.E. Philosophical Papers, p. 297.

18. Ibid., p. 298.

19. Anscombe, G.E.M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, pp. 79-80.

Propositions giving logical clarifications of terms and expressions, e.g., "to the right of" is a relation, "a is to the right of b" is a proposition.

Propositions that are important in the foundation of mathematics such as 'a is the successor of b'.

Statements about the possibility, impossibility, necessity, and certainty of particular states of affairs.

Statements of identity.

Propositions apparently expressing functions of propositions, such as "it is good that P", or 'P is possible', 'P is necessary' or again 'A believes P' or 'A conceives P', and perhaps even statements about e.g., the beauty of pictures.

Propositions stating probabilities.

Propositions of mathematics.

Propositions stating laws of nature.

Propositions about space and time.

Ego-centric propositions.

Propositions about the world as a whole about God and the meaning of life.

Thus Wittgenstein first arrived at a theory, call it for the moment theory X, which he thought was necessarily true. And this theory expressed the view that all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions and it demanded that the theory of truth-functions be true. Thus, in the last, Wittgenstein maintained the view that all types of proposition that he could

think of, and tried to amount for them all, in one way or another,  
<sup>20</sup>  
on his theory of truth functions.

Therefore, we may reach on this conclusion that theory X which demands that all genuine propositions be truth functions of other propositions, is Wittgenstein's famous picture theory of proposition. Russell in his book says that Wittgenstein is concerned with the question, what relation must one fact have to another in order to be capable of being a symbol for that order... In order that a certain fact there must however the language may be constructed, be something in common between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. This is the most <sup>21</sup> fundamental thesis of Mr. Wittgenstein, that the picture consists of elements which deputize for objects. If the proposition is true, the state of affairs exists and is then called a fact. If the proposition is false the state of affairs does not exist and is therefore not a fact.

One consequence of the theory of truth-function is that the world divides into atomic facts. Russell had maintained that universal propositions are not just truth-functions of propositions about individuals. And therefore, he had argued that there must be irreducibly general facts which are not molecular constructions out of atomic facts, in order for the universal propositions to have something to correspond to. And Russell says, "It is clear, I think that general facts as distincts from and over and above particular facts."<sup>22</sup> Since Wittgenstein stated the view that

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20. Pitcher, G., *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p. 67.

21. Russell, B., *Introduction to Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, p. 124.

universal propositions are all ultimately analyzable into elementary propositions. So Russell had argued for the existence of negative facts as a type of fact irreducible to atomic facts. But Wittgenstein rejected this view. According to him all propositions are truth-functional molecules, but all non-atomic situations and facts are structures of nothing but states of affairs and atomic facts.

It is said here that complex situations cannot consist of just states of affairs, that they must include something else besides. But Wittgenstein says, that a complex situation is described by a truth-function of elementary proposition and it describes the states of affairs, which make up the complex situation. So the term denotes whatever it is that is supposed to bind the states of affairs are the truth-functional operations, this is called logical constants. This logical constants can all be reduced by definitions to Sheffer's stroke function. 'P/q' explains, ' $\sim P, \sim q$ '. Wittgenstein says that 'not' or ' $\sim$ ' does not designate anything. Hence Sheffer's stroke does not denote anything and all the logical constants can be reduced to it (See 1.5.42).

Thus Wittgenstein's philosophical view called logical atomism.<sup>23</sup> The term was used by Russell. And Wittgenstein's logical atomism is a theory of proposition. Elementary propositions are atomic, since they cannot be further reduced to any more basic propositions. A state of affairs has no relation with any other.

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23. Russell, B., The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.178.

States of affairs are independent of one another.  
T.2.061.

From the existence and non-existence of one states  
of affairs it is impossible to infer the existence  
or non-existence of another. T.2.062.

One elementary proposition cannot be deduced from  
another. T.5.134.

It is a sign of a propositions being elementary that  
there can be no elementary propositions contradicting  
it. T.4.211.

Wittgenstein maintains that two elementary propositions  
cannot be contraries, if one is true the other is false, but they  
may both be false. And two elementary propositions cannot have  
any such relationship to one another. Later Wittgenstein aban-  
doned the view that no elementary proposition can be contraries.  
He maintained the view that they cannot be even contradictories.<sup>24</sup>

Now we may elucidate the argument that if the world had  
no simples then propositions would be transformed into other  
propositions. These elements are exhypothesis not simple, but  
complexes in their own right. There would be no connexion  
between propositions and their extra-propositional referents.  
So, no connection exists between the world and picture. And  
picturisation of the world is out of question and this is equi-  
valent to the assertion that propositions have no sense. Therefore  
the denial of simple is incompatible that propositions have

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24. In his article, "Some remarks on Logical Form", PAS,  
IX (1929).

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sense.

Therefore, the argument is that if propositions have sense independent of other propositions, then there are simples. And "what Wittgenstein means by the sense of a proposition shows that the argument is not an ignoratio elenchi".<sup>26</sup> If there is correspondence between proposition and its referent, it means that the terms of the proposition must be correlated with the elements of the fact, and the form of representation of the proposition must be identical with the structure of the fact.

We will say that Wittgenstein asserts that the argument for simples depended upon 'sense'. He says, "A fact is a combination of objects." (T.2.01). If this is true then the fact be a specific fact. And if the fact be a specific fact then there must be absolutely simple constituent of facts.

Now we are in a position to discuss the main features of Wittgenstein's picture theory. We can say that the picture represents that objects are so combined with one another as are the elements of the picture, and this is the meaning of the picture. In the Tractatus he says:

The determinate way in which objects are connected in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs.

T.2.032.

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25. Weinberg, J. R. "Are there ultimate simples?" in Essays in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, edited by Copi and Beard, p.80.

26. Ibid.

Form is the possibility of the structure.

T.2.033.

The structure of a fact consists of the structures

of states of affairs.

T.2.034.

Form is an essential property of propositions and propositional signs. Wittgenstein also distinguishes the form and logical form. He says:

What a picture must have in common with reality in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in the way it does, is its pictorial form.

T.2.17.

A picture can depict any reality whose form it has.

A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, a coloured one anything coloured, etc.

T.2.171.

A picture cannot, however, depict its pictorial form: it displays it.

T.2.172.

What any picture of whatever form, must have in common with reality, in order to be able to depict it - correctly or incorrectly - in any way at all, is logical form, i.e. the form of reality.

T.2.18.

A picture whose pictorial form is logical form is called a logical picture.

T.2.181.

Every picture is at the same time a logical one (on the other hand, not every picture is, for example a spatial one).

T.2.182.

A picture has logical form if the concatenation of elements the picture-fact means the concatenation of the things for which

the elements severally stand. So the important point is that the sense of a picture is 'shown' not 'said' or asserted. And a picture has a sense whether it is true or false.

Therefore, Wittgenstein propounded a "picture theory of meaning" for propositions, writing. He says, "The proposition is a picture of reality, for if I understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents. And I understand the proposition without having had its sense explained to me". (T.4.021). "The proposition only asserts something in so far as it is a picture" (T.4.03). "Propositions can be true or false only by being pictures of the reality". (T.4.06). Wittgenstein is not maintaining that a proposition is an ordinary that is spatial picture of the situation it describes. In order for one thing A to be a logical picture of another B, three conditions must be met. First, there must be a one to one correspondence between the components of A and those of B. Second, to every feature of the structure or form of A there must correspond a feature of the structure or form of B; and third there must be rules of projection connecting the components of A and those of B. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein's view is that the proposition is a model of the situation it represents, then to say that it is a picture of it. It is only elementary proposition those consisting entirely of names that are pictures of situations. Then a picture is a fact and it represents certain features of the reality depicted. Wittgenstein asserts a correspondence between elements of the sign and elements of the signified when a picture stands in a relation to something which is not a thing. We no longer

speak of it as picturing that thing. "A picture is a visual pattern and can picture only what is visually accessible".<sup>27</sup> The sense in which a picture shows a tasty bird is the sense in which I see a tasty bird that is I see a bird which looks as if it would be succulent to the taste. I cannot see the taste of a bird any more than a picture can show it".<sup>28</sup>

It is said that in the Tractatus Wittgenstein contains a 'picture theory of language'. Warnock gives the account of this as such: "In a picture of an object or scene, there is a kind of correspondence between the parts of or elements in the picture, and the parts of or elements in the objects or scene. But these elements must not only be present; their structure, form, or arrangement must be the same according, of course, to some system of projection, whether simple perspective or something more elaborate. Now 'an atomic fact is a combination of objects (entities, things).— The configuration of objects forms, the atomic fact'. (I.2.01, 2.0272). But the 'sentential sign' is itself also a fact, it too is a combination of elements, namely words. This sort of fact is therefore, capable of 'picturing' those other, non-verbal facts, and it is thus that language can refer to the world, can mean something other than itself".<sup>29</sup> On this view, sentences can 'mean' or 'picture' facts because sentence signs are themselves facts. But warnock does not give the distinction between linguistic and non-linguistic facts. Indeed many

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27. Shandnessy, R. O., The Picture Theory of Meaning, reprinted in Essays in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, edited by Copi and Board, p. 114.

28. Ibid.

philosophers give the account of Wittgenstein's view that "the relation of picture to what is pictured is simply reversible".<sup>30</sup> In his book, Stenius says that only the true pictures are really pictures.<sup>31</sup> And Anscombe holds that for Wittgenstein, propositions are isomorphic with facts. So according to Anscombe'a picture does not in itself describe anything at all, any more than does a fact describe anything". Stenius says that for Wittgenstein, pictures are representational and he always thinks of a picture as having a real prototype. We will says that the elements of the picture stand for the elements of the fact. According to Wittgenstein the elements of the picture correspond to objects not to elements of the fact. When Wittgenstein says that 'The picture presents that such and such is the case' he means that "The picture is the presenting that such and such is the case".

Since the elements of a picture are themselves picture, one could think that words are pictures, as well as that a sentence is a picture. Thus the picture theory also explains it that how a false sentence can have meaning. Just as a picture shows what it pictures even when it does not picture any actual thing, so a sentence shows what it means even when it does not mean any actual fact. He says in T.4.061,

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- 30. Schwyzer, H.R.O. Wittgenstein's Picture Theory of language, reprinted in Essays in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, edited by Copi and Beard, p. 272.
- 31. Stenius, S. Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 95.
- 32. Anscombe, G.H.M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 67.

If one does not observe that propositions have a sense independent of the facts, one can easily believe that true and false are two relations between signs and things signified with equal rights. T.2.22 explains that the picture presents what it represents independently of its truth or falsehood, through the form of representation. Thus, T.2.221 says what the picture represents is its sense. Since a proposition can show only what is other than its sense this account of the meaningfulness of false sentence is not correct. Nevertheless, by making meaning independent of truth or falsity it does come nearer a right description. In his article Mr. Shoughnessy<sup>33</sup> writes: "It implies that the picture theory of meaning is an error, even a simple error. This is a failure to realize that it is a great philosophical view that develops the general problem. Furthermore, the agglomeration of different modes of signifying described in the paper is only a small part of what the Picture Theory of Meaning contains. The forces which lead to it are many and strong; of course, Wittgenstein has set these out incomparably in the opening passages of the Philosophical Investigations".

Let us then see that whatever else a picture may be, e.g., 'spatial', 'musical', it must also be a 'logical-picture'. To be a logical picture is to be a thought. So all pictures are thoughts and presenting is thinking. So, the picture is the thinking that such and such is the case. Many philosophers distinguish a sentence from what it means or from what is meant

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32. Searle, P. P. "On Referring", M. 1950.

33. Shoughnessy, R. G. The Picture theory of Meaning, reprinted

by it. So Frege maintained that the meaning of a sentence was the thought expressed by it. According to Wittgenstein, a thought is an expression of sense and to think is to mean something. And the important thing for him is that "Sentences are not the kinds of things that can express a meaning, and that meanings cannot be independent thoughts. What has meaning, what means is necessarily an act of thinking." 35

Thus a picture has two distinct features. First a relation between the elements of the picture and second the correlations of the elements in the picture with things outside the picture.

Therefore, Stenius account of the sense of the picture is not far better. For him, every picture is adequate. He does not see that a picture for Wittgenstein can be nothing at all like a name; it is not the kind of thing we use. In his article, Mr. Shmyder 36 tells us, "that Wittgensteinian picture is not the kind of thing which is put into a frame and hung upon the wall. The picture, for Wittgenstein, is the thought which may be expressed by hanging the picture upon the wall".

After giving all these statements we consider only one of Wittgenstein's ground for saying that propositions are pictures. Thus when Wittgenstein says that though a proposition set out on the printed page may not look like a picture, he means that the

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31. Schopenhauer, H.R.G. Wittgenstein's Picture theory of language, reprinted in Essays in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, edited by Copi and Beard, p. 226.

proposition can be reduced to elementary propositions are pictures. Elementary propositions are the primary pictures in the sense that complex propositions are pictures. Therefore, the picture theory shows something about the atomism.

Having considered all these arguments, we now reach in a position that Tractatus account of picture theory is not quite right. He himself rejects it in his Philosophical Investigations. Many philosophers have criticized this theory. His opinion is that Tractatus was not all wrong: it was not like a bag of junk professing to be a clock, but like a clock that did not tell you the right time. At one place he says, 'A description is a <sup>37</sup> projection of a distribution in a space'.

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**C H A P T E R - III**

**FURTHER EXPOSITION OF THE PICTURE THEORY AND  
ITS CRITICISM**

C\_H\_A\_P\_T\_E\_R - III

Having concluded the ontological structure of the world Wittgenstein considered that what is necessarily involved in any symbolic representation of the world. The central question may arise: what the world must be, what must language be to represent the world? Wittgenstein places great importance of our language. He writes in the following passage:

It belongs to the essence of a proposition that it should be able to communicate a new sense to us.

T.4.027.

Therefore, Wittgenstein's doctrine of Symbolism is: how is a proposition linked with the world? Wittgenstein confuses proposition with propositional sign. In our language we can express new propositions by using the old words. He tries to solve these puzzling features of language by his doctrine that the proposition must be a picture of the situation it describes. To understand the proposition is to know the situation it describes. I can "read off" the sense of a proposition from the proposition itself if and only if, the proposition is a picture of the situation.

A proposition is a picture of reality, for I know the state of affairs presented by it, if I understand the proposition. And I understand the proposition without its sense having been explained to me.

T.4.021.

So a proposition is not a picture of the situation. Wittgenstein maintains that a proposition says something just because it is a picture.

The proposition asserts something only in so far as it is a picture.

T.4.03(4).

That a proposition says something only because it is a picture of the situation it represents. But here a problem arises. If elementary proposition is merely a series of names, how can it state a fact? It is impossible that a list of names could be a picture.

Now it is necessary that we consider the ordinary notion of a picture. Many commentators interpreted the term 'Picture' in its ordinary sense. For example, Urmson says: "Wittgenstein was surely wrong in claiming that even perfect sentences were pictures, 'even in the ordinary sense of the word'. To say that this is so, involves taking accuracy of projection as the criterion for projection in a representational portrait. But this will not do. However, accurately our childish drawing obeyed some discoverable law of projection - we would not say that it was a portrait of Napoleon -- good or bad -- we in fact, call things pictures because of a recognisable likeness not because of fidelity to some unknown rule of projection."<sup>1</sup> It is the recognisable similarity that makes anything picture of something. This is implied in expressions -- a picture of Napoleon, a photograph of the Taj Mahal. In Wittgenstein's sense they are spatial

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<sup>1</sup> Urmson, J.O. *Philosophical Analysis*, pp. 89-90.

pictures T.2.171(2). In this sense a proposition is not a picture.

Then we have seen that in Wittgenstein's sense a picture is a fact composed of elements. The elements represent the object. Wittgenstein states this in the following points:

In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to them.

T.2.13.

In a picture the elements of the picture are the representations of objects.

T.2.131.

Now he maintains that proposition is a picture of a certain state of affairs. If the proposition is true then the objects are combined in a fact and that fact has the same structure. But if there is 'structure', there is 'form'. Wittgenstein considered the question, how a picture can depict a possible state of affairs in the world? He could say that the essential feature of the picture is the internal similarity. So all the pictures have the form of the objects. Hence Wittgenstein says that the pictures have the form of the thing it represent. So in a special case the picture is a logical picture.

What every picture of whatever form must have in common with reality in order to be able to represent it at all rightly or falsely is the logical form, that is the form of reality.

T.2.18.

Every picture is also a logical picture (On the other hand, for example, not every picture is spatial).

T.2.182.

There is a common characteristic between spatial and logical picture. A picture is a fact and elements will be the objects concatenated in the picture-fact. The painting or photography shows the spatial arrangement of the things depicted. Thus we can say that the logical picture and ordinary picture are the same. A picture consists in its elements being combined in a definite structure. He says that facts can be complex and so the photograph and painting are also complex. In a certain way a picture is a fact and every fact has a definite structure.

The picture consists in the fact that its elements are combined with one another in a definite way.

T.2.14.

The picture is a fact.

T.2.141.

That the elements of the picture can be combined with one another <sup>in</sup> a definite way, represents that the things are so combined with one another.

T.2.15(1).

Now we will discuss that the essential feature of the picture theory is that there must be a structural similarity between a proposition and the fact it depicts. Some interpreters think, that by picture he meant something which looked like the original. What is essential for picturing is a one to one correspondence between the elements of a picture and those of pictured fact and a common pictorial form or form of depiction.

Wittgenstein's picture theory applies only <sup>to</sup> elementary propositions not all propositions. He says that elementary propositions are only pictures.

One name stands for one thing and another for another thing and they are connected together, and so the whole like a Tableau-Vivant presents the atomic fact.

T.4.0311.

Granted that propositions which assert atomic facts are elementary propositions, so elementary propositions are picture.

Mrs. Daitz says that "...negative statements, conditional statements, disjunctive statements, etc. are not describable in picture terms", and that they are "... statements which have no pictorial counterparts." Again Mrs. Daitz refutes that "...in the sense in which there are foreign languages there are no foreign pictures."<sup>2</sup> If there are no foreign pictures then a picture requires no previous learning. Therefore, the fundamental difference between pictures and propositions involves a mistake. It is false that "...in the sense in which there are foreign languages there are no foreign pictures".<sup>3</sup>

Now we can understand how a proposition can depict a state of affairs. A proposition is not a mere list of names. Wittgenstein maintains, it is a "nexus - a concatenation of names." (T.4.22).

A proposition is not a medley of words - (Just as a theme in music is not a medley of notes).

T.3.141(1).

It shows that there is a definite relationship among the component names that they are connected in a certain way, "only

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<sup>2</sup> Copi, I.M., Objects, properties and relations in the Tractatus reprinted in Essays in Wittgenstein's Tractatus edited by

facts can express a sense, a set of names cannot" (T.3.142). Thus Wittgenstein denies that a mere list of names can say anything. He writes in the following passage:

Instead of "the complex sign 'aRb' says that 'a' stands to 'b' in the relation R", we ought to put "that 'a' stands to 'b' in a certain relation,  
say <sup>that</sup> aRb." T.3.1432.

Wittgenstein thinks that it is a fact that it represents the situation. So there are three signs must be arranged in a relation. According to this view how a propositional sign depicts? The elements of the propositional sign represents the structural situation.

The configuration of objects in a situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign.

T.3.21.

Wittgenstein says that it is an elementary proposition that are pictures of reality. The propositional sign is not a picture. The form of representation is said to be the possibility of the configuration of the objects. The form of the picture fact is the same as the form of the state of affairs. So the picture is connected with reality.

That is how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches right out to it.

T.2.1511.

The pictorial relationship consists of the correlations of the picture elements with things.

These correlations are, as it were, the feelers of the pictures elements, with which the picture touches reality.

T.2.1515.

Then what does constitute a picture ? A fact can be a picture if and only if the following conditions are met.

There must be a one to one correspondence between the elements of an elementary proposition and states of affairs.

To the objects correspond in the picture the elements of the picture.

T.2.13.

The elements of the picture stand, in the picture, for the objects.

T.2.131.

In the proposition the name represents the object.

T.3.22.

In the proposition there must be exactly as many things distinguishable as there are in the state of affairs.

T.4.04(1).

When he says that a proposition is a picture of a situation, he means a definite representational picture. All these arguments point out that for Wittgenstein a picture can picture a fact if both of them have the same mathematical multiplicity. Wittgenstein maintains that every proposition is a definite representational picture of a certain determinate situation. This is called a logical picture. Thus all propositions are truth functions of elementary proposition.

A proposition is a propositional sign in its projective relation to the world.

T.3.12.

There must be rules of projection connecting the elements of the pictured fact and those of the pictured fact (T.4.0141). "Rules of projection are rules whereby given A (or B), B (or A) can be reconstructed from it."<sup>4</sup> Wittgenstein uses a example of it

There is a general rule by means of which the musician can obtain the symphony from the score, and which makes it possible to derive the symphony from the groove on the gramophone record, and using the first rule, to derive the score again. That is what constitutes the inner similarity between these things which seem to be constructed in such entirely different ways. And that rule is the law of projection which projects the symphony into the language of musical notation. It is the rule for translating this language into the language of gramophone records.

T.4.0141.

Wittgenstein says that the proposition is the propositional sign in a projective relation to the situation described.

We use the perceptible sign of a proposition (spoken or written, etc.) as a projection of a possible situation.

T.3.11.

The idea of projection illuminates the essential character the propositions. It explains also how we can construct

proposition which may be false. If there is no fact corresponding to it the proposition is false. He maintains that a propositional sign is <sup>not</sup> made up of signs, but made up of symbols.

I call any part of a proposition that characterizes its sense an expression (or a symbol).

T.3.31(1).

Thus an elementary proposition is made up of elementary symbols. So a name may be called an elementary sign in its projective relation to an object. In this view a picture is a symbol. The act of thinking the sense of a proposition is a mental activity which consists in correlating the names of the propositional sign and the objects of the corresponding state of affairs. He says in the Notebooks: "By my correlating the components of the picture with objects, it comes to represent a situation and to be right or wrong." (26.11.190. So "the proposition is the propositional sign in its projective relation." (T.3.12).

These discussions explain it that only elementary propositions are pictures of reality. They are the pictures of the states of affairs and all propositions are analysed into elementary propositions. Wittgenstein maintains that "first and foremost, the elementary propositional form must portray, all portrayal takes place through it". When he says that all propositions are analysable into elementary propositions, it means all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.

Now we shall discuss, how propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. According to Wittgenstein the definite sense of proposition is given only by analysis, and in the analysis

we must arrive at elementary propositions. According to the picture theory of proposition the elementary propositions are states of affairs. Non-elementary propositions are combinations of elementary propositions combined by certain truth-functional connectives. So they are molecular propositions. And all molecular propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions.

A proposition is a truth function of elementary proposition.

T.5.

Wittgenstein maintains that every true proposition must be a true function and since any false proposition is the negation of a true one. All propositions are generalized from elementary propositions by means of a 'truth-operation'. So here Wittgenstein asserts the "form of extensionality".

Suppose I am given all elementary propositions, then I can simply ask what propositions I can construct out of them. And there I have all propositions, and that fixes their limits.

T.4.51.

But a question is that in what way elementary propositions are combined with molecular propositions? Wittgenstein says that they are combined by truth functional connectives. So all molecular propositions are truth functional compounds of elementary propositions.

But what are truth functional connectives and truth functions? When the truth or falsity of any proposition determined solely from the truth and falsity of its constituent elementary

proposition it is called a truth-function of its constituent propositions. A molecular proposition ' $P, q$ ' is a truth-function of  $P$  and  $q$ , if its truth or falsity is determined by the truth values of  $P$  and  $q$ . So according to this view 'and', 'or' and 'either/or' etc. are truth-functional connectives. Truth-functions which are true are called tautologies and truth-functions which are false are called contradictions. Wittgenstein maintains that all logical propositions can be shown to be tautologies. The truths of logic are empty-tautologies say nothing.

The propositions of logic are tautologies.

T. 6.1.

Therefore the propositions of logic say nothing....

T. 6.11.

The fact that the propositions of logic are tautologies shows the formal-logical properties of language and the world.

T. 6.12.

In the Tractatus there is not any such proof to explain that all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. Wittgenstein says that an elementary proposition must be combined with each other in some way. Another important point which Wittgenstein uses a single truth-functional connective in terms of which 'either/or', 'and' and any truth-functional connective can be defined. This single connective is Sheffer's 'neither/nor', symbolized by a stroke ' $\mid$ ', the expression ' $P/q$ ' is to be read 'neither  $P$  nor  $q$ ', or 'not  $P$  and not  $q$ '. Both ' $P$  and  $q$ ' and ' $P$  or  $q$ ' can be defined in terms of Sheffer's stroke

Wittgenstein says that general propositions are really truth-functions of particular propositions about complex individuals are really truth-functions of elementary propositions. General propositions are not logically of a different kind from molecular propositions. Russell says that the practical difference between general propositions and propositions which are actual logical sums or products is very important. Many expressions which appear to be general propositions are not strictly speaking, propositions at all.

General propositions are the greatest stumbling block. They are propositions expressed by means of the words 'all' and 'some'. Russell thought that general propositions could not be analysed into a truth-functional compound of elementary propositions. They must be recognised as stating a special kind of fact of their own. This is a reasonable type of argument, but Wittgenstein does not accept it. He says that these propositions are, just as any other propositions truth-functions of elementary propositions. General propositions are truth-functions expressing agreement and disagreement with the truth possibilities of elementary propositions. General propositions are propositions expressed in English by means of the words 'all' and 'some'.

The general proposition, e.g., "Everything is A" can be analysed as an infinite conjunction of singular proposition, "This is A and that is A . . ." Similarly, the existential propositions 'something is A' can be analysed as an infinite disjunction of singular proposition 'this is A' or that is A' or . . .".

Wittgenstein states that such propositions as universal propositions about complexes must be reducible to a universal propositions about objects. And universal propositions about objects must be just truth-functions of elementary propositions. A universal proposition is not analysable as a truth-function of particular propositions about individual complexes, for the analysis must contain another universal proposition about complexes. Thus universal propositions are truth functions of elementary propositions.

Now we will explain another type of proposition such as "A believes that P", "A wishes that P", "A thinks that P", etc.

At first sight it looks as if it were also possible for one proposition to occur in another in a different way.

Particularly with certain forms of proposition in psychology, such as 'A believes that P is the case' and 'A has the thought P', etc.

T.5.541.

But this type of proposition has a difficulty. That the truth-value of the whole proposition is not determined by the truth-value of P. It appears that a proposition can occur in another ("A believes that P") in a non-truth-functional way. But Wittgenstein tries to solve this in another passage (T.5.542). He says when such propositions are properly analyzed, they are revealed to be a truth-functions of elementary propositions.

But it is clear that "A believes that P", "A thinks P", "A says P" are of the form 'P' says 'P'; and here we have no co-ordination of a fact and an object, but a co-ordination of facts by means of a coordina-

Wittgenstein says that all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions and Sheffer's view is that all the truth-functional connectives can be defined in terms of one primitive truth-functional connective.

All propositions are results of truth-operations on elementary propositions.

A truth-operation is the way in which a truth-function is produced out of elementary propositions.

### 1.5.3.

We cannot say that Wittgenstein has not given any actual proof to show that entire language is truth-functional. We will give certain propositions which seem to contradict Wittgenstein's truth-functions; Anscombe provides such a list:<sup>6</sup>

Laws of inference, and generally logical truths, Statements, that one proposition implies another;

Generality, i.e., propositions containing 'all' and 'some';

Propositions giving logical classifications of terms and expressions, e.g., "to the right of" is a relation, "a is to the right of b" is a proposition.

Propositions that are important in the foundation of mathematics such as 'a is the successor of b'; Statements about the possibility, impossibility, necessity, and certainty of particular states of affairs;

Statement of identity;

Propositions apparently expressing functions of propositions, such as, 'it is good that 'P, or 'P is possible', 'P is necessary' or again 'A  $\mu$  believes P' or 'A conceives P' and perhaps even statements about, e.g., the beauty of pictures:

Propositions stating probabilities,

Propositions of Mathematics,

Propositions stating laws of nature,

Propositions about space and time,

Egocentric propositions,

Propositions about the world as a whole  
about God and the meaning of life.

Wittgenstein maintains that all genuine propositions are molecules constructed of logical Atoms called elementary propositions. Thus elementary propositions are atomic. Since they cannot be further reduced to any other propositions. He says that most of the propositions are meaningless. And others are truth-functions of elementary propositions. It is very difficult to maintain that all molecular propositions are truth-functional compounds. Thus Wittgenstein's picture theory of propositions is that all genuine propositions be truth-functions of other propositions. Anscombe provides: ".... the picture theory does not permit any functions of propositions other than truth-functions. Indeed we should not regard Wittgenstein's theory of the proposition as a synthesis of a picture-theory and the theory of truth-functions; his picture theory and theory of truth-

functions are one and the same".<sup>7</sup>

Wittgenstein's theory of truth-functions has important bearing on his treatment of logic. His logic depends upon his view of tautology. Tautology is a truth-function which expresses agreement with all the truth-possibilities of atomic propositions involved. Contradiction expresses disagreement with all of them. A tautology, unlike each member of the series of significant propositions that it bounds, says nothing, has no truth-conditions is senseless (T.4.461), is not a picture of reality (T.4.462) etc. It presents no possible state of affairs. A tautology, lacking as it does the essential property of being true or false, is only by courtesy called a proposition, and the signs in it separate or disintegrate (T.4.466). Wittgenstein's opinion is that in a tautology "all its simple parts have meaning, but it is such the connexions between these paralyse or destroy one another, so that they are all connected only in some irrelevant manner". He compared a tautology to a wheel running idly in a mechanism of cog-wheels. Tautologies and contradictions are considered to be propositions for at least the three following reasons. First, they result automatically from the exhaustive enumeration of truth-functions; Second, they are constructed out of atomic propositions, and finally, they can be taken as arguments of truth-functions.<sup>8</sup>

In the case of a simple tautology such as " $P \vee \sim P$ ", it might be thought that what is 'presupposed' is that propositions

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7. Anscombe, G. E. M. An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 81.

8. Hetherington, A. A Study in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 112.

have sense, but propositions have sense only because the names of which they are composed have meaning and vice-versa. Thus, to understand a tautology, we must know the ranges of values of the variables that occur in the tautology. Therefore, the connexion of the tautology with the word, is this, all the propositions thus 'presupposed must have the features displayed by the Tautology'. That ' $P \vee \sim P$ ' is a tautology does not say anything about any particular proposition (or about its constituents), but it shows that any particular proposition will necessarily be such that its sense cancels out the sense of its negation.<sup>9</sup> Wittgenstein says that "Theories which make a proposition of logic appear substantial are always false". (T.6.111). This logic deals only with the rules of symbolism. Logic has nothing to do with the question whether our world is really of this kind or not (T. 6.1233). We cannot say in logic, this and this there is in the world, that there is not (T.5.61). In Russell's view a necessary criterion of logical propositions in their formality, that is, in that they 'can be expressed wholly in terms of, logical constants together with variables'.<sup>10</sup> He says that a definition of logical propositions must include not merely their complete generality but also some further characteristic, and he called this characteristic 'tautology' - but he could not give a satisfactory explanation of this. He writes,

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9. Black, M. A companion to Wittgenstein's Tractatus, p. 321.

10. Russell, B. Introduction to Mathematical philosophy, p. 222.

"It is clear that the definition of 'Logic', .... must be sought by trying to give a new definition of the old notion of 'analytic' propositions. Although we can no longer be satisfied to define logical propositions as those that follow the law of contradiction. We can and must still admit that they are a wholly different class of propositions from those that we come to know empirically. They all have the characteristic, which, .... we agreed to call 'tautology'. This combined with the fact that they can be expressed wholly in terms of variables and logical constants (a logical constant being something which remains constant in a proposition even when all its constituents are changed) .... will give the definition of logic .... for the moment, I do not know how to define 'tautology'. The importance of tautology .... was pointed out to me by my former pupil Ludwig Wittgenstein, who was working on this problem. I do not know whether he is alive or dead.

Wittgenstein's view of molecular propositions as truth-functions leads to a very simple theory of inference. He says that inference is identical with formal inference or deduction. Russell's view is that "It is to some extent optional what .... we take as undefined. So deduction between tautologies is a limiting case of deduction and it does not lead to any system between tautologies." <sup>11</sup>

In this connection he introduces the concept of logical space. He says that logical space is infinite, and a state of

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11. 1930, pp. 234-5.

12. Russell, B. *Principia Mathematica*, p. 91.

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11. *Ibid.*, pp. 204-5.

12. Russell, B. *Principia Mathematica*, p. 91.

affairs is a combination of things or objects. Wittgenstein says that objects make up the substance of the world, that is why they can not be composite. Wittgenstein says that simple particulars are objects, that all states of affairs are produced by the combination of simple particulars only. Therefore, objects must be properties. Objects include only particulars and not universals. Formal properties are identified with logical properties. But formal properties are not objects, because whereas objects can be represented, logical properties cannot. Thus, objects can be material properties. He writes, "Relations and properties, etc. are objects too." <sup>13</sup> Another important feature of objects is that they are simple. So all objects are simple particulars. Stenius, in his argument says that an object having a property must be a matter of its being configured with a universal. But if objects are simple properties and elementary propositions consist of names of objects then the two propositions must be elementary propositions. Here Wittgenstein says that, "For two colours, e.g., to be at one place in the visual field, is impossible, logically impossible, for it is excluded by the logical structure of colour ...." (T.6.3751). Thus it follows that objects are not properties. He says that space, time and colour are forms of objects (T.2. 0251).

Since objects are particulars, every fact must involve at least two particulars. Objects, being simple are changeless,

and hence indestructible, and it must be immortal. Since Wittgenstein accepts the view that objects are bare particulars. So far Wittgenstein, an atomic fact consists solely of objects, his objects do not have the sort of self-subsistence. They depend logically upon one another.

Now we are in a position to discuss that how the picture theory is concerned with its application to ordinary language. Wittgenstein had started his philosophical career in the essence of logic which led him to the pursuit of the essence of language. Wittgenstein is concerned with the construction of such a logically perfect language, that language is truth-functional and contains only meaningful propositions. "Meaningless propositions" cannot occur in it. Ordinary language and philosophic language should be replaced by this logically perfect-language. Ordinary language expresses meaningful propositions, only if it conforms to this ideal. The quest for the logically perfect language is an error. This consideration of tructarian philosophy has a myth that there are great differences between the earlier and later Wittgenstein. The tructarian philosophy was concerned with a logically perfect language but the Philosophical Investigations is really concerned with the ordinary language. Russell wrote in the Tractatus:

"Mr. Wittgenstein is concerned with the conditions for a logically perfect language - not that any language is logically perfect, or that we believe ourselves capable - here and now, of constructing a logically perfect language, but that the whole function of language is to have meaning, and it only fulfills

this function in proportion as it approaches to the ideal language which we postulate".<sup>14</sup>

The main problem in Tractatus and Philosophical Investigations are to understand how language conveys sense. "In order to understand Mr. Wittgenstein's book, it is necessary to realise what is the problem with which he is concerned. In the part of his theory which would have to be fulfilled by a logically perfect language".<sup>15</sup> Copi and Wisdom also subscribe to this view of Russell, "Wittgenstein says that sentences picture facts. But hardly any sentence in ordinary language do picture facts. Wittgenstein does not wish to assert that they do. He is trying to point out an ideal to which some sentences try to attain".<sup>16</sup> A logically perfect language has rules of syntax which prevent nonsense. The sole function of language is to assert facts. If a certain sentence asserts a certain fact then the language may be constructed between the structure of the sentence and the structure of the fact. "The tendency to reject ordinary language seems to me to predominate. Wittgenstein was concerned with the construction of "an adequate notation".<sup>17</sup> In the Tractatus Wittgenstein criticizes ordinary language. He says that the

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14. Tractatus, Logico-Philosophicus, p. 8.

15. ibid., p. 7.

16. Wisdom, J. "Logical Constructions", Mind, 1931, p. 202.

17. Copi, I. M. "Objects, Properties and Relations in the Tractatus", reprinted in Essays in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, edited by Copi and Beard, p. 160.

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16. Wisdom, J. "Logical Constructions", Mind, 1931, p. 202.

17. Copi, I.M. "Objects, Properties and Relations in the Tractatus", reprinted in Essays in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, edited by Copi and Beard, p. 160.

words have different modes of signification that are employed in propositions in what is superficially the same way. According to the Tractatus, the limits of language are the limits of the reality that can be described. Instead of saying this we can say that the limits of language are the limits of reality of the world.

Logic pervades the world; the limits of the world are also its limits.

T.551.

The totality of propositions is language. T.4.001.

Thus the language is the totality of all propositions that can be expressed in it. "The limits of my language mean the limits of my world" (T.5.6). In 4.002 he says, "Everyday language is part of the human organism and is no less complicated than it. It is not humanly possible to gather immediately from it what the logic of language is". Wittgenstein has said many places that ordinary language is quite free from logical defects. There is also a remark:

In fact, all the propositions of our everyday language, just as they stand, are in perfect logical order. That utterly simple thing, which we have to formulate here, is not an image of the truth but the truth itself in its entirety.

T.5.5563

Wittgenstein is concerned not with the conditions of any perfect language but with all significant language. He says propositions of ordinary language can be significant if they are truth-functional compound of elementary propositions. Thus he

maintains that ordinary language is all right. He says the meanings of the simple signs must be explained by those who use them. Anscombe says, "language could not approximate to having meaning; any language, just <sup>18</sup> qua language, fulfills its purpose perfectly".

Now we have seen that Wittgenstein makes frequent references to an "adequate notation" (T.6.122), "a symbolism.... which obeys the rules of logical grammar" (T.3.325). Anscombe says that the view of the ordinary language is essentially the same in the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations. She writes, "The sentences of ordinary language no more fail to express a sense than our Roman Numerical fails to express a number. The one expresses a sense, the other a number perfectly"<sup>1</sup> But a language whose symbolism obeys the rules of logical grammar which is not conceived to be a perfect language that is to replace ordinary language. Its aim is only to clear it that how any language works. Wittgenstein writes:

Everyday language is a part of the human organism  
and is no less complicated than it,

It is not humanly possible to gather immediately  
from it what the logic of language is.

Language disguises thought. So much so, that from  
the outward form of the clothing it is impossible  
to infer the form of the thought beneath it, because

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18. Anscombe, G. E., *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, p. 91.

the outward form of the clothing is not designed to reveal the form of the body, but for entirely different purposes.

T.4.002.

The purpose of ideal language is simply to make the form of the body recognized, i.e., to make it perspicuous. Hence Sellers (See "Naming and Saying") we shall call such a language the "perspicuous language", for the purpose of this language is to show perspicuously what is "hidden".<sup>20</sup> In the Tractatus Wittgenstein mentioned both ordinary language and perspicuous language. In the Tractatus he says:

My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used them - as steps to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it).

T.6.54

Hence language which used to speak about these propositions has always been one of the central in philosophy. Thus he shows the difference between ordinary language and perspicuous language only says. He says, "What can be shown cannot be said". (T.4.1212). Thus perspicuous language reveals the real form of propositions. It is an ideal language because there is no possibility of making a mistake. James Griffin writes: "An ideal language is ideal, for Wittgenstein, because it makes clear features which are obscure in ordinary language, but the features

20. James Griffin, "Wittgenstein's three languages", reprinted in *Essays on Wittgenstein's Tractatus*, ed. by Copi and

that are being made clear, one should note, are the features of ordinary language. The features, the essentials, are precisely what is common to both<sup>21</sup>. Thus Wittgenstein mentioned in the Tractatus both perspicuous language and ordinary language. It is an aid for how language works.

Now we will discuss the most important aspect of the picture theory; viz., the elementary proposition and how it depicts.

As we have seen, elementary propositions have the following features: They are made up entirely of names - and each name designates a simple object. They are logically independent of each other. They contain no logical constants, no words. They assert the existence of atomic state of affairs.

Then we will take Wittgenstein's views. Suppose that a fact is a combination of objects and an elementary proposition is a concatenation of names. But the problem is how are the elementary propositions to be written? Wittgenstein says, that an atomic fact is a combination of objects. Then an elementary proposition is a concatenation of names of these objects. A relation of objects is expressed by a relation of their names. The problem is; how can the different relations of objects be expressed of names? It is not necessary for the propositions to have a straight line structure. They must be written in many directions. The picturing relation is not the same as the pictured fact. So it is easy to understand how the picture theory

of proposition apply to relational propositions.

An elementary proposition consists of nothing but the names of these particulars, and it can be written like this: "a-b-c-d" or "c-d-e-". Wittgenstein maintains that elementary propositions are the values of certain propositional functions. The sentences of the language we use are linear-structures. We find in a map or a diagram an ideal case of a one to one correspondence between a picture and the situation depicted. Wittgenstein maintains that propositions as pictures. In the Tractatus the relation is that of hanging together and Wittgenstein writes: "The determinate way in which objects hang together in a state of affairs is the structure of the state of affairs". (I.2.032). Anscombe says that qualities and relations are not kinds of objects. She says that no word in a fully analysed elementary proposition refers to a relation, Copi says:

"Any relation of objects, spatial or non-spatial, can be represented by a spatial relation of the names of those objects. That 'a' has relation R to 'b' can be represented by writing "a" some specified distance and direction from "b", and that 'a' has some different relation R to 'b' can be presented by writing "a". Some different distance and direction from b".<sup>22</sup> Here Anscombe differs from Copi. Copi says that when elementary proposition is set out diagrammatically it will contain the two names "a" and "b". But Anscombe says that "R" may conceal further names. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein says that every atomic state of affairs

22. Kort, D. "Wittgenstein's picture theory of language", reprinted in Essays in Wittgenstein's Tractatus, edited by Copi and Neale, p. 204.

might consist of many objects, and in the later he writes that elementary propositions as functions of names, for example, "fx", " $\phi(xy)$ ", and so forth. (T.4.24). "The only propositions that are completely and directly pictorial are not linear. This is an unsatisfactory solution for it, in effect concedes that the picture theory is inconsistent with a characteristic feature of language".<sup>23</sup> In the Tractatus Wittgenstein says that propositions are linear structures. There is one passage in the Notebooks where Wittgenstein distinguished propositions from pictures. He writes; "It can be said that, while we are not certain of being able to turn all situations into pictures on paper, still we are certain that we can portray all logical properties of situations in a two-dimensional script".<sup>24</sup> When Wittgenstein is contrasting pictures on paper with portrayals in a two-dimensional script, then if propositions were itself like a map or diagram, there would be no contrast. Again he writes in the Notebooks, "What is the ground of our certainly well founded confidence that we shall be able to express any sense we like in our two-dimensional script". (26.9.14). The theory of Notebooks shows the linear character of propositions. Thus in the Tractatus propositions are thought of as linear structures.

There is important point here is that linear character of names describes a two-dimensional arrangement of squares. We

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23. Kapt, D. opcit., p.386.

24. Notebooks, 26.9.14.

can say that the essential feature of elementary proposition is not the two dimensional structure. Here we are in a dilemma; if the propositions are one dimensional structures they can not express all the possible modes of configuration of a given number of objects; if on the other hand, they are two-dimensional structures, then they become maps. But both the alternative are damaging. If we accept the first, it makes language poorer, and if we accept the second it make the picture inconsistent.

When the propositions are two-dimensional structures, the problem is, how can we understand the sense of a given proposition? If we can know the names of proposition we can understand the sense of it. Picture points out, "The assumption is that, in all possible states of affairs, objects are configured only spatially, i.e., that all possible states of affairs are purely spatial arrangements of objects. In that case, the spatial arrangement of the names in the proposition might conceivably be a picture of the spatial arrangement of the objects in the state of affairs".<sup>25</sup> But Wittgenstein makes no attempt to prove it. So we can say that the picture theory rest on an assumption which has not proved. Thus, Wittgenstein's picture theory is indefensible.

So Anscombe and Oopi's interpretations are wrong. Wittgenstein's elementary propositions are written in one-dimensional structure. He chooses the straight line notation. He writes:

These are the simple symbols; I indicate them by single letters ('x', 'y', 'z').

I write elementary propositions as functions of names,<sup>6</sup> that they have the form 'fx', 'φ(x,y)', etc.

T.4.24.

We can say that an elementary proposition consists solely of names. An elementary proposition is written in a linear structure, and in picture a relation is between objects and names. The relation signs are not to be counted as components of the propositions. While names stand for objects, relation signs denote nothing. Thus, by changing the relation-signs a linear proposition can express a new states of affairs. So it is wrong that a fully analysed elementary proposition contains a relation sign. Wittgenstein writes: "An elementary proposition consists of names. It is a nexus, a concatenation of names". (T.4.22). It clears us that elementary propositions cannot contain relation signs. They consist of names alone. So this type of elementary propositions cannot represent all possible situations.

In the Tractatus Wittgenstein's theory of propositions has far reaching and important consequences. I shall consider the nature and functions of language.

According to Wittgenstein all propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions. All propositions are either tautologies, or contradictions, or descriptive propositions. Since tautology and contradictions say nothing, Wittgenstein maintains that propositions of logic are tautologies (T.6.1), they say nothing (T.6.11), and they are purely formal (T.6.111). Propositions of logic and mathematics are senseless but not nonsensical.

Descriptive propositions assert the existence and non-existence of states of affairs. He writes:

The totality of true propositions is the whole of natural science (or the whole corpus of the natural sciences).

T.4.11.

The correct method of philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, i.e. propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy....

T.6.53.

According to Wittgenstein whatever language we speak we can think about. He says, "reality that can be described or thought", the qualifying clause "that can be described or thought"<sup>26</sup> may be dropped. So the limits of language are the limits of the world. And language is the totality of all propositions expressed in it.

The totality of propositions is language.

T.4.001.

Most of the propositions and questions to be found in philosophical works are not false but nonsensical. Consequently we cannot give any answer to questions of this kind, but can only establish that they are non-sensical. Most of the propositions and questions of philosophers arise from our failure to understand the logic of our language.

T.4.002.

Let us see what a significant language cannot say. We cannot describe the logical form of a state of affairs. What expresses itself in language we cannot express by means of language. (T.4.121). What can be shown cannot be said (T.4.1212). We cannot discuss the relation between language and the world. So there are many things which we cannot say. Wittgenstein writes in the end of his book:

My propositions are elucidatory in this way; he who understands me finally recognizes them as senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them.

T.6.54.

If the Tractatus contains nonsensical sentences, then its conclusions are non-sensical. But the conclusion is that all that preceded was nonsense, and they try to say something that can only be shown and that cannot be said. We cannot even say; whereof one cannot say/ thereof one must be silent (I.7). Ramsey says, "What we cannot say we can't, and we can't whistle it either".<sup>27</sup> According to Wittgenstein all that can be said are the propositions of the natural sciences. A significant language consists of propositions which are pictures of possible states of affairs. Every significant language is depicting language. Since the Tractatus is written in a non-depicting language, so its propositions are nonsensical. The language of Tractatus is elucidatory. This language does not describe the states of affairs. Now it is possible to defend Wittgenstein's thesis by distinguishing the elucidatory language, used in the Tractatus, from the depicting language.

Another important consequence is concerned with Wittgenstein's concept of philosophy. He says that there are two jobs of a philosopher. One negative and second positive. He says:

Philosophy aims at the logical clarification  
of thought.

T.4.112(1).

A philosophical work consists essentially of  
elucidations.

T.4.112(3).

Thus Philosophy is not the endeavour to investigate realms of being and to discover new truth, new facts. Therefore, it is not a body of true propositions, it is not a theory.

Philosophy is not a body of doctrine, but an  
activity.

T.4.112(2).

Philosophy does not result in 'Philosophical  
propositions; but rather in the clarification  
of propositions.

T.4.112(4).

Philosophy settles controversies about the limits  
of natural science.

T.4.113.

Therefore, philosophy is a clarifier and arbitrator, and it has all form and content. All that can be said is that certain states of affairs exist and certain others do not. There are many metaphysical assertions. But Wittgenstein says all of these are non-sensical. Philosophers must confine their activity to clarification of sense and meaning. So philosophy is not a body of knowledge, and not a set of propositions, but it is a "Critique of language". According to him it is a pursuit of meaning and sense, and not of truth.

Therefore, we can say that philosophical work consists of elucidations. The function of philosophy is to make proposition clear. He says the theory of knowledge is only the philosophy of psychology. So there will be no possibility of metaphysics. In the end we can see that most of the propositions and questions which we found in philosophy are nonsensical.

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C H A P T E R - IV

WITTGENSTEIN'S REJECTION OF TRACTARIAN DOCTRINES

## C\_H\_A\_P\_T\_E\_R - IV

In his preface to the Tractatus Wittgenstein said confidently: "the truth of the thoughts communicated here seems to me unassimilable and definitive. I am, therefore, of the opinion that the problems have in essentials been finally solved".<sup>1</sup> After completing the Tractatus Wittgenstein thought that he had solved all the problems of philosophy. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that he abandoned philosophy when he realised that there was no important work to be done. Passmore writes: "He had turned philosopher, in his engineer's way, in order to drain what seemed to him a swamp. The task was completed; there was no more to be said".<sup>2</sup> For some time, he was in close contact with the members of the Vienna-Circle. In March, 1928, he had heard Brouwer lecture in Vienna on the Foundations of Mathematics. After that he felt that he could do some creative work again. In the same year he submitted his Tractatus for the D.Phil. degree, and wrote "Some remarks on Logical Form", whose basic point of view was still that of the Tractatus. At that time some new ideas were born in his mind. Moore reports that Wittgenstein said to him that, "Something to the effect that, when he wrote it i.e., "Some Remarks on Logical Form", he was getting new ideas about which he was still confused,

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1. Tractatus, Logico-Philosophicus, p. 29.

2. Passmore, J., A Hundred years of Philosophy, p. 425.

and that he did not think it deserved any attention".<sup>3</sup> But in course of the next few years he came to realize clearly that the doctrines of the Tractatus were actually false. So it is necessary to consider those objections to his earlier views which he set down in the Philosophical Investigations. His later doctrines grew out of those objections and can be fully understood only in the light of them. At one place Von Wright writes: "The author of the Tractatus had learned from Frege and Russell. His problems grew out of theirs. The author of the Philosophical Investigations has no ancestors in philosophy".<sup>4</sup> Wittgenstein tells that his discussions with Ramsey woke him from his dogmatic slumber. He writes: "...Since beginning to occupy myself with philosophy again .... I have been forced to recognise grave mistakes in what I wrote in that first book (i.e., the Tractatus). I was helped to realize these mistakes - to a degree which I myself am hardly able to estimate by the criticism which my ideas encountered from Frank Ramsey, with whom I discussed them in innumerable conversations during the last two years of his life."

It is thus clear, that the later Wittgenstein is obliged to nobody for the elaboration of his new ideas, and has no source of influence. So his ideas are original. "Although the critique described above is directed not only against Wittgenstein's earlier views but against similar ideas of other

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3. Morris, G. H., "Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33", reprinted in Philosophical Papers, p. 252.

4. Cf. Pritchard, p. 26.

philosophers as well, it is still predominantly a criticism of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein here attacks not only ideas that were once his own, but also some widely held or even generally accepted conceptions in the philosophy of language and the philosophizing of other thinkers is thus more clearly revealed. Second a correct understanding of the critique of the theory of meaning is an essential precondition for grasping Wittgenstein's views about psychical or mental phenomena<sup>5</sup>. Although Wittgenstein in the preface of the Investigations writes:<sup>6</sup>

"Four years ago I had occasion to re-read my first book (*Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*) and to explain its ideas to someone. It suddenly seemed to me that I should publish those old thoughts and the new ones together; that the latter could be seen in the right light only be contrast with and against the background of my old way of thinking."

Now let us see the objections to major themes of the Tractatus that are formulated in his later works. The doctrine of the Tractatus is that the world divides not into things, but into facts and that propositions are truth-functions of elementary propositions and that each proposition has one and only one final analysis. But in the Philosophical Investigations he realizes that this notion of analysis is unwarranted.

Now let us see that the later Wittgenstein tells us that how anything divides up is not something determined by reality.

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5. Cf. William D. Hart, *Main currents in contemporary German, British and American Philosophy*, p. 429.

6. Cf. *Philosophical Investigations*, p. 4.

We can divide a composite thing from different point of view. So there are many ways of analysing a thing. As Pitcher points out, "One account might be better for some points of view, another better for other purpose or more appropriate from other points of view".<sup>7</sup> So it is wrong to say that the world divides into facts and not into things. John Wisdom says: "An account of the world in terms of things, an account of the world in terms of facts and an account of the world in terms of events is just an account of one world in three languages".<sup>8</sup>

Wittgenstein says that a thing is either simple or complex in a particular way. In the Investigations he clears it that nothing is absolutely simple and nothing is complex. In the Tractatus he maintained that names denote absolutely simple things and propositions state a complex states of affairs. But in the Investigations he says that in a certain context a thing may be called simple. And in other context, from a different point of view, the same thing may be called composite. Thus there are not the major qualities of things that they may be simple or complex. Whether a thing is simple or complex depends on the context in which it is being considered; simplicity and complexity are not absolute qualities in-hering in the thing. Wittgenstein says:

If I tell someone without any further explanation, "What I see before me now is composite", he will

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7. Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 170.

8. Wisdom, J. "Logical Construction", Part II, N, 1931, p. 192.

have the right to ask, "What do you mean by 'Composite'? For there are all sorts of things that/ can mean". The question, "Is what you see composite?" makes good sense if it is already established what kind of complexity, that is, which particular use of the word is in question.

Pl. Sec. 47.

For example, the question "Is a one inch line simple or composite"? apart from any particular way of looking at it - apart from any context, it is unanswerable for it lacks sense. So is the end Wittgenstein thinks:

To the philosophical question, "Is the visual image of this trace composite and what are its component parts?". The correct answer is: "That depends on what you understand by 'composite' (And that is of course not an answer but a rejection of the question)".

Pl. Sec. 47.

There is simply no sense in continuing to speak of something as absolutely simple. If there is no unambiguous analysis of states of affairs leading to atomic elements, then there is also no definite analysis of propositions into elementary sentences. That there is one and only one final analysis of anything. In the Tractatus his contention was that each proposition has one and only one final analysis. And that every proposition has a perfectly definite sense (I.2,251). It is this assumption which led him to argue that the propositions

are truth functions and must be analysed into a set of elementary propositions. In the Investigations he writes:

The sense of a sentence - one would like to say - may, of course, leave this or that open, but the sentence must nevertheless, have a definite sense. An indefinite sense - that would really not be a sense at all. - This is like; "An indefinite boundary is not really a boundary at all". Here one thinks perhaps; if I say "I have locked the man up fast in the room - there is only one door left open" - then I simply have not locked him in at all; his being locked in is a sham. One would be inclined to say here; "You haven't done anything at all". An enclosure with a hole in it is as good as none. - But is that true?

Pl, Sec. 99.

By the Tractatus point of view Wittgenstein says that the sense of a proposition is the situation it describes and a situation is something which is either actual or possible. But nothing in the world can be indefinite. Everything is as it is. So the sense of a proposition must be perfectly definite. At one place in the Notebooks he writes:

The question is really this: In order to know the syntactical treatment of a name must I know the composition of its reference? If so, then the whole composition is already expressed even in the ~~meaning~~ proposition . . .

N.B. 17-6-18.

In the Investigations he writes:

It can also be put like this: we eliminate misunderstandings by making our expressions more exact; but now it may look as if we were moving towards a particular state, a state of complete exactness; and as if this were the real goal of our investigation.

Pl. Sec. 91.

If we accept this assumption we may say that every proposition must be analyzable into elementary propositions. So this form of proposition is its real logical form. This real form is hidden in the proposition. (T.4.0031). He writes:

The strict and clear rules of the logical structure of propositions appear to us as something in the background - hidden in the medium of the understanding. I already see them (even though through a medium); for I understand the propositional sign. I use it to say something.

Pl. Sec. 102.

Wittgenstein came to realize that he had not simply looked at propositions objectively. In the Investigation, he says that this was a "Pre-conceived idea" (Pl. Sect. 108), not the product of actual analysis. Here he says that the facts do not conform to our previous requirement. He explains it more clearly:

The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between it and our requirement.

Pl. Sec. 107.

It is wrong to say that we can understand a proposition only if it has a perfectly determinate sense. Sentences which are vague and indefinite, they present no difficulty before us. He says in the Blue Book that many words do not have a strict meaning. "To think it would be like saying that the light of my reading lamp is no real light at all because it has no sharp boundary". We can say that many of the things are vague, inexact, and indefinite. They do not prevent us from achieving our purposes.

If I tell someone "stand roughly here" - may not this explanation work perfectly? And cannot every other one fail too?

Pl. Sec. 88.

At the same time exact and inexact are really vague concepts, through which we express praise and blame.<sup>2</sup> For the notion of the precise meaning of a word and of the perfect sense of the sentence what has to be said about exactness in general holds in particular for the special case of linguistic exactness. I will be understood at once or after a brief clarification and when I am understood the proposition that I express is as much in order as it need be. What I mean subject to a fantastically long explanation that will remove every conceivable source of misunderstanding, every conceivable clarity. An expression can have a sharp meaning in a situation, should doubts still exist regarding its meaning, these can be removed by supplementary explanations. But although such explanations can

serve to eliminate misunderstandings that do in fact occur, they can never remove all conceivable misunderstandings and <sup>10</sup> doubts.

The early Wittgenstein had imposed an impossible demands on a proposition. He had said: A proposition is no good, is not a really a proposition at all, unless it has a determinate sense. A proposition must leave no room for ambiguity, there must be no scope for any possible doubt or uncertainty. Everything it says must be precisely specified. Consider the following illustration, suppose a watch is no good unless it tells the exact time - the absolutely exact time". No, the real trouble with the claim is that exactness of time cannot be thought of in that way at all, as if there were some ideal of the absolutely exact time. What counts as exact time depends on and varies with the type of situation including the needs and aims of the <sup>11</sup> people involved.

There is no demand for further analysis. Wittgenstein had said that a proposition has a determinate sense. A proposition must leave no room for ambiguity. Therefore, Wittgenstein describes the notion of 'exactness'. There is nothing like 'absolutely exact'. But what is the sense of 'absolute exact'. Consider the expression "exact time". Does it mean the "absolutely exact time" as a matter of fact, "What counts as exact time depends on and varies with the type of situation, including the needs and aims of the people involved". Wittgenstein writes:

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10. *Shanklin, N.* Main currents in contemporary, British, German, and American Philosophy, p. 427.

11. *Prichard, G.* The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 176.

"Inexact" is really a reproach, and "exact" is praise. And that is to say that what is inexact attains its goal less perfectly than what is more exact. Thus the point here is what we call "the goal". Am I inexact when I do not give our distance from the Sun to the nearest foot, or tell a joiner the width of a table to the nearest thousandth of an inch?

No single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head - unless you yourself lay down what is to be so-called. But you will find it difficult to hit upon such a convention, at least any that satisfies you.

Pl. Sec. 28.

Pitcher points out that the ideal of exactness also follows/metaphysical considerations referring to the 'world in itself'. His idea is that the sense of a proposition is unambiguously determined, because there cannot be anything vague and undetermined in the world as it is. Propositions need be only as detailed, as specified, as the circumstances demand. The notion of an absolutely determinate sense of a proposition, divorced from the actual give and take of human discourse, is as mythical as that of absolute activities.<sup>12</sup>

So every situation has its own sense and criterion of exactness. Thus the Tractatus had assumed the validity of such a notion, it was mistaken.

Let us see now, how Wittgenstein criticized his notion of the final and complete analysis of a proposition. He said that a proposition is to be analysed into elementary proposition, which express the sense of the original proposition very clearly. In the Investigations he says:

If we were to ask anyone if he meant this he would probably say that he had not thought specially of the broom-stick or specially of the brush at all. And that would be the right answer, for he meant to speak neither of the stick nor of the brush in particular.

Pl. Sec. 60.

In the Investigations he maintains these points. Suppose we have the proposition; "The broom is in the corner". This proposition can be analysed as following: (1) the broom is in the corner, (2) the brush is in the corner, (3) the broomstick is attached to the brush. Do the analysed propositions say, what the original proposition says? Certainly not, says Wittgenstein. So he says that analysis never serve any useful purpose. He explains it more clearly:

Misunderstandings concerning the use of words, caused among other things, by certain analogies between the forms of expression in different regions of language - Some of them can be removed by substituting one form of expression for another; this may be called an "analysis" of our forms of expression, for the process is sometimes like one of taking a thing

Pl. Sec. 60.

Another important thesis of the Tractatus which Wittgenstein criticizes in his later works, is his conception of meaning. Wittgenstein says that the meaning of a name is the object it denotes, and the names of his absolutely simple objects are the only genuine proper names. He used both 'name' and 'objects' in a technical sense and only logically proper names have meaning. The meaning of a name is the object it denotes. The object is its meaning. In the Investigations it is a misuse of the word meaning. So he claims that to use it to signify the thing that corresponds to the name. Now he instances the ordinary proper name and distinguishes between its bearer and its meaning. In this case the meaning is the use. He had confused the bearer of a name with the meaning of the name. The bearer of a name may perish without the name itself losing its meaning. A name ought to signify a simple. We will discuss the point that a word has no meaning if nothing corresponds to it. It is necessary that the word 'meaning' is being used illicitly if it is used to signify the thing that corresponds to the word. In the Investigations he explains it:

When Mr. H.H. dies one says that the bearer of a name dies, not that the meaning dies. And it would be nonsensical to say that, for if the name ceased to have meaning it would make no sense to say "Mr. H.H. is dead".

Pl. Sec. 40.

It is a fact that a man's name does not lose its meaning when he is dead. So the meaning of a name is one thing and the bearer is another thing. He says the meaning of a name

is given by many descriptions, which apply to the bearer of the name.

We may say, following Russell: the name "Moses" can be defined by means of various descriptions. For example, as "the man who led the Israelites through the wilderness", "the man who as a child was taken out of the Nile by Pharaoh's daughter" and so on. And according as we assume one definition or another the proposition "Moses did not exist" acquires a different sense, and so does every other proposition about Moses.

Pl. Sec. 79.

Wittgenstein was definitely right to reject his earlier opinion that the meaning of a name and what it applies are absolutely identical and cannot be distinguished with one another. That is why it is not possible to say such things as "I broke part of the meaning of the word 'slab'", or "I laid a hundred parts of the meaning of the word 'slab' today". Such utterances should not be absurd, if the meaning of the word "slab" is slab itself. Wittgenstein sums up:

For a long class of cases - though not for all - in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Pl. Sec. 43.

Again he says:

Let us imagine samples of colour being preserved in Paris like the standard metre. We define: "sepia" means the colour of the standard sepias which are always kept hermetically sealed.

Pl. Sec. 50.

A name can have a meaning even though nothing corresponds to it. Here it is necessary that if the particular sample did not exist then the word 'Sepia' would have no meaning. He refers such sample as "an instrument of our language". (Pl. Sec. 57). Thus the very foundation of picture theory is demolished.

Wittgenstein had insisted in the Tractatus that it is elementary proposition that are pictures of reality in a certain states of affairs. But if we remove both the picture and pictured the picture theory is dissolved into nothingness. What rather constituted the heart of the picture theory was the assumption that both propositions and the corresponding states of affairs are identical in respect of their logical form.

We will say that every word has a meaning and this meaning is correlated with the word. Meanings are definite and their order must be simple. The philosopher has to discover the essence of the object and they build an ideal language. So the essence must be found in reality and it can be experienced. We can say that to grasp the meaning means the same as, "to have understood the explanation", "That the essence of the object denotes the meaning of the denoting expression follows from an analysis of this picture - of this sensation. And it follows from the exhibition of the process in question".<sup>13</sup>

According to Wittgenstein one of the important features of human thinking is craving for unity. We assume that there is

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13. Strawson, P., "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations", reprinted in Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, edited by George Pitcher, 1968, p. 106.

something common to all tables, to all mens, to all horses and so on. Since everything has an essence, "So one form of the craving for unity, then is a craving for essences, and it is so strong that we tend to assume that everything actually has an essence - that it is the essence of all nouns to name some entity, or kind of entity, in the way that "John" or "tree" does that it is the essence of all declarative sentences to state some fact in the way that "The cat is on the mat" does and so on." According to Wittgenstein this belief is absolutely wrong.<sup>14</sup>

You are reading when you derive the reproduction from the original. And by "the original" I mean the text which you read or copy; the dictation from which you write; the score from which you play, etc. etc.

Pl. Sec. 162.

In a similar way we also use the term "to read" for a family of cases; we generally assume that the 'reading' stands for a single object. And reading is a quite particular process. To discover the essence of reading certain philosophers opinions are the followings: "For reading is a mental process and the one real criterion for anybody's reading is the conscious act of reading, the act of reading the sounds off from the letters. "A man surely knows whether he is reading or only pretending to read".<sup>15</sup> So this mental process will enable to solve problems

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14. Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p.217.

15. Pl. Sec. 162.

which we could not solve when considering material processes. But mental processes are the same kind of processes; that neither a material nor a ~~material~~<sup>mental</sup> process enables us to explain how it is that words are meaningful; that their meanings can be known; that in pointing to mental processes we cling to the same scheme of explanation as in the physiological or the behaviouristic theory of meaning without realizing that we are doing so.<sup>16</sup> Further Pitcher says that there is not a mental content which is always present when a person is reading, and that therefore, giving the criterion for a person's reading cannot consist in pointing out a particular mental content which is present if and only if a person is reading, we could not take this content to be the essence of reading.<sup>17</sup>

Wittgenstein's point is that there is no general term which has a unitary meaning. If a word does not have a single meaning, it has more meanings and each meaning may not be unitary. So he says that the term 'game' has no unitary meaning. Now we shall explain how the phenomena of language are studied in primitive kinds of application. "In which one can demand a clear view of the aim and functioning of words." We shall discuss here one such language game.

That language is meant to serve for communication between a builder A and an assistant B, A is building with building-

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16. Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 111.

17. AMB, p. 117

stones; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. pass the stones, and that in the order in which A needs For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "Pillar", "Slab", "beam". A calls them out - B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such and such a call - conceive this as a complete primitive language.

Pl. Sec.2.

Now we consider how A prepares B for the purpose he is supposed to fulfil. An important feature of the training will consist in the teacher's pointing to the objects, directing the child's attention to them, and at the same time uttering a word; for instance, the word "slab" as he points to that shape. Let us now imagine that A teaches B more complicated orders which contain color, names, number - words.

Now what do the words of this language signify ?- What is supposed to show what they signify, if not the kind of use they have ? And we have already described that. So we are asking for the expression "This word signifies this" to be made a part of the description. In other words the description ought to take the form: "the word .... signifies...."

Pl. Sec.10.

Therefore, the term game might be called a genus term, and the concept 'game' might be called a genus concept, as there are several species of games falling under it (board-games, ball games, chess-games, dice-games and so on); and individual games (e.g., chess, cards, billiards), in turn, belong to one or more

species. Although all general terms are not genus term, there are special kind of generality that genus and species terms have no unitary meaning.

Now let us consider the term "Lemon". It has certain characteristics, e.g., a yellow colour, thickness, acid taste, a size and hardness that falls within a certain range and so on. If an object has such qualities it is surely called Lemon. Thus we may say that lemon like games have no essence; and "lemon" like 'game' has no unitary meaning.

Now Wittgenstein gives another argument against essentialism. He points out that many terms not only fail to have a unitary meaning but also fail to have a fixed meaning. Take for example, the sentence "Sugar is white", whiteness is one of the characteristics now belonging to the sugar-cluster. But in future a new kind of raw material may be produced or a new

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18. Pitcher, G. *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p. 221.

19. This example is borrowed from Michael Scriven. See his "The Logic of Criterion", *JP* (1959), pp. 357-63.

20. Wittgenstein's thesis, although highly plausible for terms like "house", 'lemon', and 'game', is not at all plausible for terms like 'brother' and 'Vixen'; for to be a brother, it is essential that one be male, and to be a Vixen, it is essential that a fox be female. There is then an important distinction between those terms that do and those that do not fall under Wittgenstein's thesis. I am not sure how to characterise this distinction in any more fundamental way, but somehow or other it is one that must be made. For an interesting discussion of his perplexing subject, see Hilary Putnam's "The Analytic and Synthetic" in *Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, Vol. III, H. Feigl and G. Maxwell, eds. For an article that opposes the claim asserted in his doctrine, see J. R. Bumbridge's "Universals and Family Resemblances", *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, (1959), especially, 219-34.

process for sugar may be found and such kind of sugar may turn out to be blue. In this case the cluster of sugar characteristics will have to be modified accordingly.

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Wittgenstein's opinion is that words have no unitary, fixed meaning. They do not designate essences. If we do the same for the various different words and sentences we will find that there is no one thing which they all do.

Think of the tools - in a tool box. There is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. The function of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects (And in both cases there are similarities).

Pl. Sec. II.

Review the multiplicity of language - games in the following examples, and in others:

Giving orders and obeying them -- Describing the appearance of an object, or giving its measurements --

Constructing an object from a description (a drawing) --

Reporting an event --

Forming and testing a hypothesis.

Presenting the results of an experiment in tables and diagrams --

Making up a story, and reading it --

Play or acting --

Singing catches --

Guessing riddles --

Making a joke; telling it --

Solving a problem in practical Arithmetic.

Translating from one language into another.

Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying.

Pl. Sec. 23.

We do the most various things with our sentences. Think of exclamations alone, with their completely different functions:

Water !

Away !

Oh !

Help !

Fine !

No !

"Are you inclined still to call these words names of objects" ?

Pl. Sec. 27.

Now let us consider some of Wittgenstein's criticisms of the earlier assumption that meaning is a mental act of meaning or intending. He had believed that a correlation is made between a word and the object it denotes, between a sentence and the situation it is used to describe. He thought that the correlation is made by a mental act of meaning. The meaning we connect with a certain sign is a mental picture. We do not look into the mind of a person what he is really saying. We understand him at his face value, e.g., when someone utters the sentence - "I hate you", at that moment he is in a state of hating. Wittgenstein writes:

If I give anyone an order I feel it to be quite enough to give him signs. And I should never say: this is only words, and I have got to get behind the words. Equally, when I have asked someone something and he gives me an answer (i.e. a sign) I am content that was what I expected, and I do not raise the objection; but that is a mere answer.

Pl. Sec. 503.

We may explain this fact by another example. Suppose P says "Jack came today", that Q asks him "Do you mean Jack Smith or Jack Spratt?" and that P replies "I meant Jack Spratt". These utterances seem to force one to assume that when P said "Jack came today", he performed at the same time, a mental act of meaning the word "Jack" to stand for Jack Spratt and not for "Jack Smith". For one thing, when P replies, "I mean Jack Spratt", his use of the past tense makes it appear as though he is talking about the previous moment, the moment at which he said "Jack came today"; he seems to be saying that at the moment he first spoke, i.e. while he was speaking, he then meant the word "Jack" to refer to Jack Spratt and no one else.

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In the Tractatus Wittgenstein's view is that meaning is a mental act. When we are speaking the words and that it is the performance of this mental act, then the connection between our

words and the world is made. But in the later he thinks that the early view was wrong. He realizes that if a set of words of itself means nothing, and requires in addition that act of intending, then we should be able to mean anything by it. He explains it in the following argument:

I say the sentence; "The weather is fine" - but the words are after all arbitrary signs - so let's put "a b c d" in their place. But now when I read this, I cannot connect it straight away with the above sense.

Pl. Sec. 508.

Again he says:

Suppose I said "a b c d" and meant the weather is fine. For as I uttered these signs I had the experience normally had only by someone who had year-in year-out used "a" in the sense of "the", "b" in the sense of "weather", and so on -- Does "a b c d" now mean: the weather is fine ?

Pl. Sec. 509.

But we cannot say why should it be so difficult if the mental act view of meaning were correct. Let us try another example:

Make the following experiment; say "It is cold here" and mean "It is warm here". Can you do it ? -- And what are you doing as you do it ? And is there a only one way of doing it ?

Pl. Sec. 510.

If the act of meaning by certain words is a different act from speaking them, then we ought to be able to perform it without saying anything. Make the following experiment, e.g.

"It will probably rain tomorrow". Now think the same thought again, mean what you just meant, but without saying anything (either aloud or to yourself). If thinking that it will rain tomorrow accompanied saying that it will rain tomorrow, then just do the first activity and leave out the second.— If thinking and speaking stood in the relation of the words and the melody of a song, we could leave out the speaking and do the thinking just as we can sing the tune without the words.

BB, P. 42.

If the act of meaning something by a propositional sign is a different act from speaking it, then it should be possible to do the first act without the second. We will give one example that "now imagine someone's saying Mr. A and Mrs. B loved — I mean lived together for a long time. In this case he does not want to give a definition or an explanation, according to which "love" is supposed to mean the same as "live", rather he committed a slip of the tongue and wanted to correct himself. In certain cases this is clear enough. In other cases it follows, e.g., from the fact that 'love' is never again mentioned in connection with Mr. A and Mrs. B etc. When, therefore, I say, By "a b c d" I mean "The weather is fine", it is not yet certain what the case is, whether I intended to give an explanation or was just speaking from a kind of trance, or

whatever else might be the case. The way I mean is to be interpreted follows from the context in which the whole sentence is uttered and from what we find out about the further use of the sign "a b c d".<sup>23</sup>

So, according to this theory acts of meaning must be performable in complete independence of language. For example, we understand the sense of this sentence that "It is to be hoped that the Sun will shine for the celebration to be held-<sup>24</sup> day after tomorrow without saying at all". Here the very description of the imaginary experient takes an air of absurdity and we have to conclude that no mere mental effort of a person A can either make a string of signs mean something different from the meaning it has within a certain language - game. So we say that the conception in question collides with the correct use of the word "mean", as is shown by considering simple question and answer games.

Although there are further difficulties. At what time is P supposed to perform the mental act of meaning Jack Spratt by the word Jack while he says "Jack came today". At that moment he uttered the term "Jack", but then speaker must often perform several acts at that time for P meant by "Jack", Jack Spratt and he may have meant by came, came here to this house and by today he may have meant this morning. On this mental act view the correct answer is, "What was going in P's mind when he said "Jack came today" would have to begin with:

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23. Putnam, H. "Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations", reprinted in Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, ed. by George Pitcher, 1968, pp. 126-37.  
24. Strawson, P. Main Current in Contemporary German, English and American Philosophy, p. 431.

"Tell me, what was going on in you when you uttered the words ....?" The answer to this is not: "I was meaning ...." !

Pl. Sec. 675.

Again the question is what kind of a mental act is the act of meaning supposed to be? Does it consist in entertaining an image of the intended thing? For example, did an image of Jack Spratt come before P's mind and how is the connection made between that image and Jack Spratt? Might that image not be a likeness of lots of other people who happen to look just like Spratt? You reply "But P intends the image to be an image of Jack Spratt, and of no one else". But then what does an act of intention consist in? (BB.P.39).

Therefore, Wittgenstein maintains that nothing would be more preposterous than call meaning a mental activity. Thus this view is untenable and leads to absurdities. In short, we operate with linguistic expressions, that we 'calculate' with them. And it is also part of this calculating that we translate these expressions some times into one picture and some times into another.

"But it is just the queer thing about intention, about the mental process, that the existence of a custom, of a technique, is not necessary to it. That, for example, it is imaginable that two people should play chess in a world in which

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25. Stegmüller, W., Main Currents in Contemporary, German, British and American Philosophy, p. 432.

otherwise no games existed; and even that they should begin a game of chess - and then be interrupted".

Pl. Sec. 205.

Wittgenstein points out many other difficulties (which cannot be discussed here for want of space) and concludes:

.... Nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity.

Pl. Sec. 693.

Thus in the end Wittgenstein's view is, that meaning depends not on any mental activity, but on conventions and contexts. So meaning can be generalized into an important truth about language. There are many expressions which seem to do nothing but refer. So the meaning something by one's word is a mental act accompanying the speaking of words. And many remarks in Wittgenstein's later philosophy are in this special sense "analyses". But they are not analyses in the sense that they claim to have discovered the true sense of forms of expression hitherto ignored by other philosophical currents.

**C H A P T E R - V**

**USE AND LANGUAGE-GAME**

## C H A P T E R - V

In the previous chapter I have tried to show that Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations contains the many comments on his earlier doctrines. A correct interpretation of Wittgenstein's later views requires a thorough understanding of the Tractarian theses. The philosophical theories discussed and demolished are mostly those which, he thinks, misled him in the Tractatus. Therefore, I shall begin my interpretations with a short account of how Wittgenstein reacts to the central thesis of the Tractatus, namely the notion of use and language game.

In the Investigations Wittgenstein is anxious to make us see "the multiplicity of kinds of words and sentences" (Pl. Sec. 23). Wittgenstein has said that we get our understand<sup>ing</sup> tied up in knots that is we fall into confusion. He says we are like flies in a fly-bottle.

What is your aim in Philosophy - To show the fly the way out of the fly-bottle.

Pl. Sec. 309.

Wittgenstein says that how our words actually do work, and what their uses really are.

Philosophical problems are, of course, not empirical problems; they are solved, rather, by looking into the workings of our language, and that in such a way as to make us recognise those workings; in despite of all ways to misunderstand them.

Pl. Sec. 109.

Let us see the word 'time'. We assume that 'time' has the same kind of use that 'tree', or 'table' or 'river' does. But if we examine the situation in which the word 'time' is used, we would see that it does not function as the name of any kind of ghostly medium, Wittgenstein says:

A main source of our failure to understand is that we do not command a clear view of the use of our words — our grammar is lacking in this sort — of perspicuity. A perspicuous representation produces just that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'. Hence the importance of finding and inventing intermediate cases.

Pl. Sec. 122.

Wittgenstein uses the word 'use' for more often than any other, but he speaks of the functions of words, of their purposes, their offices and their employments. But what might be called various different aspects of the use of a thing ? We will see different aspects of the use of words.

Wittgenstein is responsible for the linguistic turn in philosophy, but he was not very clear about the various aspects of the use of words. Words may be studied grammatically, phonetically, syntactically, semantically and finally in terms of speech acts and speech activities. They can also be studied as instruments of what Chomsky calls generative and transformational grammar. We must however, bear in mind that these aspects came into prominence after Wittgenstein. Let us now turn to some of these aspects.

Words are used as the materials of speaking and writing. So all words are identical in this respect. An important concept of the use of words has to do with the grammar of the word in question where the word can and cannot occur. But the question is how we construct grammatically correct word-groups (e.g., sentences) which contain that word and which can be able to recognize grammatically incorrect word-groups. We shall call it the 'grammatical aspect' of the use of words.

Therefore words are used to do certain things and when we speak of the use of words, it means that words are used to perform certain speech acts (such as issuing orders, asking questions and so on). We shall call it the speech act aspect of the use of words. But when we use the speech act aspect we are concerned with the use of words to do one thing or another. When we discuss the grammatical aspect of the use of words, the individual words regularly occur in certain linguistic frames. There is an important aspect of the use of words in which word-groups are normally used. We shall call such aspect the semantic aspect of the use of words.

Let us see, then, what Wittgenstein means by the use of words. Before we proceed further, we must guard ourselves against a possible misunderstanding. By the use of a word Wittgenstein means the grammatical aspect of the use of word in question. For instance, knowing how to use a word includes knowing in what sort of linguistic contexts the word can or

cannot occur. In other words, we can claim to know the use of a word, if we know how to construct sentences which contain that word.

At certain passages Wittgenstein seems to support the view that:

Our investigation is therefore a grammatical one.  
Such an investigation sheds light on our problem  
by clearing misunderstandings away.

Pl. Sec. 90.

But here Wittgenstein is not using the term "grammatical" in its ordinary sense. He is using it in "an extremely broad sense, to mean simply linguistic". He makes a distinction between linguistic and empirical investigations; and identifies philosophical activities with the former. In this sense, he describes his investigations as a grammatical one. He makes a distinction between "Surface grammar" and "depth grammar". He writes:

In the use of words one might distinguish "Surface grammar" from "depth-grammar". What immediately impresses itself upon us about the use of a word is the way it is used in the construction of the sentence, the part of its use -- one might say that can be taken in by the ear. And now compare the depth grammar, say of the word "to mean", with what its surface grammar would lead us to suspect. No wonder we find it difficult to know our way about.

Pl. Sec. 664.

By "surface grammar", Wittgenstein means, grammar in its normal or ordinary sense. He believes that grammar (in its normal sense) is misleading. It imposes rather oversimplification on language. He warns us against the "troublesome features in our grammar", and "grammatical illusions".<sup>1</sup> So by the use of a word Wittgenstein means something else. In one passage Wittgenstein compares words to tools:

Think of a tools in a tool-box; there is a hammer, pliers, a saw, a screw-driver, a rule, a glue-pot, glue, nails and screws. The functions of words are as diverse as the functions of these objects. (And in both cases there are similarities).

Pl. Sec. 11.

Now, let us take the views of some speech activities, and Wittgenstein's notion of them. Wittgenstein connects the notion of 'Use' with that of 'language-game'. When he urges to examine the use of a word, he refers to language games played with the word in question. According to him, using language is playing language-games. Malcolm reports:

"One day when Wittgenstein was passing a field where a football game was in progress the thought first struck him that in language we play games with words".<sup>2</sup>

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1. 200, p. 68.

2. Pl. Sec. 110.

3. Malcolm R. Ludwig Wittgenstein : A Memoir, p. 48.

Wittgenstein says that the different ways in which language is used are specific language-games; such as giving order, reporting an event play-acting, asking greeting, etc. The following points, give the view that what Wittgenstein calls a language-game:

A is building with building-stone; there are blocks, pillars, slabs and beams. B has to pass the stone, and that in order in which A needs them. For this purpose they use a language consisting of the words "block", "pillar", "Slab", "beam". A calls them out; B brings the stone which he has learnt to bring at such and such a call.

Pl. Sec. 2.

Wittgenstein says that the non-linguistic behaviour is also to be included in the language game.

I shall also call the whole, consisting of language and the actions into which it is woven, the "language-games".

Pl. Sec. 7.

Now Wittgenstein makes a distinction between pure language-game and impure language-game. He says that to speak a language is to exercise certain highly complex ways. In this connection Wittgenstein says: "An extensive definition can be variously interpreted in every case".<sup>4</sup> An extensive definition is employed to clear up a misunderstanding. But we can

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misunderstand what somebody is pointing at. Pointing in itself does not guarantee success. What guarantees success is that the learner can play all the language-games in which the word he is learning occurs;

Therefore, language is not something artificially constructed for the use of philosophers. That is to say, speaking a language and understanding it, is a matter of being "able to do a variety of things, to act or behave in certain ways - and to do so under the appropriate conditions".<sup>5</sup> Thus speaking a language is engaging in certain modes of behaviour. It is to engage in "forms of life", and "to imagine a language means to imagine a forms of life".<sup>6</sup> This explains Wittgenstein's provocative remarks:

"If a lion could talk we could not understand him".<sup>7</sup>

Therefore, Wittgenstein says when we use language, we actually play kinds of games. Words are pieces used in various language-games. So the meaning of a word is its role in the various language-games,<sup>8</sup> the kind of behaviour in which its use is embedded. An expression has meaning only from these modes of behaviour. Wittgenstein once said, "An expression

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5. Pitcher, G., *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p. 242.

6. PI. 222, 19.

7. PI. p.222.

8. PI. 222, 562.

has meaning only in the stream of life".<sup>9</sup> Thus Wittgenstein thinks that language is almost inseparably connected with life. Thus it does not mean that some sort of non-linguistic activity is always essential for the use of a word. In Section 23, he mentions purely linguistic activity such as telling a joke, reporting an event and so on. Under the notion of language game, he includes both linguistic and non-linguistic activities. As Pitcher says: that we can call the former (which consist entirely or virtually entirely, in the use of words) pure language-games, and the latter (which include non-linguistic behaviour as important parts) impure language-games. The word 'impure' has no pejorative force, and the difference between pure and impure language-games is not hard and fast. On the contrary he believes that in a certain sense, impure language-games are basic, and holds that "pure language-games are parasitic upon them in a crucial way".<sup>10</sup> Now Wittgenstein asserts that words derive their meanings from the language-games which are their "original-homes".

When philosophers use a word - "knowledge", "being", "object", "I", "proposition", "name" - and try to grasp the essence of the thing, one must always ask oneself: is the word ever actually used in this way in the language-game which is its original home? What we do is to bring words from their metaphysical to their everyday use.

Pl. Sec. 116.

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9. *Wittgenstein, Tr. 1. Manuscr.*, p. 92.

10. *Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p. 240.

Wittgenstein says that if we forget that words derive their meanings from the language-games which are their original homes, and that the intimate connections between language and behaviour, and try to treat words in isolation from the actual practical situations in which they are used, we end up in puzzlement.

The confusions which occupy us arise when language is like an engine, not when it is doing work.

Pl. Sec. 132.

.... Philosophical problems arise when language goes on holiday.

Pl. Sec. 38.

Let us then see, the notion of time. No puzzlement arises if we ask how time is measured or why time seems to go slower when we are waiting for the green light than when we are reading a good book, and so on. In these questions, the word 'time' is considered in the context of some possible situation. But we become bewildered if, severing all ties with any conceivable situation, we ask simply "what is time" ?<sup>11</sup> In Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

Augustine says in the confessions "quid est ergo tempus? Si nemo ex me quaerat scio; Si quaerenti explicare valim, nescio". This could not be said about a question of natural science ("what is the specific gravity of hydrogen ?" for instance).

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11. Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 245.

Something that we know when no one asks us, but no longer know when we are supposed to give an account of it, is something that we need to remind ourselves of (and it is obviously something of which for some reason it is difficult to remind oneself).

Pl. Sec. 89.

This example is given from St. Augustine, who writes:

For what is time? Who can readily and briefly explain this? Who can even in thought comprehend it, so as to utter a word about it? But what in discourse do we mention more familiarly and knowingly, than time? And, we understand, when we speak of it; we understand also. When we hear it spoken of by another. What then is time? If no one asks me I know; if I wish to explain it to one that asketh, I know not....

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When the word 'time' is, thus isolated, what is done is to treat it on the pattern of certain analogies. Some pictures hold us captive, so to say. In this case, for example, the word 'time' is classified with noun words that stand for some continuous process, e.g., 'river' or 'line'. Then, the philosophical problem, <sup>Con-</sup>cerning time is to discover the nature <sup>13</sup> of this quasi-physical stream. Therefore, one critician might

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12. Howard, R. Pease, (Tr.) The Confessions of Saint Augustine, p. 243.

13. Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 245.

be raised against Wittgenstein; "He makes too much of behaviour. Words are often used in the context of practical activity, in situations in which non-linguistic behaviour plays an essential part -- that is, in what were called impure language-games. Wittgenstein focuses his attention on such language-games. But words are also, and perhaps most often used in pure-language-games, we commonly use words in mere conversation. What sort of non-linguistic behaviour is supposed to be relevant in these cases? There is not any. The words that are used undoubtedly have meaning and yet they are not woven into any pattern of non-linguistic behaviour. So it would seem Wittgenstein's account is just inapplicable to the use of words in pure language-games and hence is of only limited interest".<sup>14</sup> Wittgenstein says that language is related to human-behaviour and that to imagine a language means to imagine a form of life. Thus he uses the term behaviour in a very wide sense:

Commanding-question,<sup>15</sup> recounting, chatting, are as much a part of our natural history as walking, eating, drinking, playing.

Pl. Sec. 25.

Therefore, the use of words is embedded in non-linguistic modes of behaviour so both purely linguistic (or almost purely linguistic) behaviour, and behaviour which is a mixture of linguistic and non-linguistic behaviour are central to Wittgenstein's conception of a language-game. Wittgenstein says that

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14. Pitcher, G., *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p. 246.

15. Ibid., p. 247.

using words in impure-language-games is dependent on their use in impure ones. His view is that the meaning of these words is given in such language-games as mastered in such games, and is essentially involved in them. As Pitcher points out that these fundamental impure language-games "lie in the background", when words are used in pure ones.<sup>16</sup> But here Wittgenstein's opinion is that one who has mastered the uses of the word in both kinds of language-games has a deeper understanding of the meaning of the word. It means that he can understand very easily both kinds of language-games, i.e. the impure language-games and pure-language-games. But if a person did not know how to play the impure games, he could not play the pure ones. The words and symbols may have no uses in impure-language-games but they may have uses only in pure language-games. Hence Wittgenstein says that these pure-language-games would be the "original homes" of such words.

Wittgenstein's purpose on the use of a word is that its role in language is determined by strict logical rules. David Pole gives some views about languages. Those views are:

"Broadly the thesis is that a language .... consists of a complex set of procedures, which may also be appealed to as rules".<sup>17</sup>

We are to think of two factors in language; on the one hand particular moves or practices which

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16. *ibid.*, p. 200.

17. *ibid.*, p. The availability of Wittgenstein's later *Philosophical Investigations* reprinted in Wittgenstein, the *Philosophical Investigations*, ed. by George Pitcher, p. 154.

are assessed by appeal to the rules, and on the other hand those rules themselves. Beyond these there is no further appeal. They are things we merely accept or adopt.

Where there are no rules to appeal to we can only decide; and I suppose that it is primarily on this account that this step is called a  
<sup>18</sup> decision.

That David Pole suggests that the notion of language-game is employed to show that it consists of a set of procedures which may also be appealed to as rules. The correctness or incorrectness of a use of language is determined by the rules of the language, and the rules form a complete system that for every "move" within a language is obvious that a rule determine its correctness. And where a rule does apply, it is obvious whether it has been followed or infringed. If such a move is made which is not covered by the existing rules, it violates the procedures of the game. So rules are the highest court of appeal.

What Wittgenstein says about rules, correctness, decision, games, etc. is difficult enough, "but not sufficiently so that one must hesitate before saying that Pole has not tried to understand what Wittgenstein has most painfully wished to say  
<sup>19</sup> about language (and meaning and understanding)". Pole says

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18. 1944, p. 120.

19. 1944, p. 120.

that the correctness is determined in a constructed language. And ordinary language does not depend upon the conception of rules. The analogy of game is employed to show that words and sentences are vague. Wittgenstein says in the Tractatus that language is impossible without exact logical forms. But the views of later Wittgenstein is to demolish this artificial notion of language. Then, Wittgenstein compares moments of speech with moves in a game. Pole describes this as such:

"the comparison .... serves his purpose in at least two ways. It serves him first in that a game is usually a form of social activity in which different players fill different roles.  
Secondly, in that games observe rules".<sup>20</sup>

Wittgenstein uses the analogy of game to insist on the fact that we do not proceed according to definite rules either in games or in language. He says the uses of word is unregulated. "It is not everywhere circumscribed by rules...."<sup>21</sup> "Following a rule" is an activity which is learned against the background of innumerable other activities such as obeying orders, giving rules, repeating what is done and so on. The concept of rule does not exhaust the concept of correctness or justification. A rule can be misinterpreted in the course.<sup>22</sup>

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20. Ibid., p. 256.

21. PL, 200, 42.

22. ~~1960~~, a. "The availability of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by George Pitcher, p. 157.

Wittgenstein maintains that rules do not "determine" what a game is. Playing a game is "a part of our natural history".<sup>23</sup> And we can learn a new game without ever learning or formulating its rules.<sup>24</sup> There is no one set of characteristic which everything we call "games" shares, hence no characteristic called "being determined by rules".<sup>25</sup> Language has no essence. Then, according to Wittgenstein, "following a rule" is just as much a "Practice" as "playing a game is".<sup>26</sup> Thus "obeying a rule" has none and it can be done correctly or incorrectly. Rules are not enough. Wittgenstein says:

And hence also 'obeying a rule' is a practice.  
And to think one is obeying a rule is not to obey a rule. Hence it is not possible to obey a rule 'privately'; otherwise thinking one was obeying a rule would be the same thing as obeying it.

PI. Sec. 202.

Whether a rule is obeyed or not is a matter of what Wittgenstein describes in the Blue Book, as "Conventions",<sup>27</sup> and in the Investigations as "forms of life".<sup>28</sup> According to Wittgenstein the conventions or forms of life are not rules. He says:

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23. PI. Sec. 25.

24. PI. Sec. 31.

25. PI. Sec. 65.

26. PI. Sec. 199.

27. PI. p. 24.

28. PI. Sec. 521.

If I have exhausted the justifications I have reached bedrock, and my spade is turned. Then I am inclined to say: "This is simply what I do".

Pl. Sec. 217.

Now we will see that Wittgenstein says that the "appeal to rules" is as an explanation of language. In the Blue Book he refers:

When we talk of language as a symbolism used in an exact calculus, that which is in our mind can be found in the sciences and in mathematics. Our ordinary use of language conforms to this standard of exactness only in rare cases. Why then do we in philosophizing exact rules? The answer is that the puzzles which we try to remove always spring from just this attitude towards language.

BB. pp. 25-26.

Again he says:

The man who is philosophically puzzled sees a law (rule) in the way a word is used, and, trying to apply this law consistently comes up against cases where it leads to paradoxical results.

BB. p. 27.

We learn and teach words in certain contexts, and we are expected to be able to project them into further contexts. So the meaning of a word is not something unique and mythical. What is important is the stream of life from which words derive their meaning. Wittgenstein refers that the meaning

of a word is the object for which it stands and he says that the meaning of a word is its use in the various language-games in which it play a part.

For a large class of cases - though not for all, -in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language.

Pl. Sec. 43.

Wittgenstein asserts the view that just as there are many different kinds of games, so there are many different kinds of meanings and all can not be identified with the use of the word. He not only speaks the meaning of the word but also speaks the sense of a sentence, as consisting in its use. As Pitcher points out that, "I do not think that Wittgenstein's mistake here, if it is one, has any very serious consequences for his philosophy".<sup>29</sup> Therefore, there are some accidental connections between the meaning of a word and its use.

Then, Wittgenstein identifies the meaning of a word, and the sense of a sentence, with its use in the language. He says of different kinds of sentences. He makes the point that a formal (grammatical) likeness may cover a functional difference. He asserts, "But how many kinds of sentences are there?"<sup>30</sup> "Kind of sentence," in the question to 'kind of

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29. Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 281.

30. Pl. Sec. 22.

'use' in the answer was an important one. "It would be absurd to speak of different sentences here, let alone of different kinds of sentences. We might speak of different uses of the sentence, though it would be better to speak of different linguistic activities in each of which the sentence occurred".<sup>31</sup> But we must not forget that Wittgenstein is criticising here a particular view of language which divides sentences into certain kinds (formally or grammatically), which are supposed to correspond to "differences in use". The other point made by Ryle in his article 'Ordinary language'.<sup>32</sup> He says that "We cannot talk about the functions or uses of words in the same sort of way as we can talk about the functions or uses of sentences".<sup>33</sup>

Before we come to the next point, it is necessary here to consider certain objections against Wittgenstein's views of language and meaning. It has been said that Wittgenstein identifies the meaning of a word with its uses in language. But this identification is wrong. "In non-linguistic areas, at any rate, things which have uses (e.g., tools, instruments) normally cannot sensibly be said to have meanings. Moreover, things which may sometimes have meanings, or (in case nothing

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- 31. Strawson, P. F. Review of *Philosophical Investigations*, reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations* ed. by George Pitcher, p. 26.
- 32. Ryle, G. 'Ordinary language', *The Philosophical Review*, April, 1953, pp. 178-180.
- 33. Strawson, P. F. *Species*, p. 26.

non-linguistic can be said to have a meaning) things which may sometimes mean something, (e.g., black clouds on the horizon, footprints in the snow, the rising pitch of someone's voice) do not, except rarely, have uses. Therefore, we could not expect the meaning of a word to be the same thing as its use(s) in the language. But "those connections between meaning and use which were just admitted to hold for words generally, do not hold universally, much less necessarily. And thus although in general if one knows the meaning of a word he also knows the use, still it is quite possible to know the meaning of a word and yet not know its use".<sup>34</sup> Thus Pitcher maintains that meaning cannot be identified with use. If a word has both meaning and use, no one can claim to have understood its meaning in the full sense of the term, unless he knows how to use that word in different language-games which are played with it. Thus, there is a necessary relation between meaning and use in language.

Therefore, Pitcher criticises the identification of meaning and use. He points out a example: that a non-latin speaker may know that 'Ulfus' means revenge in Latin, but he may not know when or how to use it. And we may take an example of the latter; most people know how to use the sign 'Q.E.D.' yet far fewer know its meaning. So many words have a use in language, but no meaning.

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34. Pitcher, G., *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, pp.261-62.

35. Ibid., p. 262.

Granted that the meaning of a word and its use are necessarily related, does it follow that they are identical? Pole maintains that there is always more meaning in an expression than we have given it, i.e., the meaning of a word is not exhausted by its use. Thus Wittgenstein has failed to establish the thesis that the meaning of a word is identical with its use.

Now we shall see that Wittgenstein identifies the 'meaning' and 'use' with the meaning of the proper names and even of their definitions. But he is simply misusing the words 'meaning' and 'definition'. Wisdom interpreted Wittgenstein's theme. He says, "Do not ask for the meaning, ask for the use".<sup>36</sup> Wittgenstein investigates the uses of words, and is not much concerned with their meanings. Strawson identifies that, "One might get the impression that he was saying: in philosophy you want the meaning of the word. Do not look for the mythical, uniquely related term, but look at the use; for that is the meaning (cf. 43). But in view of the natural place of 'meaning', it might be better to say: In doing philosophy, it cannot be that you are ignorant of the meaning;<sup>37</sup> what you want to know is the use".

This is the fact that Wittgenstein says that whatever be the relation between the meaning and use of a word, in

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36. Wisdom, J., "Ludwig Wittgenstein", *Mind*, LII, No. 242, April, 1943, p. 252.

37. Strawson, P. F., *Review of Philosophical Investigations*, reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by George Pitcher, p. 24.

philosophy it is the use(s) that matters. Talking about the game in a simple language-game he says:

But what is the meaning of the word "five"? —

No such thing was in question here, only how the word "five" is used.

Pl. Sec. 1.

In another passage he explains it:

If we look at the example in 1, we may perhaps get an inkling how much this general notion of the meaning of a word surrounds the working of language with a haze which makes clear vision impossible. It disperses the fog to study the phenomena of language in primitive kinds of application in which one can command a clear view of the aim and functioning of the words.

Pl. Sec. 5.

Wittgenstein says that if we command a clear view of how words are used in various language-games, we shall free ourselves from the puzzlement. We shall no longer assume that our language, functions in one way only. We shall no longer assimilate all words and sentences to a few standards or paradigms.

Having demolished the myth that the meaning of a word is something, unique and mysterious, given to it independently of its uses in the language, Wittgenstein examines another misleading feature of the traditional doctrines of meaning, viz., meaning and understanding as mental activities. What

seems to be required are various kinds of mental acts or processes. In order to say something definitely the speaker must not only utter or write a sentence, he must also mean something by it. There must be some thought behind the words. The hearer must not only hear the word but he must understand them. And some process must go on in his mind. Wittgenstein puts these points with great clarity:

But is not it our meaning it that gives sense to the sentence? (And here of course, belongs the fact that one cannot mean a senseless series of words). And 'meaning it' is something in the sphere of the mind. But it is also something private: It is the intangible something, only comparable to consciousness itself.

Pl. Sec. 258.

Thus, it is said that Wittgenstein's emphasis of the use of the words is misguided. Therefore, he is concerned with the mental act of meaning and understanding. Now we shall see that how this thesis comes into existence. He describes this tendency to search the life of meaning in the mental activity as a 'disease'.

There is a kind of general disease of thinking which always looks for (and finds) what would be called a mental state from which all our acts spring as from a reservoir.

BB, p. 143.

This disease is based on a generally correct premises from which a wrong conclusion is made to follow. For example, when a person is given an order, we say that he must understand it if he is to carry it out. A mental act or process of understanding must occur in his mind prior to his overt activity. These forms of expression can lead us something which Wittgenstein considers to be a "grammatical fiction".

"Are you not really a behaviourist in disguise ? Are not you at bottom really saying that everything except human behaviour is a fiction?" - If I do speak of a fiction, then it is of a grammatical fiction.

Pl. Sec. 307.

Again he says in the Blue and Brown Books:

We are treating here of cases in which, as one might roughly put it, the grammar of a word seems to suggest the 'necessity' of a certain intermediary step, although in fact the word is used in cases in which there is no such intermediary step. Thus we are inclined to say: "A man must understand an order before he obeys it". . . .

BB. p. 130.

Another reason for the belief that meaning is a mental activity is embedded in the circumstances where we seem to say something and mean something else. Now let us consider the term 'thinking'. We say many things about speaking are

correlated with things. This is the assumption here that 'thinking' designates a mental process. Wittgenstein in the following passage says:

Consider these examples: "Think before you speak!" "He speaks without thinking", "What I said did not quite express my thought", "He says one thing and thinks just the opposite", "I did not mean a word of what I said", "The French language uses its words in that order in which we think them".

BB.P.148.

Granted that Wittgenstein's opinion is that 'meaning' and 'understanding' do not designate any inner process. Whereas if someone says something and does not mean it, he says nothing to himself inwardly. On this account Wittgenstein maintains that something like it may sometimes happen, although he insists that such cases are extremely rare.<sup>38</sup> But we cannot consider that whenever anyone says something and means it, something must go on in his mind while he speaks. It is possible to say something and to mean something else, but usually it is gestures, tone of voice, facial expressions and experiences of different kinds which distinguish meaning what we say from not meaning it.<sup>39</sup>

Therefore, it may be said, that the meaning of an expression is not determined by any mental activity. Although

something must occur if we mean something when he says it. And if we will insist that there must have been some special act <sup>40</sup> at that time we are being misled by grammatical similarities. It is wrong that "he said it and meant what he said" is just like "He said it and smiled" or "He saw it and touched what he saw". Let us consider a concrete example of Reading. For reading is a mental process, so a specific mental process, the reading process, MRP is present in the mind when we are reading. The MRP is the object of our analysis of reading, its presence makes our overt behaviour a manifestation of reading. <sup>41</sup> Thus, Wittgenstein shows that MRP does not enable us to explain how mental words are meaningful. Although it can be said that this mental process will enable us to solve problems which we could not solve when considering material process only. Now we shall show that there is not a mental content which is always present when a person is reading. So that a mental content is the essence of reading and that a person is reading if and only if this content, namely the MRP is present. This implies that no distinction can be drawn <sup>42</sup> between reading and believing that one is reading.

Now we have seen that Wittgenstein admits that in some circumstances "meaning what one says" is a mental occurrence.

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40. Pitcher, G. *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p. 260.

41. Feyerabend, P. *Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations*, reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by George Pitcher, p.112.

42. Pl. 262.

If an inner process or experience be the essential part of an act of meaning, then it must be a sufficient condition to decide whether a word is used correctly or not. words and sentences derive their meanings from the language-games in which they have their roles. A careful analysis of the way we use phrases such as "A intends to - - - -", 'A means that - - - -', 'A suddenly understands that - - - -', shows that in trying to account for this use we use certain elements of the language-game in which these expressions occur and the connection of this use with our actions.

Then, it may be argued that when we use a word, it arouses an image in the mind, which determines its meaning. We can say that words in themselves are lifeless. He maintains that no bridge from words to the world can be built on the basis of mental images. Then, it is not the occurrence of an image but its use, that gives it any significance. What a particular image says depends on how it is used -- not on its occurrence. Its use depends on how the expression for it is used in various language-games. Thus, an image is not a necessary element in the meaning of a word. For example, the word 'elliptical' derives its meaning from the language games in which it is used. Generally, nothing that happens in a person's mind can possibly be definitive of whom or what he means by a certain word. That is why, Wittgenstein says:

If God had looked into our minds he would not have been able to see there whom we were speaking of.

Pl. p. 217.

Wittgenstein maintains the word 'meaning' in another different sense, but he says that:

And nothing is more wrong-headed than calling meaning a mental activity ! Unless, that is one is setting out to produce confusion. (It would also be possible to speak of an activity of butter when it rises in price, and if no problems are produced by this it is harmless).

Pl. Sec. 693.

It is said that according to Wittgenstein the words like 'thinking', 'meaning' and 'understanding' can be generalised into an important truth about language. Thus all sorts of different things depend upon the expression. We use the word 'meaning' in a wide variety of situations, and it is wrong to maintain that in all these situations it is the occurrence of an occult process in the mind which justifies the use of this term. What goes on in the user's mind is only an idle ritual, in the sense that it is a mere accompaniment.

What is happening now has significance -- in these surroundings. The surroundings give it its importance.

Pl. Sec. 693.

After considering the speaker's meaning, we consider the other side namely, the hearer's understanding what he

hears. Wittgenstein asserts that the hearer must not only listen to what a speaker says, but he must try to grasp it clearly. When a speaker understands the sense of language, something occurs in his mind which justifies us to say that he has now understood it. That means, he knows how to go on.

Another discussion of Wittgenstein's analysis is to examine the notion of knowing how to go on, as it occurs in the following example. Suppose a person A writes down the numbers 1, 5, 11, 19, 29; and that at "29" B claims "Now I know how to go on". But it is wrong that B's "knowing how to go on" is a mental process that occurred in his mind. But there are some other situations in which the right formula occurs to B and he does not know how to go on.<sup>44</sup> So Wittgenstein says that B knows "how to go on" means different things in different situations, in different kinds of cases. As the statement, "We can walk now" means different things in different situations.<sup>45</sup> "Now I know how to go on" is not a description of a mental state in Wittgenstein's sense. It is rightly employed if B does. It is an "exclamation", and a "glad start".<sup>46</sup> Thus Wittgenstein writes:

In the sense in which there are processes  
(including mental processes) which are  
characteristic of understanding, understanding  
is not a mental process.

Pl. Sec. 154.

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44. Pl. Sec. 152.

45. Pl. Secs. 223 and 224, pp. 134-15.

46. Pl. Sec. 226.

Therefore, it can be said that meaning and understanding and thinking are not altogether different from physical acts and processes. What meaning and understanding consist in is revealed only in the course of time and in a wide variety of the person's behaviour.

Now, Wittgenstein is trying to show is that instead of assuming that there must be something common to all things to which a general term applies, one has to examine whether they all have it. There is no common essence. In the Investigations Wittgenstein speaks of "family resemblances". He says that if we look at all the things called 'games', we find that there is nothing which must be present in every game. He gives an account of the similarities and differences between various games:

Consider for example, the proceedings that we call "games". I mean board-games, card-games, ball-games, Olympic-games and so on. What is common to them all? Don't say: "There must be something common, or they would not be called 'games' ", - but look and see whether there is anything common to all. - For if you look at them you will not see something that is common to all, but similarities, relationships, and a whole series of them at that. To repeat: Don't think, but look! - Look for example at board-games, with their multifarious relationships. Now pass to Card-games; here you find many correspondences with the first group, but many

common features drop-out, and others appear. When we pass next to ball-games, much that is common is retained, but much is lost. — Are they all "amusing"? Compare chess with noughts and crosses. Or is there always winning and losing, or competition between players? Think of patience. In ball-games there is winning and losing; but when a child throws his ball at the wall and catches it again, this feature has disappeared. Look at the parts played by skill and luck; and at the difference between skill in chess and skill in tennis. Think now of games like ring a ring a roses; here is the element of amusement, but how many other characteristic features have disappeared? And we can go through the many, many other groups of games in the same way; can see how similarities crop up and disappear.

And the result of this examination is: we see a complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities, sometimes similarities of detail.

Pl. Sec. 64.

I can think of no better expression to characterize these similarities than "family resemblances", for the various resemblances between the members of a family, build, features, colour of eyes, gait,

temperament, etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. — And I shall say: "games" form a family.

Pl. Sec. 67.

Having failed to realise this, the platonists and the idealists postulate the existence of real forms and concrete universals respectively. According to Wittgenstein, things have no common essence, they have "family resemblances". Words do not have essential characteristics as their meanings. A word is used to refer to a wide range of things. If a word does not have a single meaning, it has two or more meanings. Thus Wittgenstein exposes the traditional theories about things, and destroys them completely. Let us consider the term 'Lemon'. Lemons have certain characteristics, say, a, b, c, d, e, etc. If an object has all these properties, it is definitely a lemon, but if something lacks one or more of them may still be a lemon. If due to change of certain conditions lemon trees started producing fruits of a pinkish colour and with a sweet taste, but having all the other characteristics of lemons, these fruits would still be lemons. A lemon must have only most of the properties which are generally found in lemons.

So Wittgenstein denies the possibility of fixed and unitary meaning. But this is wrong impression. According to Wittgenstein games have nothing in common except that they are games. At one place Ayer says that, "It is correct, though not at all enlightening, to say that what games have in common is their being games". The nominalist view is that all games

have nothing in common except that they are called games. Wittgenstein does not accept the nominalist views. He feels that games have in apart from being games. But this is a misplaced feeling. Let us take an example: If I ask what all chairs have in common, or what all books have in common, But it is a poor joke to say that what all books have in common is that they are books and that what all chairs in common is that they are books and that what all chairs have in common is that they are chairs.<sup>47</sup> Of course, games do have something in common. The truth is that what games have in common is that they are games.

Therefore, there can be no objective justification for the application of a general term to its instances unless its instances have something in common over and above their having in common that they are its instances. According to nominalist there is no such additional common element and he thinks that there is no objective justification for the application of any general term. But Realist's opinion is that there is an objective justification for the application of general terms and he concludes that there must be some additional common element. Thus he denies the assumption, that is common to both nominalism and realism. Now Wittgenstein admits that games have nothing in common except that they are games.

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47. Bembridge, R., *Universals and Family Resemblances*, reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by George H. Marcus, pp. 196-197.

48. 1944, p. 200.

So we are in a position to say that Wittgenstein is neither a realist nor a nominalist. He maintains that the simple truths, that they both deny and also admits the two simple truths of which each of them asserts one and denies the other. Here an illustration is, that if we choose to give the name "alpha" to each of a number of miscellaneous objects then we may succeed in choosing the objects so arbitrarily that we shall succeed in preventing them from having any feature in common.<sup>49</sup> The use of a general word must refer to characteristics of the objects to which it applies. If everybody always called a particular set of objects by the same name, that would be insufficient that the name was a general name. Thus, there is no limit to the number of possible classifications of objects. The Realist view is correct that there is no classification of any set of objects which is not objectively based on genuine similarities and differences. Of course, the result is that there is one complete system of classification which marks all the similarities and all the differences.

Now we shall try to show, then that Wittgenstein's notion of "family a resemblances" constitute a general feature of ordinary language, so far as common names are concerned. According to his view, in every case where things are called by the same name there is a quality which is common to them all, by virtue of which they are all called by that name.<sup>50</sup> But this is wrong interpretation. In speaking of language-games he says:

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49. TMC, pp. 192-200.

50. TMC, pp. 206-208.

"Instead of producing something common to all that we call language, I am saying that these phenomena have no one thing in common which makes us use, the same word for all, - but that they are related to one another in many different ways.

And it is because of this relationship, or these relationships that we call them all "languages".

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The features of "family resemblances" are determinate characteristics and not merely kinds of characteristics. We can think in a "family" where all members have a determinable, in common. If Wittgenstein admits that all things called by the same name have a qualitatively identical "determinate" characteristic, then traditional essentialism will not be overthrown. Similarly Wittgenstein considers games which are ~~amusing~~ having a common feature, with games which involve competition, or winning and losing and so on. Another point is that when he talks about "Family resemblances" he is concerned with things which are called by the same name in one and the same sense, and not in different senses.

Wittgenstein maintains that there are no determinate characteristics common to all things called "games". All games are played with certain kinds of rule, so that there is a universal common to them all. There is a more determinate feature common to all kinds of game, that is, the capacity to serve a specific human need. We consider that games have a

common capacity to produce pleasure under standard conditions. The word 'capacity' is meant to indicate that if certain conditions obtain, pleasure <sup>52</sup> will be produced.

Let us then take an statement that "This is a good game, but I do not enjoy it". The speaker implies that he is not being affected in the way which is normal in those cases, without hesitation call a given phenomena a "good game". Saying this, he concedes that it can give others, some, or even a good deal of pleasure. And he admits that his failure to have pleasure is not due to game itself, but to his state of mind etc. <sup>53</sup>

But here a problem arises that is the pleasure produced different kinds of games? But if I accept this statement that

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52. The statement: "If standard conditions obtain pleasure will be produced by a game" is meant to be and is, an analytic statement; and not either an a priori synthetic judgment or an empirical generalization. For our contention is that the notion of "standard" conditions here is built into the meaning of the word 'game' in such a way as to make the above statement analytic. The essential point here is that we are not arbitrarily introducing the notion of "standard" conditions in order to guarantee the truth of the statement. Our contention is that if we analyze the uses of the term 'game', we discover this notion of "standard" conditions implicit in it. That this is so is, however, an empirical assertion about the uses or meaning of 'game'.

53. Khatchadourian, H., Common Names and Family Resemblances, reprinted in Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, edited by George Pitcher, p. 212.

Wittgenstein's analysis of games would be true. This is the result of games that are related by "family resemblances". So it is true that different kinds of pleasure produces different kinds of games. Thus a relatively determinate kind of effect seems to be produced by all kinds of games. It seems to follow that in games themselves, there are some kinds of capacity, which is similar in the case of all games. And there is not any determinate characteristics common to all games.

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**C H A P T E R - VI**

**PAIN AND PRIVATE-LANGUAGE GAME**

## C\_H\_A\_P\_T\_E\_R - VI

In the previous chapter we have seen that according to Wittgenstein meaning and understanding are not mental activities. Their function is neither to name nor to describe mental occurrences. In this section we shall explain Wittgenstein's reflections about the relationship of language to inner experience. He proceeds to examine those words of language which are supposed to refer to private experiences -- words like 'pain', 'itch', 'ache', 'anger', 'mood' and others. These words seem obviously to name private sensations and Wittgenstein would want to deny it. It is believed that only I know my pain, others can only guess.

Before we come to Wittgenstein's analysis of sensations-expressions in the Philosophical Investigations, it would be profitable to see briefly his earlier views. Moore reports that in the early 1930s Wittgenstein accepted the view that sensation words describe 'private experience'. He says this about Wittgenstein's lectures of 1932-33 that: <sup>1</sup> ---- as to the ---- proposition ---- I have toothache', the point on which he seemed most anxious to insist was that what we call 'having toothache' is what he called a 'primary experience' (he once used the phrase 'direct-experience' as equivalent to this one)....

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1. Moore, G. E. "Wittgenstein's lectures in 1930-33", reprinted in *Philosophical Papers*, p. 202.

He also maintained that both first person and third person sensation words describe the same sensation.<sup>2</sup> For example, 'toothache' means the same thing in both the propositions, "I have toothache" and "He has toothache". But Wittgenstein realised soon that these propositions have different meanings.<sup>3</sup> He maintained that they are different in their logical characteristics, and words like 'pain' and 'ache' describe private contents of our conscious life.

Now let us discuss the account of sensation-words as given in the Investigations. According to Wittgenstein the view which these assumptions express - let us call it view V. The view which Wittgenstein criticises throughout his later works may be put as follows: that sensations are private and no one can have my pains. I can never know whether another person is in pain or not -- for I cannot feel another person's pain. The meaning of a sensation-word is the thing it refers to a sensation. Only I can know that I have a sensation; it is the bearer and bearer alone who can claim to have full understanding of the sensation-expressions which he uses to describe his sensations.

Although the view V is natural and plausible, when I talk my sensations, feeling etc. then other people do understand me. That is to say, other people do know that I am in pain. The view V holds that while I am absolutely certain that I am in pain, I can never certain, whether another person is in

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2. 1M4, p. 207-8.

3. 1M4, p. 207.

pain or not. This is so because I cannot feel another person's pain. I can only guess but I can never know it. Wittgenstein says that it is absurd. According to him, if we are using the word 'know' in its standard sense, then other people know when I am in pain. He says about sensations that:

If we are using the word "to know" as it is normally used (and how else are we to use it?) then other people very often know when I am in pain.

Pl. Sec. 246.

Just try - in a real case - to doubt someone else's fear or pain.

Pl. Sec. 303.

I can be as certain of someone else's sensations as of any fact .... Am I less certain that this man is in pain than that twice two is four?

Pl. Sec. 234.

Wittgenstein's view is that there are situations in which I am as certain that another person is in pain, as of my own pain. However it may be said that other person might be only pretending or acting.

The designation of the experiences of others as pain is indirect in a particular sense. After being embedded in the public language the expression "pain" remains meaningful for each person only because he attaches to it the private ideas, and I always know with respect to my own self whether or not I am in pain whereas I can at most believe or hypothetically

assume pain in others. For in their case, it is not the pain itself that is given but only the pain <sup>4</sup>utterances.

Wittgenstein says that there are situations, in which it is quite possible that a person is pretending or acting but there are cases in which I know for certainty that he is not pretending. For example, a man met an accident. It is possible that he might be pretending. In fact there will always be at least a conceivable doubt that another person is in pain and hence we can never know that he is. But in this case a conceivable doubt exists. If you are certain, is it not that you are shutting your eyes in face of doubt? There must be something in the situation itself which justifies our doubting. When we are in doubt, it must affect our attitude and practice. Doubting is a form of life. Doubting cannot just be saying "I doubt". If I find the man is bleeding and crying and I rush to his aid then I cannot in doubt. If our attitude are not in conformity with doubt, then the doubt is pointless. To imagine a doubt is not to be in doubt.<sup>5</sup> Doubting has an end.<sup>6</sup> In philosophy it is possible to communicate the fact that I have pain. I cannot communicate my pain because sensations are private. From my own experience I can learn the meaning of the word 'pain'.

Now Wittgenstein maintains that if 'pain' is the name of a sensation which I experience then I cannot understand what

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4. Stegmüller, W., Main currents in contemporary German, British and American Philosophy, p. 482.

5. PI. 222, 24.

6. PI. 24, 122.

it would mean to say that another person has a pain. If the word 'pain' denotes, for me, then pain can exist only when I am aware of it. Therefore, one essential feature of pain is that I feel it. Wittgenstein points out, it is wrong to say that I know that I am in pain. I know that the other person is in pain. His view is that there can be no distinction between my pains and all pains, for all the pains I ever met with are my pains. If it is correct that "I know that I am in pain", then the question is, how do you know you are in pain? In the Investigations he says:

"But if I suppose that someone has a pain, then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have. So often had" - That gets us no further. It is as if I were to say: "You surely know what "it is 5 o'clock here means: so you also know what 'It is 5 o'clock on the sun means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 o'clock" -- The explanation by means of identity does not work here. For I know well enough that one can call 5 o'clock here and 5 o'clock there "the same time", but what I do not know is in what cases one is to speak of its being the same time here and there.

In exactly the same way it is no explanation to say: the supposition that he has a pain is simply the supposition that he has the same as

I. For that part of the grammar is quite clear to me: that is, that one will say that the stove has the same experience as I, if one says; it is in pain and I am in pain.

Pl. Sec. 360.

But this suggestion gets us no further. It is like saying: "You surely know what 'It is 5 O' clock here' means. So you also know what 'It is 5 O' clock on the Sun' means. It means simply that it is just the same time there as it is here when it is 5 O' clock". Wittgenstein says that the explanation by means of identity does not work here.

Similarly Wittgenstein's view is that 'pain' is the name of a private sensation. I cannot conceive that another person feels the same sensation that I do when I feel a pain. Wittgenstein points out:

If one has to imagine someone else's pain on the model of one's own, this is none too easy a thing to do; for I have to imagine pain which I do not feel on the model of the pain which I do feel. That is, what I have to do is not simply to make a transition in imagination from one place of pain to another. As, from pain in the hand to pain in the arm. For as I am not to imagine that I feel pain in some region of his body (which would also be possible).

Pl. Sec. 302.

If I can imagine that another person experiences the same private sensation of pain that I do when I am in pain. When I feel a pain, I also experience other things when I imagine a pain, I cannot help imagining myself having it. If this argument is valid then 'pain' denotes a private sensation has the absurd consequence that another person is in pain is an unintelligible one.

Wittgenstein points out that sensation-words name private sensations. He tried to show that it would lead to the absurd thesis according to which no one save the experiencer can understand that he is in pain. But he shows that a private understanding of sensation-words is impossible. Consequently all of the remarks ought to be intelligible.

How do you know you are in pain ?

I think I am in pain but I may be mistaken.

I do not know whether I am in pain or not.

I know I am in pain.

I believe I am in pain.

I seem to be in pain.

I doubt whether I am in pain.

Let me find out if I am in pain or not.

I wonder whether I am in pain or not.

But all these questions and remarks are out of circulation in our language. These language-games are missing. As Wittgenstein says:

that expression of doubt has no place in the language-games if we cut out human-behaviour.

which is the expression of sensation — it looks as if I might legitimately begin to doubt afresh. My temptation to say that one might take a sensation for something other than what it is arises from this: if I assume the abrogation of the normal language-game with the expression of a sensation, I need a criterion of identity for the sensation, and then the possibility of error also exists.

Pl. Sec. 282.

The criterion of another's being in pain is, first, his behaviour and circumstances and second, his words. There are essential connections between the use of the word 'pain' and the normal manifestations of pain in human behaviour, and insist that pain simply denotes a private sensation. Wittgenstein maintains that if people had pains then there is no conceivable way that anyone could learn the use of the word 'pain'. But 'pain' could not be a word in any language. So there must be a connection between pain and pain-behaviour. He says that:

If I know it only from my own case then I know only what I call that not what anyone else does.

Pl. Sec. 347.

It might be objected that I am talking about describing a sensation rather than about naming it. Wittgenstein says that naming is a particular kind of ceremony. He says:

When one says "He gave a name to his sensation" one forgets that a great deal of stage-setting in the language is presupposed if the mere act of naming is to make sense. And, when we speak of someone's having given a name to pain, what is presupposed is the existence of the grammar of the word 'pain', it shows the post where the new word is stationed.

Pl. Sec. 257.

There are some contexts where naming takes place and these new names play a definite role in our social life, therefore, there is something new to be named. If a certain sort of sensation had diagnostic value then it might be given a name<sup>7</sup> for the convenience of medical workers.

Further he writes that:

"what would it be like if human beings showed no outward signs of pain (did not groan, grimace, etc.)? Then it would be impossible to teach a child the use of the word 'tooth-ache'."

Pl. Sec. 257.

But these arguments do not show that 'pain' is not the name of a private sensation. They show that some manifestations of pain are required for learning the use of the word 'pain'. If sensation-words are not connected with overt manifestations of sensations then they can not be used in any language. If the pain is to be introduced into the language immediately, then the

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<sup>7.</sup> Wach, P., *Studies in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p.162.

sentence which expresses pain would be an elementary proposition. But the problem here is that those who are trying to argue for the primary nature of sensation-language, they have not seen the full consequences of their arguments. We learn sensation-words in certain situations which give meaning to them. In the Investigations he says that:

....we call very different things "names"; the word "name" is used to characterise many different kinds of use of a word, related to one another in many different ways ....

Pl. Sec. 38.

According to this view 'pain' denotes a sensation in a quite analogous to the way that say, 'red' denotes a familiar kind of property. The difference is that colour is public by all and pain is private. Wittgenstein maintains that the relation between pain and the sensation is of the same kind as the relation between red and the physical property. Wittgenstein says:

How do words refer to sensations?—How is the connexion between the name and the thing named set up?

Pl. Sec. 244.

To guard against a possible misunderstanding, we must not forget that Wittgenstein is examining the cartesian account of matter. In order to understand Wittgenstein's Investigations, it is important to realize that the thesis under discussion is being proposed by the cartesian interlocutor, not by Wittgenstein.

Now we will consider the following points that some of the language-games in which pain might play a part are similar to the sorts of language-games, that pain and familiar words are the names of private sensations in very much the same way that 'red' and 'tree' are the names of physical things. Let us imagine the following case. I want to keep a diary about the recurrence of a certain sensation. To this end I associate it with the sign "S" and write this sign in a calendar for every day on which I have the sensation. <sup>8</sup> Wittgenstein tells us immediately that a definition of the sign cannot be formulated. But still it is possible to give a ostensive definition. Normally a sign is ostensively defined by pointing to the object it is intended to refer to. In all such cases the object or property is publicly observable. I can teach the meaning of 'red' to someone by pointing to something which is red. But I cannot point to the sensation in this sense. <sup>9</sup> We cannot give ostensive definitions for sensation-words in the ordinary sense. The only way open to the cartesian is to suggest that the connection is established by a private ostensive definition. Suppose I experience a certain sensation. I concentrate inwardly on the sensation, and give it the name "S". This is like an ostensive definition, only in this case I point to the sensation mentally, and I give the definition to no one but myself. I may

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8. Pl. Sec. 222.

9. Pl. Sec. 223.

keep a diary and write down the sign "S" whenever I experience the same sensation in future.

Wittgenstein says that the whole idea of giving myself a private definition is pointless. Consider the alleged private ostensive definition. It is true that a man can focus his attention on a sensation and say "let this be called 'S'." In itself it is but an idle ritual. The ritual must have some actual practical consequences. He says:

Why cannot my right hand give my left hand money? — My right hand can put it into my left hand. My right hand can write a deed of gift and my left hand a receipt — But the further practical consequences would not be those of a gift when the left hand has taken the money from the right, etc. We shall ask: "Well, and what of it?" And the same could be asked if a person had given himself a private definition of a word; I mean if he has said the word to himself and at the same time has directed his attention to a sensation.

Pl. Sec. 268.

Wittgenstein gives the following objections which show that it is not. For example, I suddenly experience a sensation which I have never felt before. I focus my attention on it, and decide to name it "E". If I have named a sensation "E", I shall be able to use "E" again, whenever I experience the same sensation. I have established a

connection between "s" and a particular sensation e.g., pain. In short, my private ostensive definition is correct if and only if, it enables me to get the connection right everytime. It must be possible for me to know whether the entries in my diary correct or not. How is it to be decided whether I have used the sign "E" correctly or not?

I can know that I have used "E" correctly only if I can identify that I am experiencing the same sensation. In order to write "E" again in my diary, I must be able to recognise that it is the same sensation which I experienced before and named "E". Wittgenstein is not assuming here anything uncritically, as might appear at first sight. It follows from the nature of language itself that there must be some way to distinguish correctness from incorrectness. Wittgenstein is saying that there must be some criterion. So what is the criterion of sensation I have now and call "s" being the same as the one I experienced the other day and also named "E". There is no external check. I have only an impression that I have the same sensation. Consequently we cannot talk about correctness or rightness:

Whatever is going to seem right to me is right.

And that only means that here we cannot talk  
about 'right'.

Pl. Sec. 232.

One may be inclined to say that memory must be accepted as a criterion. I can remember that the sensation I have now is the same which I had the other day. So, we do have some confidence

in memory. Memory plays a vital role in our daily affairs. "But surely I can appeal from one memory to another. For example, I do not know if I have remembered the time of departure of a train right and to check it I call to mind how a page of the time-table looked. Is not it the same here?" No, for this process has got to produce a memory which is actually correct. If the mental image of the time-table could not itself be tested for correctness, how could it conform the correctness of the first memory? (As if someone were to buy several copies of the morning paper to assure himself that what is said was true).<sup>10</sup>

Now we will accept the view that 'pain' is the name of a private sensation. When somebody is in pain, the important thing for him is the sensation which he is feeling. Wittgenstein points out that:

The very fact that we should so much like to say "this is the important thing" - while we point privately to the sensation - is enough to show how much we are inclined to say something which gives no information.

Pl. Sec. 296.

Thus everyone knows that sensations are private and no one can experience another person's sensations. So when you are in pain, I do not know it. Wittgenstein in this connection says:

The essential thing about private experience is really not that each person possesses his own exemplar, but that nobody known whether other people also have this or something else. The assumption would thus be possible - though unverifiable - that one section of mankind had one sensation of red and another section another.

Pl. Sec. 272.

Even Pitcher points out that "the word 'pain' denotes a private sensation and that the sentence "I am in pain" is used to assert that the speaker is experiencing a private sensation of pain, then one is supposing that "I am in pain" conveys no information whatever, has no real use at all".<sup>11</sup> "But" someone objects, "at least it tells the hearer that the speaker feels something". No, it does not even tell him that the speaker uses the sentence, 'I am in pain' when he feels nothing.<sup>12</sup> Wittgenstein is maintaining that "Private" sensation do not enter into sensation-language-games. Commenting on the alleged "something" Wittgenstein says:

Suppose everyone had a box with something in it: we call it a beetle". No one can look into any one else's box, and everyone says he knows what a beetle is only by looking at his beetle. - Here it would be quite possible for everyone to have

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11. Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 228.

12. Pl. Sec. 274.

something different in his box. One might even imagine such a thing constantly changing.— But suppose the word "beetle" had a use in these people's language? If so it would not be used as the name of a thing. The thing in the box has no place in the language-games at all; not even as a something: for the box might even be empty.— No, one can't decide through' by the thing in the box; it cancels out, whatever it is.

Pl. Sec. 293.

Analogically, if 'pain' refers to "something" privately then the "something" cancels out. Pitcher says, Wittgenstein is not denying "that when a person is in pain, he very often and perhaps always feels something <sup>12</sup> frightful". Wittgenstein is only denying a particular thesis about language, that the word "pain" stands for that frightful thing in the same sort of way as the word "red" stands for a certain colour, or the word "tree" for a certain sort of plant. Pitcher holds that "In the language-games we play with words like 'tree' and 'red', trees and redness play some part, and it is in these games that the connection between the name and the thing named is established. But in the numerous language-games we play with the word 'pain', private sensations play no part, and so 'pain' cannot denote them in anything like the way that 'tree', for example, denotes that kind of object. What does play a part in pain language-games is pain-behaviour (e.g., groaning, crying,

clutching the affect<sup>ed</sup> part) and pain comforting behaviour (e.g., saying something words, administering sedatives, applying bandages, fixing pillows) - in short, the external circumstances in which the word 'pain' is used".<sup>14</sup> According to Wittgenstein 'pain' derives its meaning from the pain language-games.

Here Wittgenstein's position is this: the private inner happenings really do exist, but no language either does or can have names for them. Sensations are a matter of the behaviour of those who have them, and the behaviour of others towards them. This position might be described as "linguistic behaviourism",<sup>15</sup> which denies that cartesian inner happenings exist at all.

However, it should not lead us to suppose that sensations are nothing. Wittgenstein is aware of the charge of behaviourism, and says that if he has denied anything, it is a grammatical fiction.<sup>16</sup> We say that cries of pain are uttered on account of something frightful that "accompanies" them. Wittgenstein says:

Of course, if water boils in a pot, steam comes out of the pot and also pictured steam comes out of the pictured pot. But what if one insisted on saying that there must also be something boiling in the pictured pot?

Pl. Sec. 297.

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14. Ibid., p. 292.

15. Dumigan, A. Wittgenstein on sensation reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by George Pitcher, p. 299.

16. Pl. Sec. 297 and 298.

Pitcher writes: "It would be absurd to start talking about the liquid in the pictured pot; to wonder, for example, whether it is water or tea .... (The liquid in the pot is no part of the picture and language-games) which involve the picture do not contain references to the contents of the pot."<sup>17</sup> Sensations are "as nothing" in our language-games. The following remark sums up his position excellently.

"And yet you again and again reach the conclusion that the sensation itself is a nothing" — Not at all. It is not a something, but not a nothing either. The conclusion was only that a nothing would serve just as well as a something about which nothing could be said. We have only rejected the grammar which tries to force itself on us here.

Pl. Sec. 304.

Let us now turn Wittgenstein's account of sensation-expressions. We have seen Wittgenstein maintains that our use of sensation-words is tied up with the expression of sensations. But sensation-words must have some legitimate uses. He has explicitly rejected the impression that he has put forward a thesis.<sup>18</sup> He destroys only "houses of cards"<sup>19</sup> and "grammatical fictions".<sup>20</sup> One of the reasons why people are led to the concept of a "private" language is this: "Sensations are private, no one

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17. Pitcher, G., *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, pp. 299-300.

18. Pl. Sec. 305.

19. Pl. Sec. 310.

20. Pl. Sec. 304.

else can have my sensations (for instance pains)". Wittgenstein examines the nature of this statement and shows that it expresses only a grammatical point. The proposition "Sensations are private" is comparable to "one plays patience by oneself". It is also like the proposition "Every rod has a length".<sup>21</sup> The proposition "sensations are private" tells us something about the use of "sensations". "No one else can have my pains" expresses the grammar of the word 'pain'. Consequently, the "privacy" of sensations is only a grammatical fiction.

Let us now discuss, if sensation-words do not name sensations privately, what uses do they have? I shall start Wittgenstein's account of first person, present tense pain utterances which are different from other uses. If I am in pain, it makes no sense to ask me "How do you know you are in pain?", but it makes a good sense to ask "How do you know that he is in pain"? Similarly, I cannot say, "I think I am in pain, but I may be wrong", but it is quite correct to say, "I think he is in pain, but I may be mistaken". Thus the first person present tense uses of 'pain', are quite significant for the third person sensation utterances.

What do "I am in pain" and "I have a pain" mean? What are their uses? How do I learn to use sensation-words? Wittgenstein writes:

How does a human being learn the meaning of the names of sensations? - of the word "pain" for example. Here is one possibility, words are

connected with the primitive, the natural-expressions of the sensation and used in their place. A child has hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him and teach his exclamations and, later sentences. They teach the child new pain-behaviour.

Pl. Sec. 244.

Pain is also a word of everyday language which we do use correctly. But Wittgenstein shows us how it can have its everyday use. He describes this by giving the example of pain-behaviour.

Thus sensation-words are connected with the natural expressions of sensations. But how it is done. We can teach a child how to use them. For example, when a child falls down or receives an injury, he begins crying and screaming. We comfort him with some words such as "oh! you have a pain", and try to relieve the pain. Such things may occur again and child thinks that 'pain' is used in these situations. He may first learn the exclamation 'pain' and later on sentences as "I am in pain" or "I have a pain". Thus "I am in pain" is not connected with my private sensations, but with my pain-behaviour, which is publicly observable. If 'pain' is a private sensation, then the child can never learn its meaning. Wittgenstein maintains that if pain does not denote a private sensation, then it must denote some natural pain-behaviour which may accompany one's use of the word. The word 'pain' does not denote anything. He says:

"So you are saying that the word 'pain' really means crying?" -- on the contrary, the verbal expression of pain replaces crying and does not describe it.

Pl. Sec. 244.

These latter things make no sense because groaning and crying do not express statements. Therefore, 'I have a pain' is to be constructed as a particular form of pain-behaviour rather than as an assertion. But here there is no need of any sort of inference. Thus two difficulties are there. Roger Buck in his article "Non-other Minds" discussed it. He shows his problem that "If mental predicates have their criteria in behaviour, what of self-criptions of such predicates. Does one have to observe his own behaviour, listen to his own utterances, in order to find out that he is angry, has a toothache etc."<sup>23</sup> Another problem is connected with the kind of genetic account that Wittgenstein gives of this and an account which, if hardened into dogma, seems to restrict the possibility of language. Wittgenstein denies the existence of inner sensations. He says that:

And now the analogy which was to make us understand our thoughts falls to pieces. So we have to deny the yet uncomprehended process in the yet unexplored medium. And now it looks as if we had denied mental processes. And naturally we do not want to deny them.

Pl. Sec. 302.

According to Wittgenstein, the utterances, "I have a pain" and "I am in pain" are not used as assertions either about a pain-sensation or about pain-behaviour. The utterance "I am in pain" is used like the words "ouch" and "ow". Like "ouch", "I am in pain" is a learned expression of pain. There are passages where Wittgenstein says:

To say, "I have pain" is no more a statement about a particular person than meaning is.

BB, p. 67.

This statement shows another aspect of Wittgenstein's position. He maintains that 'I' in the statement "I am in pain" does not name/person. Thus neither 'I' nor 'pain' is a name of anything.

"When I say, 'I am in pain', I do not point to a person who is in pain. Since in a certain sense I have no idea who is". And this can be given a justification. For the main point is: I did not say that such and such a person was in pain, but "I am...." Now in saying this I do not name any person, just as I do not name anyone when I groan with pain. Though someone else/who is in pain from the <sup>seen</sup> groaning.

PI, Sec. 404.

These remarks do not apply to other person pain-utterances, to first person non-present tense utterances. To say, "He is in pain" is not to exhibit pain-behaviour. It is to say something about someone else. Wittgenstein does not say

that "I am in pain" has one and only one use. In some contexts it has that use; but in other contexts, others. In the Investigations he shows the point that:

We surely do not always say someone is complaining, because he says he is in pain. So the words "I am in pain" may be a cry of complaint, and may be something else.

Pl. p. 189.

Consider the words "I am afraid". But the question is in which case they are very like a cry of fear. We can say that on some circumstances they can be a request for help. Wittgenstein maintains that "A cry is not a description. But there are transitions. And the words "I am afraid" may approximate more, or less, to being a cry. They may come quite close to this and also be far removed from it".<sup>24</sup> Wittgenstein says that on a given occasion, the words "I am afraid" may have two or more uses. In one place he refers that, "Are the words "I am afraid" a description of a state of mind? I say, "I am afraid", someone else ask me: "What was that? A cry of fear; or do you want to tell me how you feel; or is it a reflection on your present state?" — Could I always give him a clear answer? Could I never give him one?"<sup>25</sup> Here Wittgenstein agrees this point. He says the words "I am in pain" may be a request for assistance. Pitcher says that if Wittgenstein's view is correct then in a strong sense, 'pain' may be a

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24. Pl. p. 189.

25. Pl. p. 187.

name of a private sensation. But Wittgenstein says that there are important differences among descriptions. He writes:

But is not the beginning — which I describe?  
Perhaps this word "describe" tricks us here.  
I say "I describe my state of mind" and "I  
describe my room". You need to call to mind  
the differences between the language-games.

Pl. Sec. 290.

Discussing the term descriptions he tells us that all descriptions have the same purpose. For example, "He describes his room", "He describes his state of mind" are all refer to the same sort of thing. He explains this point with a fantastic example:

What we call "descriptions" are instruments for particular uses. Think of a machine-drawing, a cross-section, an elevation with measurements, which an engineer has before him. Thinking of a description as a word picture of the facts has something misleading about it. One tends to think only of such pictures as hang on our walls: which seem simply to portray how a thing looks, what it is like.

Pl. Sec. 291.

The purpose of some descriptions is not to tell the hearer what the thing looks like. Wittgenstein says that when "I am in pain" is a description of one's inner state. Therefore, describing one's inner state does not involve naming

certain objects. So Wittgenstein does not explain it that 'pain' may be the name of a private sensation. Wittgenstein says that pain is non-behavioural and non-dispositional. And pain is something that accompanies pain-behaviour. Certain modes of behaviour are important to the concept of pain.

The first important point Wittgenstein makes in this connection is this. It is unintelligible to ascribe sensations to inanimate things. "Only of a living human being and what resembles (behaves like) a living human being can one say: it has sensation".<sup>26</sup> Behaviour is essential for the ascription of sensations to others. It must make sense to imagine that pots, pans, and stones might be in great pain, but the difference is that they can not express their pains. How can I know that they are in pain? Wittgenstein writes in the Investigations that:

Look at a stone and imagine it having sensations -- one says to oneself. How could one so much as get the idea of ascribing a sensation to a thing? One might as well ascribe it to a number! And now look at a wriggling fly and at once these difficulties vanish and pain seems able to get a foothold here, where before everything was. So to speak, too smooth for it.

Pl. Sec. 284.

But this view is different from that according to which 'pain' is the name of a private sensation. Here the only thing

essential is a certain sensation or feeling. If the view that pots-pans and stoves do not express their pains, is correct, then there is something absurd. But one feels inclined to objects: at least in fairy tales the pot too can see and hear (and be in pain). "Certainly; but it can also talk". Where there is no possibility of pain-behaviour, there is no possibility of pain either. "But cannot I imagine myself having pains and turning to stone while they continue ? And would not this be an example of a stone's having pains ?" <sup>27</sup> As Wittgenstein says: "What has ---- pain to do with a stone ?" <sup>28</sup> In the last the result is that pain behaviour is an essential part of the concept of pain.

Now it is clear that according to Wittgenstein my criterion of another's being in pain is his behaviour. It does not however, mean that Wittgenstein is equating a person's being in pain with his actually exhibiting pain behaviour. First, a person can be in pain and suppress all pain-behaviour. "But notice that he does have to suppress it; in these cases there must be at least a tendency - a proneness, to exhibit pain-<sup>30</sup> behaviour even if one manages to suppress the tendency". Secondly, a person can exhibit pain-behaviour without actually being in pain, he can be shamming, play-acting, giving a

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27. PI. Sec. 222.

28. PI. Sec. 222.

29. PI. Sec. 222.

30. Pitcher, G. The Philosophy of Wittgenstein, p. 207.

demonstration, and so on. It means pain-behaviour is a criterion of pain only in certain circumstances. A person's behaviour is the criterion of his being in pain only if he is in a genuine pain-situation. Wittgenstein does not deny the fact that when a person is in pain he must feel pain; what he is emphasizing is that an "inner process" requires "outward criterion".<sup>31</sup> The idea of pain doubtless enters into these language-games. There are situations of real life in which a question as to whether the person who is exhibiting pain-behaviour is really in pain, simply does not arise. In his analysis of the representation of pain, Wittgenstein says "The representation of pain enters into the language-game, he will admit only not as an image or picture".<sup>32</sup> It means that one person may imaginatively represent another's pain without having an "image or picture of a private sensation, just like one's own pain-hovering before the other fellow's consciousness".<sup>33</sup>

There cannot be a picture of a private sensation. But Pitcher says that for Wittgenstein, "The representation of pain enters in ---- not by any reference to a mental object behind the pain-behaviour and causing it, but rather by a reference to the circumstances, including various sorts of surroundings of the present pain-behaviour".<sup>34</sup> At the very least, Wittgenstein

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31. Pl. See, 500.

32. Pl. See, 300.

33. Pitcher, G., *The Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, p. 307.

34. I.M.C., p. 307.

maintains that in the representation of pain-reference is made to something other than the external circumstances depicted in the picture that corresponds to it.

When another person is in pain, it has another aspect, that aspect is what Wittgenstein called the attitude of the believer. The difference between thinking that one person is in pain and thinking that another is not in pain is bound up with a difference in attitude. Malcolm reports<sup>35</sup> that "in lectures Wittgenstein imagined a tribe of people who had the idea that their slaves had no feelings, no souls, that they were automatons, despite the fact that the slaves had human bodies, behaved like their masters, and even spoke the same language. Wittgenstein undertook to try to give sense to that idea. When a slave injured himself or fell ill or complained of pains, his master would try to heal him. The master would let him rest when he was fatigued, feed him when he was hungry and thirsty, and so on. Farther more, the masters would apply to the slaves our usual distinctions between genuine complaints and malingering. So what could it mean to say that they had the idea that the slaves were automata? Well, they would look at the slaves in a peculiar way. They would observe and comment on their movements as if they were machines. (Notice how smoothly his limbs move). They would discard them when they

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35. Malcolm, N. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, reprinted in Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, edited by George Pitcher, p. 90.

were worn and useless, like machines. If a slave received a mortal injury and twisted and screamed in agony, no master would avert his gaze in horror or prevent his children from observing the scene any more than he would if the ceiling fell on a printing press".

So Wittgenstein says in the Investigations, "My attitude towards him is ~~an~~ attitude towards a soul. I am not of the opinion that he <sup>36</sup> has a soul". If I know that a person is in pain, I react to him sympathetically, send for the doctor, give him medicine, but if I know that he is not in pain, I react differently. "He is in pain" does not mean that his behaviour, words, and circumstances are such and such. Wittgenstein says here:

I tell someone I am in pain. His attitude to me will then be that of belief; disbelief; and so on. Let us assume he says: "It is not so bad" -- Does not that prove that he believes in something behind the outward expression of pain? His attitude is a proof of his attitude. Imagine not merely the words "I am in pain" but also the answer "It is not so bad" replaced by instinctive noises and gestures.

Pl. Sec. 310.

But when he groans we do not assume, that the groaning expresses pain. Thus Wittgenstein would maintain that what is

to be accepted as a justification or criterion is a form of life.

What has to be accepted, the given, is - so one could say, forms of life.

Pl. P.226.

Private sensations play no part in these language-games and could not explain them. What we should say is:

Our mistake is to look for an explanation where we ought to look at what happens as a 'proto-phenomena'. That is where we ought to have said; this language-game is played.

Pl. Sec. 664.

There are many objections made against Wittgenstein's Investigations of sensation-words. Strawson, in his critical notice makes a distinction between "a stronger and a weaker thesis, of which the first is false and the second true".<sup>37</sup> "The weaker thesis says that certain conditions must be satisfied for the existence of a common language in which sensations are ascribed to those who have them".<sup>38</sup> "The stronger thesis says that no words name sensations (or 'private experiences'); and in particular the word pain does not".<sup>39</sup> Then he says, "The oscillation between the two theses is to be explained by the fact that the weaker can be made to yield to the stronger by the addition of a certain premise about language, viz., that all there is to be said about the descriptive meaning of a word is

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37. Strawson, P.F. Review of Philosophical Investigations, reprinted in Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, edited by George Pitcher, p. 42.

38. 414.

said when it is indicated what criteria people can use for employing it or for deciding whether or not it is correctly employed". His "obsession with the expression of pain" leads him "to deny that sensations can be recognized and bear names". Strawson attributes Wittgenstein's errors to "the old verificationist horror of a claim that cannot be checked", but also to various confusions and muddles.

As Malcolm writes that "it is important to see how very erroneous is this account of Wittgenstein". Rather he says, "Don't we talk about sensations every day, and give them names"? and then asks, "How does a human being learn the names of sensations — of the word 'pain' for example"? We also distinguished sensations from feelings, moods, etc. But Wittgenstein does not deny this. Wittgenstein only maintains the view that it is impossible to name sensations "privately", and that sensations words have various uses in ordinary languages. Thus he does not deny that there are inner experiences. As Malcolm writes, "Either to deny that such occurrences exist or to claim that they cannot be named, reported, or described is entirely foreign to Wittgenstein's outlook. In Strawson's sense dreams and mental pictures are not observed. Wittgenstein discusses reports of dreams. He says:

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40. Ibid., p. 43.

41. Ibid., p. 46.

42. Ibid., p. 52.

43. Ibid., p.

44. Malcolm, E., Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, reprinted in Wittgenstein, the Philosophical Investigations, edited by George H. von Wright, p. 92.

45. ibid. p. 94.

Think how many different kinds of things are called 'descriptions': description of a body's position by means of its co-ordinates; description of a facial expression; description of a sensation of touch; of mood.

Pl. Sec. 24.

It means he is denying only a philosophical theory about naming and describing sensations. Thus, Strawson writes, "To deny that 'pain' is the name of a (type of) sensation is comparable with denying that 'red' is the name of a colour".<sup>46</sup> There is a sense in which 'pain' is the name of a sensation. In this sense 'pain' stands for a sensation, as '0' denotes a number, as 'red' denotes a colour. What we need to notice is the difference between the way 'red' and 'pain' function, although both are names: so Wittgenstein says:

We call very different things 'names'; the word 'name' is used to characterize many different kinds of use of a word, related to one another in many different ways.

Pl. Sec. 38.

Now let us see something of how Wittgenstein means the "idea of a private language". 'Private language' can not be understood by anyone other than the speaker. The reason for this

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46. Malcolm, N. Wittgenstein's Philosophical Investigations, reprinted in Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, edited by George Pitcher, p. 55.

is that the words of this language are supposed to "refer to what can only be known to the person speaking; to his immediate private sensations.<sup>47</sup> It is the idea that there is an essential connection between a sensation and its outward expression. The philosophical idea of a private language is this that "No one can know that another person is in pain or is dizzy or has any other sensation, for sensations are private in the sense that no one can feel (experience be acquainted with) another person's sensations".<sup>48</sup> The word 'pain' is a meaningful expression for me only because I myself have been in pain. The fact is that other's pain is not given to me directly. It is expressed by physical signs. Wittgenstein seems to maintain that no words name sensations. He says:

"If I say of myself that it is only from my own case that I know what the word pain means, must I not say the same of other people too? And how can I generalize the one case so irresponsibly?"

Pl. Sec. 293.

Since a language may come to be intelligible only to a few people by falling into general disuse; but such languages are not private. The private languages derived from public languages. For a language to be public it must refer to what is publicly observable. "If a person could limit himself to describing his own sensations or feelings, then, strictly speaking,

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47. Ibid., p. 68.

48. Cf. Wittgenstein on Privacy, reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by George P.oggen, p. 207.

only he would understand what he was saying; his utterance might indirectly convey some information to others, but it could not mean to them exactly what it meant to him".<sup>49</sup>

The problem about private languages is the problem of how words mean. And when we talk about something our language does not point to it. When we speak of "use" we may think of rules. When I learn the use of an expression, I do not say I have learned what other people do, I have learned what it means. So a rule is something that is kept. When we use any expression then we can also say something. For example, "This is red" does not mean "Everyone calls this red". And there should be rules at all does depend on what people do. "If you teach someone the meaning of a colour word by showing him samples of colour, then he will probably understand; and if he understands he will go on to use the word in new situations just as you would".<sup>50</sup>

Wittgenstein is referring a point in the Investigations. He says:

If language is to be a means of communication there must be agreement not only in definitions but also (queer as this may sound) in judgments. This seems to abolish logic but does not do so.

49. Ayer, A.J. Can there be a private language, reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by George Pitcher, p. 202.

50. Rhys, R. Can there be a private language? reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by George Pitcher, p. 203.

It is one thing to describe methods of measurement, and another to obtain and state results of measurement. But what we call "measuring" is partly determined by a certain constancy in results of measurement.

Pl. Sec. 242.

Without knowing the language, we cannot say anything. If I cannot know any language privately. In the words of <sup>see</sup> the main question "is a question of whether I can have private understanding; whether I can understand something which could not be said in a language anyone else could understand". <sup>51</sup> In a private language everything would have to be at once a statement and a definition. The expressions of a language get their significance from their application, from their extensive uses. Wittgenstein did not accept this view that the ascription of meaning to a sign is something that needs justification. But this view is as meaningless as language needs justification. So if anyone had tried to invent a language then you might say the language and the use of expressions did stand in need of justification. So the main point is that "no one could invent just language, language goes with way of living. An invented language would be a wallpaper pattern, nothing more". <sup>52</sup> In short, we can say that language is something that is spoken.

Now in this section we will discuss the main concepts which Pole rejects in his description of Wittgenstein's views of language. Pole says about the view of Wittgenstein's language. These views are:<sup>53</sup>

Broadly the thesis is that a language ----consists of a complex set of procedures, which may also be appealed to as rules. Normative notions — rightness, validity, and we may perhaps add the truth — are significant in as much as there exist standards which we can appeal to and principles we can invoke ....

He says that everyday language does not depend upon such a structure and conception of rules. According to Wittgenstein, "following a rule" is just as much a "practice" as "playing a game" is. Pole says that "Wittgenstein regards ordinary language as "sacrosanct" that he speaks in the name of nothing higher than the "status quo" and that he "has forbidden philosophers to tamper with 'our ordinary expressions'.<sup>54</sup>

That the actual use of language may in no way be changed. But the ordinary language philosopher will say: "They do not; the philosopher is 'misusing words' or 'changing their meanings'; the philosopher has been careless, hasty, even wily in his use of language".<sup>55</sup> In the Investigations he writes: "A reform of ordinary language - for particular purposes, an

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53. Cavell, S. The availability of Wittgenstein's later philosophy, reprinted in Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, edited by George Pitcher, p.154.

54. Ibid., p. 154.

55. Ibid., p. 155.

improvement in our terminology designed to prevent misunderstandings in practice is perfectly possible. But these are not the cases we have to do with.<sup>56</sup> Pole's reference about what Wittgenstein 'forbids' is to a passage which begins, "philosophy in no way interfere with the actual use of language; it can in the end only describe it".<sup>57</sup>

Thus, I cannot say anything unless I know the language. But I cannot know the language privately. In a private language everything would have to be at once a statement and a definition. In ordinary language I may decide to use an expression in a particular way. The expression of a language get their significance and their force from their application. In Section 256 Wittgenstein considers, "the language which describes my inner experiences and which only I myself can understand", he says that our ordinary use of sensation words is not such a language.

Now the view that "no one can have another's pain" expresses a logical impossibility when Wittgenstein maintained that "when a sentence is called senseless, it is not as it were its sense that is senseless. But a combination of words is being excluded from the language, withdraw from circulation".<sup>58</sup> But what does it mean to say of "a combination of words being

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56. Pl. Sec. 122.

57. Pl. Sec. 124.

58. Pl. Sec. 539.

excluded from the language". When he writes that "it cannot be said of me at all (except perhaps a joke) that I know I am in pain".<sup>59</sup>

The point here is important to Wittgenstein's thought is following. In Moore's report of Wittgenstein's 1930-33 lectures:<sup>60</sup>

(Wittgenstein) then implied that where we say, "this makes no sense" we always mean, "this makes nonsense in this particular game"; and in answer to the question, "why do we call it 'nonsense'? What does it mean to call it so?" said that when we call a sentence 'nonsense', it is "because of some similarity to sentences which have sense", and that "nonsense always arises from forming symbols analogous to certain uses, where they have no use".

Another passage is this that:<sup>61</sup> It is possible that, say in an accident, I should .... see a broken arm at my side, and think it is mine when really it is my neighbor's .... on the other hand, there is no question of recognizing a person when I say I have a toothache. To ask, "are you sure that it's you who have pains?" would be nonsensical. Now, when in this case no error is possible, it is because the move which we might be inclined to think of as an error, a "bad move", is no move of the game at all. (we distinguish in chess between good and bad

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59. PI, Sec. 226.

60. Moore, G. E., "Philosophical Papers", pp. 273-74.

61. PI, p. 67.

moves, and we call it a mistake, if we expose the queen to a bishop. But it is no mistake to promote a pawn to a king).

On the Investigations David Pole expresses his view that "In some sense experience is clearly private; one person cannot be said literally to feel another's feelings" and this cannot be said, he thinks because grammar "forbids us" to say it. Pole rejects Wittgenstein's intention that "bring-words" back from their metaphysical to their everyday use<sup>62</sup>. So he writes of Wittgenstein's "characteristic anxiety to pin language down within the limits of its origins" and of Wittgenstein's insistence that "existing usage is to be accepted as we find it and never tampered with". But Pole says that "the advance of speculation may well be contained within its existing frontiers", But it is said that two people cannot feel same sensations. Wittgenstein suggests, because we are inclined to suppose that we can take the identity of a thing with itself as "an infallible paradigm" of the same. The statement of Wittgenstein's argument is that a private language rests on private rules, but private rule is a fiction.

Thus Wittgenstein says that we think a phrase, "Following a rule" of a private language because when we encounter such a

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62. Pole, D. *The later Philosophy of Wittgenstein*, pp. 68-69.

63. Pl. 116.

64. Pole, D. 1964, pp. 92 and 94.

65. 1964, p. 92.

66. Pl. 229, 230.

phrase all kinds of picture arise. The user 'P' of a private language has no criterian for following the rules of this language. "Following a rule" is constituted by habits or usage. And we can say that Wittgenstein's argument has the form of a reduction -ad- absurdum method from the assumption that a private language exists consequences have followed that show is not to be a language at all. Here we explain the concept of sameness. Sameness is intended to bridge the gap between one's own experience and those of another person. But if I suppose that someone has a pain; then I am simply supposing that he has just the same as I have so often had.

Wittgenstein contrast criterion with symptom. A criterion is satisfied only in certain circumstances. The expression of pain are a criterion of pain in certain "surroundings" not in others. In the Blue and Brown books<sup>67</sup> he gives a definition of criterion.

Let us introduce two antithetical terms in order to avoid certain elementary confusions: To the question "How do you know that so and so is the case?" We sometimes answer by giving criterion and sometimes by giving "symptoms". If medical science calls 'angina' an inflammation caused by a particular bacillus, and we ask in a particular case, why do you say this man has got 'angina'?; then the answer, "I have found the bacillus <sup>so</sup> and in his blood" gives us the criterion, or

what we may call the defining criterion of 'angina'. If on the other hand the answer was, "His throat is flamed", this might give us a symptom of angina. I call "symptom", a phenomena of which experience has taught us that it coincided, in some way or other, with the phenomena which is our defining criterion then to say. "A man has angina if this bacillus is found in him" is a tautology or it is a loose way of stating. The definition of "angina" whenever he has an inflamed throat is to make a hypothesis.

Here Wittgenstein makes some remarks about the role of criterion in our actual use of language. "In practice, if we were asked which phenomenon is the defining criterion and which is a symptom you would in most cases be unable to answer this question except by making an arbitrary decision ad-hoc. It may be practical to define a word by taking one phenomena as the defining criterion, but we shall easily be persuaded to define the word by means of what, according to our first use was a symptom. Doctors will use the names of diseases without ever deciding which phenomena are to be taken as criterion and which as symptoms; and this need not be a deplorable lack of clarity. In general, we do not use language according to strict rules either. We, in our discussion on the other hand, constantly compare language with a calculus proceeding according to exact rules".

This is a very one sided way of looking at language. In practice, we very rarely use language as such a calculus. For not only do we not think of the rules of usage of definiti

etc. While using language, but when we are asked to give such rules, in most cases we are not able to do so. We are unable clearly to circumscribe the concepts we use not because we do not know their real definition, but because there is no real 'definition' to them. To suppose that there must be would be like supposing that whenever children play with a ball they play a game according to strict rules.<sup>68</sup>

The criterion of a thing is its "defining criterion". Though the criterion is a logically necessary as well as a logically sufficient condition of its being so, Wittgenstein in the Brown Book writes: "the real criterion for a person's reading or not reading"; "the only real criterion distinguishing reading from not reading".<sup>69</sup> We can say that for him criterion are primarily criteria that men "accept", "adopt", "fix", "introduce" and "use" or "apply" in connection with their use of certain expressions. Wittgenstein's term "symptom" expresses that if anything is a symptom for us of a given thing's being so, there must be some phenomenon which is the criterion for it being so. Wittgenstein denies this assumption that any phenomena is the criterion of X, in most cases. But he does not deny that there will generally turn out to be criteria of X in those cases. A symptom of X will be a "phenomena of which experience has taught us that it coincided in some way or other", why one or more of the phenomena which are our criteria of X. In the

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68. BB, p.25.

69. BB, pp.121-122.

example of toothache, the red patch on a person's cheek will be a symptom in this way; "certain phenomena" — criterion of having a toothache — "had always coincided with the appearance of the red patch".

By criteria of X Wittgenstein says that if a phenomena is a criterion among others for a things being so, then it is one among other phenomena that can show the thing to be so, as the criterion for its being so might do if there were one. Wittgenstein says: it can be "used as a criterion", or "is a criterion", only under certain circumstances: "Many different criterion distinguish, under different circumstances, cases of believing what you say from those of not believing what you say".<sup>72</sup> Therefore, the term "criterion" Wittgenstein says the defining criterion of X is a logically necessary and sufficient condition of X in consequence of being the only criterion of X.

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70. Why, if asked "which phenomena is the defining criterion and which is a symptom", would not we be able in most cases to say at least that this or that one is a symptom? Wittgenstein seems to be thinking of the question as one that might be asked with reference to a couple of phenomena (or more but the wording suggests two) so intimately associated with X that where neither of them was the defining criterion of X both would turn out to be criteria of X. And in that case it would be misleading to say even that neither of them was a symptom. Since a phenomena that is one among other criteria of X is nevertheless a symptom of X under some circumstances. In Pl.1, Sec. 354, Wittgenstein refers to this state of affairs as "the fluctuation in grammar between criteria and symptoms" which "makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms".

71. BB, pp. 61, 126.

72. Ibid., p.144.

In expressing criterion and symptom he writes at one place in the Investigations that:

The fluctuation in grammar between criterion and symptoms makes it look as if there were nothing at all but symptoms. We say, for example, "Experience teaches that there is rain when the barometer falls, but it also teaches that there is rain when we have certain sensations of wet and cold, or such and such visual impressions". In defence of this one says that these sense-impressions can deceive us. But here one fails to reflect that the fact that the false appearance is precisely one of rain is founded on a definition.

Pl. Sec. 354.

Now we shall discuss that what Wittgenstein calls a "criterion" of having a toothache is a phenomenon by which one would be justified in saying that a man had a toothache. When I say that a man had a toothache by his present behaviour then I shall say that when a man of whom it is true that so and so behaves thus and thus under certain circumstances, he always has a toothache. But Wittgenstein says that if this position is definitely correct, then it is a necessary true. Therefore, a man behaves in a certain manner, under certain circumstances can entail that he almost certainly has a toothache.

Thus in Wittgenstein's opinion a criterion is a kind of behaviour. In the Investigations he says that:

It is only in normal cases that the use of a word is clearly prescribed; we know, are in no doubt, what to say in this or that case. The more abnormal the case, the more doubtful it becomes what we are to say. And if things were quite different from what they actually are — if there were, for instance, no characteristic expression of pain, of fear, of joy; if rule became exception and exception rule, or if both became phenomena of roughly equal frequency — this would make our normal language-games lose their point.

Pl. Sec. 142.

Therefore, according to his opinion there are characteristic expressions of pain. If Wittgenstein is right, there were no characteristic, natural expressions of pain, pain and pain might be less public on the whole than now, but would not be any the more a "private object". Thus "private objects" are not so easily come by.  
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Now we shall explain here that Wittgenstein did not deny that words like "toothache" and "pain" are the names, in

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73. Albrition, R. On Wittgenstein's use of the term "Criterion", reprinted in Wittgenstein, The Philosophical Investigations, edited by G. Pitcher, pp. 248-49.

a non-trivial sense, of sensations which people sometime experience or when I say "I have toothache" or "I am in pain", I am describing the state of my consciousness or that when I say of another person, "He has toothache" or "He is in pain". I can say that he is "experiencing the same sort of sensation as I do". A sensation is, that when a normal man naturally has when his body is in a certain kind of state. That is a sensation is defined by reference to its external circumstances.<sup>74</sup>

It has been said that like Hegel Wittgenstein establishes necessary connexions between distinct things between behaviour; distinct things between behaviour and its private accompaniment. But Wittgenstein did not establish any such connexion between behaviour and its private accompaniment. He says the connexion between them is contingent. He says that sensations are a non-dispositional accompaniment of behaviour and dispositions to behaviour. He rejected the Cartesian doctrine that sensation words are names privately conferred on processes inwardly observed. He writes that:

How does the philosophical problem about mental processes and states and about behaviourism arise? The first step is the one that altogether escapes notice. We talk of processes and states and leave their nature undecided.

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74. Donagan, A. Wittgenstein's sensation reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by G. Pitcher, p. 302.

Sometimes perhaps we shall know more about than-we think. But that is just what commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. For we have a definite concept of what it means to learn to know a process better. (The decisive movement of the conjuring-trick has been made, and it was the very one that we thought quite innocent).

Pl. Sec. 308.

So it is clear that Wittgenstein maintained "the decisive movement of conjuring trick" to have been made by the cartesians. Wittgenstein rejects to recognize those accompaniments as processes that can be named. He says such private accompaniments cannot even be named in a common language.

Here we will discuss Descartes's account of pain. Descartes epistemology and psychology express<sup>s</sup> the view that mind is better known than body. According to Descartes pain is something spiritual. For Aquinas, pain is something physical. Descartes says that there are two different ways of taking "Sensations". "Suppose I say I see (or I am walking) therefore I exist. If I take this to refer to vision (or walking) as a corporeal action, the conclusion is not absolutely certain, for as often happens during sleep, I may think I am seeing though I do not open my eyes (or think I am walking although I do not change my place); and it may even be that I have no body. But if I take it to refer to the actual sensation or

awareness (consciention) of seeing (or walking) then it is quite certain; for in that case it has regard to the mind, and it is the mind alone that has a sense or experience of itself seeing (or walking)". Therefore, sensation for him is a thought.

Now we will explain how Wittgenstein's philosophy is relevant to cartesian dualism. If Descartes innovation was to identify the mental with the private, Wittgenstein's contribution was to separate the two. Since Wittgenstein we tend to equate the mental with what is peculiar to language-users; and if Wittgenstein's <sup>75</sup> are valid, languages cannot be private. The cogito and the private language argument each lie at the heart of the epistemology and philosophy of mind of their inventors. The cogito led to the conclusion that mind is better known than body. The private language argument leads, we might say, to <sup>76</sup> the conclusion that body is better known than mind.

Therefore, I shall explain Wittgenstein's arguments against private language and try to show that how they connect with Cartesian theses. The referents of the words of Wittgenstein's private language correspond to Descartes Cogitationes. If Descartes uses a language it must be a private language in <sup>76</sup> the sense defined by Wittgenstein. If the language contains

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75. Kenny, Cartesian Privacy, reprinted in Wittgenstein, *The Philosophical Investigations*, edited by G. Pitcher, pp. 360-361.

76. Pl. See, 244, 254.

words for sensations, then the connection between the words and the sensations must be set up without the intermediary of the natural expression of sensation in bodily behaviour, and for the words of the language are supposed to have meaning at a stage at which it is doubtful whether there are any bodies at all. According to Descartes pain was something very like perception i.e. pain was the perception of the inner senses. Thus, in the sixth Meditation he writes: ("I found error) not only in (judgments) founded on the external senses, but even in those founded on the internal as well, for is there anything more intimate or internal than pain? And yet I have learned from some persons whose arms or legs have been cut off, that they sometimes seemed to feel pain in the part which had been amputated which made me think that I could not be quite certain that it was a certain member which pained me, even though I felt pain in it". In the private language "pain" is meant to refer to something private in a special sense.

Therefore, Descartes Cogitatio of pain will be private in the sense that it cannot be known with certainty to other people. He thinks that animals displayed all the bodily manifestations of pain without feeling pain itself. Explaining this to the Marquis of Newcastle, Descartes writes: "There is not one of our exterior actions, which can assure those who examine them that our body is not just a self-moving machine, but also contains a soul which has thoughts, with the exception

of the words or other signs deliberately produced in connection with subjects which occur without having reference to any passion". And pain is known with certainty to the sufferer, and pain is clearly perceived when it is considered merely as a sensation.<sup>77</sup> At one place Descartes writes: "The knowledge upon which a certain and incontrovertible judgment can be formed should not alone be clear but also distinct. I term that clear which is present and apparent to an attentive mind in the same way as we assert that we see objects clearly when, being present to the regarding eye, they operate upon it with sufficient strength. But the distinct is that which is so precise and different from all other objects that it contains within itself nothing but what is clear".

Therefore, pain is a cognition and pain cannot occur without being perceived. He says "when a man feels great pain he has a very clear perception of pain" and "A perception may be clear without being distinct, though not distinct without being clear." Descartes says that there is some relation between perception and judgment. The perception of pain is not a genuine intermediary between the occurrence of pain and the judgment on pain. Wittgenstein maintains that the expression of doubt has no place in the language-game with "pain". There are two possibilities of discrepancy between pain and its expression. First, there should be pain-behaviour, without

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77. Kenny, *Op. cit.*, p. 342.

pain and second, that there should be pain without pain-behaviour. Thus the Cartesian cogitation corresponds to the private sensation disconnected from bodily expression.

Thus, all these arguments explain that if a cartesian spirit uses a language at all, it seems that it must be a private language. According to him, need judgments be made in language at all? He says, "because we attach all our conceptions to words for the expression of them by speech, and as we commit to memory our thoughts in connection with these words; and as we more easily recall to memory words than things we can scarcely conceive of anything so distinctly as to be able to separate completely that which we conceive from the words chosen to express the same". Therefore, all the argument of Wittgenstein shows is that it would be impossible to learn the words for sensations, if sensations had no bodily expression. And Wittgenstein's argument shows that it is impossible to give a coherent account of the exercise of the knowledge of the meaning of a word in a private language.

**C H A P T E R - VII**

**SOME OTHER THEORIES OF MEANING**

## C\_H\_A\_P\_T\_E\_R - VII

In order to understand the importance of Wittgenstein's views let us examine some important theories of meaning. In this connection I shall discuss four views of meaning, viz., the referential theory, the ideational theory, the behaviour theory and the intentional theory. The referential theory identifies the meaning of an expression with the referential connection, the ideational theory with the ideas, the behavioural theory with the stimuli that evokes its 'utterances' and the intentional theory with the mental intention.

The referential theory has been popular among both philosophers and laymen. They take it to be the obvious view. For example, here is the word 'Fido'; it is the name of a dog. Everything is cut in the open; there is nothing hidden or mysterious. Its having the meaning, it has, is simply constituted by the fact that it is the name of that dog<sup>1</sup>. A similar account can be given for all meaningful expressions,

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1. A more penetrate account of proper names would show that this is a singularly unfortunate model for an account of meaning. It is questionable whether proper names can be correctly said to have meaning. They are not assigned meanings in dictionaries one who does not know what 'Fido' is the name of is not thereby deficient in his grasp of English, in the way he would be if he did not what 'dog' means. And the fact that 'Fido' is used in different circles as the name of a great many different dogs does not show that it has a great many different meanings or that it is a highly ambiguous word.

that every meaningful expression names something or other - to which it refers. "Words all have meaning, in the simple sense that they are symbols that stand for something other than themselves".<sup>2</sup>

A more refined view is that the meaning of an expression is to be identified with the relation between the expression and its referent, that the referential connection constitutes the meaning; but the referential theory is full of difficulties. First, two expressions can have different meanings but the same referent. In this connection we can mention Russell's example: "Sir Walter Scott" and "the Author of Waverley". These two expressions refer to the same individual but do not have the same meaning. This is a fundamental principle that when two referring expressions have the same meaning then what we get is a very poor tautology. Generally if anything can be referred to by many expressions, the expressions do not have the same meaning at all, for example, John F. Kennedy, can be referred to as 'the President of the U.S.A. in 1962', 'the U.S. President assassinated in Dallas'. Such examples show that an expression refers to a certain object but the object is not its meaning.

The phenomenon that same meaning but different referents can be demonstrated not for different expressions, but for different utterances of the same expression in different contexts. Seeing this difficulty the sophisticated

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2. Russell, B. *Principles of Mathematics*, p. 47.

advocates of the referential theory maintain that not the referent of a word but the referential relation constitutes its meaning.<sup>3</sup> But this version is based on the assumption that all meaningful expressions do refer to something or other. Thus the referential theory will not be adequate as a general account of meaning. Unless it is true that all meaningful expressions do refer to something.

A second difficulty concerns the referent itself. What is it exactly an expression refers to? Suppose, we take the example of the word 'Pencil'. The question is; to what does the word pencil refer? The word 'Pencil' can be used about any pencil whatsoever. The answer here is that it refers to the class of pencils, that is, to the same total of all those objects correctly called 'pencils'. But if the word refers to the class of pencils, how can it refer to any particular pencil? The truth is that referring is only one of the functions that linguistic expressions perform, a function assigned to some sorts of expressions and not to others. If referring is one linguistic job among others then no account of meaning which presupposes that all meaningful units refer to something can be correct. Referential theory is based on the insight that we generally use expressions to talk about things in the world including language itself. But it should not be taken to mean that every word refers to something concrete or abstract. Wittgenstein has clearly shown that even if an expression refers to an object the object is not its meaning.

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3. Russell, B. *Analysis of Mind*, p. 191.

The referential theory is based on the assumption that language is used to talk about things; and the ideational and behavioural theories are based on the view that words have the meaning they do only because of what human beings do when they use language. Moreover, when people set out to clarify the concept of meaning they do so by asking "what sort of entity is a meaning and how does an entity of this sort have to be related to a linguistic expression in order to be the meaning of that expression"? Thus the referential theory generally takes the form of an identification of the meaning of  $E$ , with that to which  $E$  refers, the ideational theory identifies the meaning of  $E$  with the idea(s) that gives rise to it and to which it gives rise; and behaviour theories typically identify the meaning of an expression with the situation in which it is uttered, with responses made to its utterance or both. Thus the referential theory says that two expressions have the same use if and only if they refer to the same object. The ideational theory would be that that two expressions have the same use if and only if they are connected with the same ideas and the behavioural theory explains that two expressions have the same use if and only if they are involved in the same stimulus response-connections.

The ideational theory in its general form depends upon the ideas. In his *Essay* John Lock<sup>4</sup> tells that, "the use, then of words is to be sensible marks of ideas; and the ideas

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4. Aiston, W.P. *Philosophy of Language*, p. 20.

5. Lock, J. *Essays concerning human understanding*, Sect. I.

they stand for are their proper and immediate signification".  
We may mention here Lock's statement to this effect quoted  
by Alston;  
<sup>6</sup>

Man, though he has great variety of thoughts,  
and such from which others, as well as himself,  
might receive profit and delight, yet they  
are all within his own breast, invisible and  
hidden from others nor can of themselves be  
made to appear. The comfort and advantage of  
society not being to be had without communica-  
tion of thoughts, it was necessary that man  
should find out some external sensible signs  
whereof these invisible ideas, which his  
thoughts are made up for, might be made known  
to others .... Thus we may conceive how words  
which were by nature so well adapted to that  
purpose, come to be made use of by men, as  
the signs of their ideas, not by any natural  
connexion that there is between particular  
articulate sounds and certain ideas, for then  
there would be but one language amongst all  
men; but by a voluntary imposition, where by  
such a word is made arbitrarily the mark of  
such an idea.

According to this theory there are ideas which have  
an existence and a function that is independent of language.

And a linguistic expression gets its meaning by being used as an indication of such ideas. Therefore, when an expression is used, its corresponding idea must be present in the mind of the speaker, and speaker must realize that at that time this idea is in his mind, so he produces such an expression. Thus ideas would have to be introspectively discriminable items in consciousness.

There are many other versions of the ideational theory but all of them identify the meaning of an expression with a certain idea or concept - the idea may be a sense impression, an image or a pure abstract concept. This theory is true so far as it asserts that whenever we use an expression we have a vague or definite idea of what we are doing and of what we are talking about. The theory, however, misinterprets this truth when it connects the meaning of an expression with an idea either in the mind of the speaker or in a nonmundane world. A basic difficulty against this theory is to understand the relationship between the symbol and the corresponding idea, and again between the idea and the object or situation for which the symbol is used. We may talk about the ideas, but we do not often do so. We also talk about things and we use language not only for talking about things but for doing innumerable other things. In these situations it is not only difficult but absurd to posit ideas as meanings between expressions and what our language is intended to do. Further, there are words such as 'and', 'if', 'but', etc. Corresponding to which there are no objects or ideas. Finally, even if there

is an idea corresponding to every utterance, nobody including the speaker himself, can understand it unless there are certain conventions regulating the use of the expression. Meaning is, then to be understood and explained in terms of use, not objects and ideas. The central error underlying both the referential and the ideational theories is that meaning is an entity. Nothing is more erroneous than this assumption.

The behavioural theory differs from both referential and ideational theories. It concentrates on what is involved in using language in communication. The behavioural theory is to be found in the writings of linguists psychologists and psychologically oriented philosophers. Bloomfield says that ".... the meaning of a linguistic form ...." is "...the situation in which the speaker utters it and the response which it calls forth in the hearer".<sup>7</sup> Further he says, "we must discriminate between the non-distinctive features of the situation ... and the distinctive or linguistic meaning (the semantic features) which are common to all the situations that call forth the utterance of the linguistic form".<sup>8</sup>

Charles Morris<sup>9</sup> and psychologist Charles Osgood<sup>10</sup> maintain that a certain meaning cannot be simply identified

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7. Bloomfield, L. *Language*, p. 139.

8. *ibid.*, p. 141.

9. Morris, C. *Method and Theology in Experimental Psychology*.

10. Osgood, C. *Language and behaviour*.

with regularly evoking a certain overt-response. Where there are overt response they can vary widely among themselves without any variation in meaning. But they adopt a more subtle version of the theory and identify the meaning of an expression with the disposition to respond in certain ways. There may be then either an overt response or a covert disposition to respond in certain ways. The behavioural theory perverts through over-simplification. This theory is based on the fact that a word or sentence has a certain stimulus response connections.

The behavioural theory in its naive form is simply absurd. If the meaning of a word is identical with the situation in which it is used, then every word is a hopelessly ambiguous word; which is fortunately not the case. The sophisticated version of the theory is also fraught with difficulties. If the theory is to work there must be features common and peculiar to all situation in which an utterance is made and further there must be feature common and peculiar to their responses. But that again is not the case. If we take the dispositional aspect the prospects are even worse. All utterances are not accompanied by responses or even disposition to respond. And even where there is a disposition to respond the disposition may be irrelevant so far as the meaning of a word or sentence is concerned. We are forced to conclude that meaning does not vary according to the situations of using a word and it is simply a mistake to identify the

meaning of a word with either stimulus response or the disposition to respond. Meanings are conferred on linguistic units by the convention and uses of the expressions. .

After giving the explanation of various theories of meaning we shall discuss here some account of Husserl's theory of meaning. It is important for the understanding of Husserl's theory to realize that everything he explains is developed out of the "phenomenological Method and phenomenological philosophy".<sup>11</sup> In the theory of meaning he leans towards Platonism.

For Husserl, the function of expression is only directly and immediately adopted to what is usually described as the meaning or the sense of the speech. There exists an essential relation between the meaning and its expressions, because the meaning is the expression of the meant through its own content. Thus what is meant exists in the 'object' of thought or speech.

, The object is that about which the expression says something, the meaning is what it says about it. Therefore, the expression is connected to the object by means of its meaning. Husserl says that "The object never coincides with the meaning". According to him the fact is that "several expressions can have the same meaning, but different objects, and

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11. Ogden, C.K., and I.A. Richards, *The Meaning of Meaning*, p. 250.

again, different meanings, but the same objects."<sup>12</sup> "The two expressions, 'equiangular' and 'equilateral triangle' have a different meaning but name the same object. The meaning of an expression becomes an object, only when an act of thought turns towards it reflectively".<sup>13</sup> According to Geyser, the sense of the expression 'meaning' is as a rule synonymous with 'concept'. But Husserl says by comparison of two cases that expressing is an initiative and not a productive function.

Husserl connects meaning with a number of things such as concepts, judgments and conclusions. He says: "Pure logic, wherever it deals with concepts, judgments, conclusions, has in fact to do exclusively with these ideal unites, which we here call meanings."<sup>14</sup> So all thoughts have a certain appropriate range of acts of expressing or meaning.

Against all such theories of abstraction and the consequent accounts of thinking, Husserl gives the following objection. He says: "A psychological and genetic explanation of thinking must be kept apart from a logical clarification of the contents of such consciousness".<sup>15</sup>

According to the nominalists generality lies in the representative function of an image or of a name. Husserl

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12. Husserl, E. L.V. II, I, p.47.

13. Geyser, Neue Und alte Wege der Philosophie, p.29.

14. Husserl, E., L.V. II, I, p.916.

15. Mehenty, J.N., Husserl's theory of Meaning, p. 26.

excludes all psychological considerations from his theory of meaning. Similarly he rejects nominalism. According to him the essence of nominalism is not that it rejects universal entities, but it overlooks that peculiar mode of consciousness which announces itself in the living group of the sense of signs, in the actual understanding of them, and on the other hand in those correlative acts of fulfilment that constitute the genuine representation of the universal. According to nominalism there is no difference between sensing and thinking.

Husserl rightly rejects the view that an expression is constituted by the association of a verbal symbol and a fixed meaning. For him an expression as such is constituted by a unity of the physical aspect and the meaning aspect; "Der <sup>16</sup> Worttaut ist Zunächst eins mit der Bedeutungs intention". Further, he says that if an expression as such is constituted by its meaning and is not an expression without it, it follows that one cannot even strictly say that an expression "expresses <sup>17</sup> its meaning".

Husserl was as much against the image theory of meaning as Wittgenstein. His originality lies in approaching the whole problem through Brentano's theory of intentionality of consciousness. For him as indicated earlier, the concept of expression is narrower than that of sign. Every sign has a reference, but

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16. Husserl, E., L.U. II, I, p.38.

17. ibid., p. 39.

every sign does not express a sense. If it expresses a sense it becomes an expression. We may perceive meaningless words and sentences, but in meaningful speech the articulated complex of sounds becomes intelligible. The sense imparting acts turn it into an expression. Expression and meaning are thus inseparable. Since a material sign becomes an expression only through sense-imparting acts which confer a meaning upon it, we can thus distinguish two aspects in every expression: the physical sign and the sense-endowing acts. Wittgenstein also makes a distinction between a mere sign and a meaningful expression, but he does not agree with Husserl concerning the role of meaning-endowing acts. We shall come to this point later on. However, in order to see how Husserl has not been able to shake off the psychological aspect completely, let us examine his analysis of the image theory in detail.

Bradley distinguished between image and meaning, but could not grasp the full force of his own thought. He maintained that the meaning is a part of the content of an image abstracted from the psychical existence of the latter. To this Blanshard says: "If the image is what Bradley says it is - a mere fact as opposed to meaning, 'a hard particular', 'an event in my history' - how can a piece of it be eternal and a part of it the physical world."<sup>18</sup> Thus the relation between image and meaning or between any verificatory experience and meaning must be fundamental clearly explained.

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18. Blanshard, B. *The Nature of Thought*, Vol. I, p. 442.

The relation is neither identity nor that of a whole to its part.

Many philosophers reject the image theory in the case of what is called abstract thinking. They think that the meaning consists in the actual experience accompanying and making possible my judgments. In his criticism of the picture theory Husserl takes up a perceptual judgment and argues that the meaning of the judgment retains its identity in the midst of changing perceptions. The perceptual basis could disappear without changing its meaning.

Thus, in the rejection of the mental picture theory, there is an agreement between Husserl and Wittgenstein. In the Investigations he maintains that psychical images have nothing to do with the meaning of an expression. Similarly both Husserl and Wittgenstein would reject the view that meaning is in any way connected with sensuous experience.

Let us see, then, the traditional form of the empiricist criterion of meaning. According to this view a word gets a meaning by becoming associated with a certain idea in such a way that the utterance of the idea will set off the utterance of the word. All ideas are copies of sense impressions. Therefore a word can have a meaning only if an association has been set up between it and an idea that was derived from sense experience. So, all a meaning is necessarily derived from sense experience. The empiricist criterion rests on the notion of "extensive definitions".

Moreover, according to this criterion meaningfulness depends on expressions being connected with aspects of the extralinguistic world about which they are used, to talk. How this such connections are possible? They are established by experience. Locke and Hume hold that meaning is essentially a matter of intramental associations. For them, it would not be the case that the conditions of meanings being publicly shared are *ipso facto* conditions of words having meaning. For the empiricist criterion epistemology and semantics were not really separated from psychology. If we find out how people learn the meanings of words, there is no substitute for careful observation of the process itself. Alston points out; "in order for an expression to be meaningful in my current use of it, it is necessary that there be a tendency for the word to elicit in me a certain idea and vice-versa. The formulation in terms of extensive definition seems to be more wedded to the genetic form, but it can be restated without losing its empiricist force, a word can have a meaning for someone only if he is able to pick out its "referent" in his experience. This means that we have shifted from the genetic requirement that a word have acquired its meaning by way of an extensive definition to the requirement that it be possible to give an extensive definition".<sup>19</sup>

Therefore, in all forms of empiricism, language is divided up into semantic levels or strata. Some words get

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19. Alston, W.P. *Philosophy of Language*, p. 66.

their meaning from experience more directly than others; but experience is the source of meaning for all.

But there is a defect in this theory that no one has ever made a plausible case for the possibility of defining all meaningful words in the language in terms of the lowest level. There is another difficulty that there is no reason to say that we are dealing with a language. In order to understand a sentence, one must not only know the meanings of nouns, verbs and so on, but someone understand various kinds of words and understand the significance of the syntactical form of the sentence. It would also appear that we are to understand how language is based on experience. This form reappears in the theory of Bertrand Russell. He wants to restrict the basic sentences to those that simply report the speaker's own sense experience. He says that the sentences that could be used to report a single observation, e.g., "This is red" and "this book is on the top of the table", we may call such sentences as "observation sentences".<sup>20</sup>

Then, the idea of a criterion of meaningfulness is recent in origin. We shall discuss the verifiability criterion of meaning to make it more clear. This view maintains that meaning is a function of verification. It means, it can be possible to specify what observations could count for or against truth of a proposition. For it philosophy is a scientific orientation.

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20. Russell, B. The Philosophy of Logical Atomism, p.73.

Let us see that there is no distinction between verification and verifiability. This theory not only expresses that only verified sentences are meaningful, but it points out that we could not understand a statement until after we had established that it was true. Logical Positivists say that verifiability is the possibility of verification. But this verification is not physical or technological. They maintain that there are perfectly meaningful statements, that we are not in any position to test. Thus, the point is that the sentence in question be capable of an empirical test.

So we may say that this theory is different from others, and it does not involve any stratification. It says that a sentence is meaningful if and only if it is empirically testable. In this connection we shall see that 'logical Atomism' and verifiability theory are in general the same kind of theory. But they stated in different ways. Evans has rightly shown that the verification theory is a recommen-  
datory definition of the terms 'tautologous' and 'empirical' and that in no case could it be regarded as limiting the range of meaningful sentences.<sup>21</sup> Philosophy can not determine as to what should and what should not be treated as meaningful.

Another form of this theory asserts that a sentence could not be regarded as meaningful unless it were possible to specify a way in which it could be shown by empirical

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21. Evans, J.L. On meaning and Verification, N. 1953,  
pp. 1-14.

evidence to be true or false. Suppose we give an illustration: "All lemons are yellow". We can say that this statement is true. Therefore the view is that "The meaning of a proposition is the method of its verification". At last we can say in specifying a method of verification for a sentence we are thereby giving its meaning. Thus, when we are talking about the past, we are talking about the future.

The verification theory of meaning like its predecessor, the image theory of meaning is inadequate in explaining the nature of meaning of every type of expression. First, the principle of verification is not clear and satisfactory. Secondly, it restricts meaning to only indicative sentences only to those indicative sentences which are true or false. It fails to distinguish between the conditions of meaning and the conditions of truth. The theory is unacceptable to both Husserl and Wittgenstein.

Husserl's theory of meaning does not tell which expressions are meaningful and which not. It simply describes what is meant by saying that an expression is meaningful. He does not give any criterion, and does not make a linguistic proposal. He maintains that we are permitted to say an 'ordinary' use and 'ordinary' decision. In this respect he is a pluralist and would make room for what Weisgram has called "language-strata". Husserl agrees with Weisgram's thesis that statements are verifiable in radically different  $\alpha$  senses and so also are meaningful in radically different senses.

Coming now to Husserl's own theory of meaning, we could say that the whole theory depends on 'meaning-intention' and 'meaning-fulfilment'. But it has nothing to do with intuitive experiences. Those who take meaningfulness to consist in certain intuitive experiences cannot explain how expressions could be meaningful.

Let us consider the following seven types of expressions which are so chosen as to represent a certain type.

1. Abecaderaf.
2. Roundsquare.
3. Pegasus.
4. The Present King of France.
5. The other side of the moon.
6. Man.
7. The white wall before me.
8. Syncategorematic expressions like 'is' 'or', 'and' etc.

We shall consider that first is clearly not an expression at all; so it is meaningless. Second, is a meaningful expression. Third is also meaningful and in its case also there is no designatum. And third and fourth are same, both being meaningful and both being without designatum. As constracted with third and fourth, the fifth is also meaningful and referential. Seven is such that its meaning is accompanied by corresponding intuition, and thus eight is also meaningful but not referential.

According to Husserl expressions two to eight have meaning-intention but the first lacks it. All meaningful

expressions are meaningful by virtue of the meaning-intention, which they embody. Husserl says that thinking consists in the meaning-intending act and knowing consists in the appropriate fulfilment of the meaning-intention, when meaning-intention is not fulfilled then we do not have knowledge. So knowledge is an intuitive apprehension. Thus symbolic thought is meaningful.

Expressions show two sorts of 'sense-endowing acts'. The first are 'meaning-bestowing acts' or 'meaning-intention'. The second are those which, though not essential to expressions, have the important function of filling the meaning-intentions with more or less of an intuitive content. These acts are called 'meaning-fulfilments'. They enable us to turn our intention to the objects of the meaning-intention exhibited in the expression. Thus according to Husserl it is the intention that breaths life-meaning into what is otherwise a mere sign meaning nothing. Another important thesis of Husserl's is that meanings belong to the world of ideal entities. In his opinion meaning is identically the same, no matter when and whom the expression is uttered.

Having considered the notion of meaning-intention we may discuss briefly Wittgenstein's account of meaning. Wittgenstein would suggest that expressions two to eight are governed by rules, linguistic conventions etc. We do not have any such rules or conventions for the first. Some signs are meaningful because there are rules governing their use.

On this view, to understand an expression is to be able to do something with it, but not to grasp some mysterious entity called its meaning and not to inject intention into a physical mark or sound.

Let us consider here this point that meaning is a function of use. We may say that the meaning of an expression is somehow a function of what members of the linguistic community do with the expression, the activity of the speaker would seem to be a more promising place to look. The main point here is the notion of the meaning of a word rather than meaning of a sentence. In the Investigations Wittgenstein writes:

For a large class of cases -- though not for all -- in which we employ the word "meaning" it can be defined thus; the meaning of a word is the use in the language. And the meaning of a name is sometimes explained by pointing to its bearer.

Pl. Sec. 42.

Thus to explain the meaning of an expression is to show its meaning-locution, use implicit in the functioning of language-games. A game consists of constructing a set of rules and obeying them. To explain the meaning of a word which is a rule. A rule explains that such and such a sign can be combined with such and such other sign. Meanings of words and sentences are governed by these rules. Further,

Wittgenstein says that words have no fixed rules or fixed meanings for all occasions of actual use. The two important points in Wittgenstein's account which are opposed to Husserl's teachings are the following. First, meaning is determined by use not by intention and secondly, meanings are not fixed and sharply bounded. There is, thus, no need to invent an ideal world to house them. It may not be a digression to see what Wittgenstein has to say about grasping the meanings of words. He says: "But we understand the meaning of a word when we hear or say it; we grasp it in a flash and what we grasp in this way is surely something different from the 'Use' which is extended in time".<sup>22</sup> But can the whole use of the word come before my mind, when I understand it in this way?<sup>23</sup> One answer to this question is set aside by Wittgenstein immediately. The answer is that what is present in mind is a mental picture. "Is there such a thing as a picture, or something like a picture that forces a particular application on us...?"<sup>24</sup> he rejects this answer for, "the same thing can come before our mind (i.e. the same picture) when we hear the word and the application still be different. Has it the same meaning both times?<sup>25</sup> I think we shall say not".

But the meaning is not something that comes before the mind, a picture, a scheme, an image. Further, there is

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22. Pl. p. 53.

23. Pl. p. 54.

24. Pl. p. 55.

25. Pl. p. 55.

not an expression that makes possible an understanding of it prior to all application. "A set of rules, conventions etc. is all that is needed to do this work; we shall be told by the Wittgensteinians".<sup>26</sup> But it is not said that expressions of understanding is the same as being aware of such a set of rules, conventions etc. In fact no such rules or conventions present in our mind. "The application is still a criterion of understanding".<sup>27</sup> But does it constitute the nature of understanding ?

After all this it might be said that application does not constitute the nature of understanding. Applicability only shows that the meaning of an expression can not be identified with any actual verification. So understanding is not possible verification but makes right verification possible.

The opinion of many modern philosophers is that "knowing and understanding" are capacity words. "The grammar of the word 'knows' is evidently closely to that 'can', 'is able to'.<sup>28</sup> But also closely related to that of 'understands'. But then we shall say the uses to be made are "in some unique way predetermined"? Denot we say that "a machine has (possesses) such and such possibilities of movement"? Wittgenstein understands this problem and says "what is this possibility

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26. Mohanty, J.N. Russel's Theory of Meaning, p. 39.

27. Pl. p.58.

28. Pl. p. 59.

29. Pl. p. 76.

of movement (or of use or of verification)"<sup>30</sup> Then meaning is a possibility of use which would be a sort of shadow of actual use.

Then the problem arises here; how the account of symbolic meaning of an expression prior to any actual use or verification is possible. Such understanding cannot consist in entertaining an image, a scheme and a mental picture etc. Thus Husserl's view of meaning-intention is based on this phenomenological evidence.

Now, it is true that we can grasp the meaning of an expression in a flash as it were, and this thing cannot consist in visualizing an image or picture. But it is certainly wrong to say that there is any meaning-endowing act that performs the task. It is quite obvious that if there is any sudden grasp of meaning of an expression then the meaning is already given to be grasped and created by any mental act. Wittgenstein does make a distinction between an idle talk and a significant talk. But he explains that the distinction does not consist in any mental processes. In his opinion an idle talk is idle or meaningless simply because it has no connections with the forms of life while a significant talk is part of a certain form of life. Not intention, but use is the basis of meaning in any natural language.

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30. P. 1. p. 78.

To understand Husserl's philosophy, there is an important difficulty which lies in the idea of 'intention'. Of course, there is a rough parallel. In the psychological sense "intention" means "stands for", "what is left over if we subtract the fact that B does not occur from the fact that A fails to <sup>31</sup> B". In the present case "meaning-intention" stands for the difference between a physical sign and the same sign used as a meaningful expression. Wittgenstein says: "An intention is embedded in its situation in human customs and institutions". <sup>32</sup> If there were no rules of playing chess, I could not intend to play a game of chess, says Wittgenstein. Again, he maintains that I can intend the construction of a sentence in advance, because I can only speak the language in question. But does this prove his point? The supporters of Husserl maintain that conventions of use are necessary for the meanings of expressions, but, they point out, conventions are not enough. Mere conventions cannot convert a mere sign into an expression. Only intention can play the trick. To my mind they are certainly wrong. As Wittgenstein has shown by citing a number of examples if intention is the necessary aspect of meaning then intention must be capable of turning any sign into a significant expression. Moreover I must be able to convey any sense by employing any selection of words. To give an example, I must be able to mean it is cold today by using the

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31. Chisholm, R. "Review of Anscombe's intention", PR, 1959, p. 112.

32. PI. p. 108.

sentence "it is hot today". But this is ridiculous. Here it is the use(s) that determines the meaning of an expression and not intention. Further, if intention alone is important then there is no possibility of a common language. No bearer can know for certain the intention of the speaker unless words have objective criteria of meaning.

After having considered the explanation of Husserl's notion of meaning-intention. Let us now come to the correlative-notion of "meaning-fulfilment", we see that the notion of "meaning-intention" is meant to explain what has been called merely symbolic understanding. Hence we have seen that verification is not a criterion of meaning. Expressions are meaningful prior to and independently of actual verification. Their meaningfulness is independent even of their verifiability. However, it is not deniable that the meaning of an expression makes an important relation to verificatory experience. In the intentional acts of meaning Husserl distinguishes between two points. Under the first come desire and wish. The other consists in objectifying acts. Objectifying acts are those which are capable of such identifying fulfilment. Meaning-intention consists of this group of objectifying intentional acts.  
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The meaning-intention is not an indefinite-indeterminate character waiting to be first determined and made

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33. Husserl, E., L.V. II, 2, pp. 51-52.

definite by the fulfilment experience.<sup>34</sup> It must be clearly seen that the relation between intention and fulfilment is not external.

As regards meaning C. S. Pierce maintains that symbols are distinguished from other 'signs' by the fact that their significance is conventional. Hoopers in his essay says, "... After one person or group decided to use this (a word) to stand for that, other people decided to do the same thing and the practice spread; that is, these symbols were adopted—<sup>35</sup> by common convention ...." And Ruby mentions that "A symbol, such as a word, designates a referent by agreement or convention. Human decision are thus required in order to establish the meaning of symbols and such decisions are arbitrary ones. Names arise as a result of human agreements, or stipulation".<sup>36</sup> But we can see that language arises by having decisions adopted by "Common-conventions".

So, it can be pointed out that no word of language has a fixed objective meaning. The objective meaning is only an abstraction, which is cut off from the living linguistic meaning, from the "immanent dialectic". And there would be no identical meanings, and no ideal meaning-unites. The meaning-situation may be considered either from the hearer

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34. Husserl, E. L.V. II, 1, p.98.

35. Hoopers, J. An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, p. 2.

36. Ruby, L. Logie, p. 20.

standpoint or from the speaker's standpoint. We may say that the speaker's standpoint is more compromising. The view is that the expression as spoken is the basic phenomenon, and the hearer's standpoint is that the expression as heard may be reduced to the expression as spoken. Both are however, possible because of common conventions.

Platonism, so far as the theory of meaning is concerned, involves the absurd thesis that when we understand an expression meaningfully, we are expecting some curious entities called meanings. Husserl is aware that in meaning-intending expression we are not objectively aware of the meaning itself. So the analysis begins with the distinction between subjective expressions and objective expressions. An expression is objective if it is possible to fix its meaning through its mere sound sensory appearance. An objective expression is equivocal in this sense that it is related to many different meanings in the same relationship.

An expression is subjective and occasional if it has "a conceptually unitary group of possible meanings", in such a sense that its actual meaning in any particular case is essentially dependent on the person using it. For example, such expressions are 'I', 'this', 'here' and so on. However, the supporter of Husserl cannot succeed in defending him against the charge of Platonism. It is true that Husserl is

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37. Mohanty, J.N., Husserl's Theory of Meaning, p. 78.

not a full-fledged Platonist, but ideality of meaning and the supposed-meaning-intention compel him to remain a Platonist.

To be fair to Husserl it must be said that he does not believe that every expression has its own independent meaning. His view is that although every expression has its own meaning, not every expression has independent meaning. The syncategorematic expressions have their own meanings, but their meanings are 'dependent'. The expressions which are categoric are called 'independent'. However, it is accepted that the meaning of syncategorematic expressions, suffers from two essential limitations. It is in a sense 'dependent' and claims supplementation. In all these points intentional theory is perfectly correct.

There are different ways of knowing and saying and in this way there are many ways in which linguistic entities are said to be meaningful. There are many modes of meaning-requirement. As linguistic activity is multifarious there will be many ways or modes in which linguistic entities can be said to be meaningful-cognitively meaningful, emotively meaningful, meaningful by being a well-formed formula-meaningful by virtue of being a product of an admissible operation etc.

We have examined some prominent theories of meaning, the referential theory, the ideational theory, the behavioural theory and the intentional theory of Husserl. I have tried to show that these theories are based on some genuine insights, but their propounders have failed to understand the correct

nature of these insights. Instead they have turned these insights into metaphysical dogmas. We use language to talk about objects both concrete and abstract; we do have certain ideas about both objects and thoughts; we have certain dispositions to respond to our utterances and finally we do intend our words to perform certain functions. But it does not mean that meaning of our words consist in referential relations, ideas, dispositions and intentions. In contrast to these theories we can understand Wittgenstein's position more clearly. He is not proposing any theory. He has simply described the nature of how all our language succeed in conveying meanings. As he has said, "we must look, not think". This approach is less likely to be misleading. Wittgenstein's criticism of the naming theory and the mental aspect theory has made it quite clear that words require their meanings in actual contexts. The actual contexts are the home of words. Other aspects are secondary and parasitic. We can conclude then that meaning is dependent on use and conventions. Wittgenstein's other theories may be defective and doubtful but his findings about the functions of language and the nature of meaning are basically correct.

## **B i b l i o g r a p h y**

B\_i\_b\_l\_i\_o\_g\_r\_a\_p\_h\_y

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